Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Ethics and Social Responsibility in the Life Sciences

Social Sciences and Humanities Research CouncilHomerton College, Cambridge, U.K.

Social Opportunities and Individual Responsibility: The Capability Approach and the Third Way

The fashionable widespreading of Sen’s ideas coincides with a new mood in the shaping of public policies in affluent societies. In Europe indeed, an “opportunity”-based approach to social security has been implemented through the European Employment Strategy. Public action tends to rely on a procedural concern with individual opportunities or potentialities in the labour market. The underlying ethics is that individuals are then responsible to use these background opportunities in order to lead the kind of life they value most. More broadly, the discourse and practice of the so-called “Third Way” shares with the capability approach an appeal for a procedural and enabling depiction of the role of the State. The paper intends to clarify the relation between procedural and opportunity-based approaches to social justice, among them the capability approach, and these new patterns of public action. Our vision goes in the way of a yet renewed, but deeper action of the welfare state, where social agency is envisaged as the very condition of individual agency. Drawing on the various critics of mainstream equality of opportunity, two opposed approaches to responsibility are identified: on the one hand, responsibility is conceived of as i) a “luck vs. choice” fixed starting point, ii) a backward-looking conception and iii) a highly individualistic framework. On the other hand, responsibility is envisaged as i) an outcome of public policies rather than a starting point, ii) a forward-looking conception, and iii) a combined institutional-individual framework. We situate here Sen’s capability approach, as well as critics of the luck egalitarianism path. The Third Way rhetoric is assessed against both these perspectives. The issue eventually boils down to an ethical reflection on the articulation of responsibilities, and to a pragmatic and substantial concern for the content of what providing security should mean in practice.

A Reading of the conception of man in Hans Jonas’ works: Between Nature and Responsibility. An Environmental Ethics Approach

Hans Jonas is considered one of the principal leaders of the ecological doctrine that fights against the hegemony of technical power upon society. We will study the conception of man in Jonas’ ideology through the lens of nature and of responsibility. He brandishes the specter of disaster (“heuristics of fear”) as a guard against technological excesses. He appeals to a prospective, universal and categorical responsibility to protect nature and to save future generations. Jonas considers responsibility as a method of anticipating the threat to that which is vulnerable, ephemeral, and perishable. Thus, the responsibility that Jonas decrees implies an ethics of conservation. Jonas’ writings aim to procure a new dimension of acting, which necessitates an ethics of foresight and responsibility.

Companies’ practices and social responsibility: cases of companies in the French tourist sector

This article examines the firms’practices in the French tourist sector. By confronting the concepts defined in the literature on the social responsibility and what really happens in companies, the current research shows that the studied firms implement a minimal social responsibility which remains well below the expectation level of some stakeholders. This situation is explained by several factors, namely structural. Finally, the paper suggests ways to improve the concept of social responsibility.

Who has responsibility for access to essential medical drugs in the developing world?

L’accès aux traitements de base est un enjeu crucial pour la santé, la pauvreté et le développement. La responsabilité en matière d’accès est alors une question essentielle. Le huitième Objectif du Millénaire pour le Développement postule qu’en coopération avec les firmes pharmaceutiques, l’accès aux traitements essentiels doit être assuré. Les principales parties prenantes qui doivent engager leur responsabilité pour l’accès aux médicaments sont (1) l’industrie pharmaceutique, (2) les gouvernements, (3) la société au sens large, et (4) les individus (qu’ils soient ou non malades). Quatre approches permettent d’appréhender la responsabilité: (a) l’approche déontologique; (b) l’utilitarisme; (c) l’égalitarisme; (b) l’approche basée sur les droits de l’homme. Ces quatre arguments peuvent être utilisés pour assigner une responsabilité aux gouvernements dans l’accès aux médicaments. Le papier conclut qu’il est parfois difficile de distinguer entre ces quatre approches et qu’un « glissement-d’échelle » de la responsabilité est une voie utile pour appréhender les rôles des quatre principales parties prenantes dans l’accès aux médicaments, dépendant du pays ou de la région et de son environnement interne.

Cosmopolitanism and confrontation : realizing consumer responsibility in a globalized marketplace

Ce mémoire explore des façons de conceptualiser la responsabilité dans des cas où des individus contribuent de façon peu significative à des torts collectifs éloignés. Pour contextualiser la discussion, la relation entre des actes de consommation et la perpétuation des « sweatshops » dans l’industrie des textiles et des chaussures est utilisée. Une approche basée sur les droits humains est déployée pour définir le tort qui est présent dans les usines de textiles et une conceptualisation de la connection est proposée selon la notion de la structure sociale. Guidé par la notion de « unstructured collective harms » proposée par Christopher Kutz, et en comparaison avec des notions de responsabilité qui mettent la responsabilité nationale en premier plan, les conclusions qui sont offertes ici sont centrées sur l’importance de la confrontation du consommateur pour remédier aux effets du problème d’action collective qui est au coeur de la création des torts collectifs lointains. Finalement, l’importance du cosmopolitanisme comme une façon de stabiliser des théories de responsabilité à travers les frontières est mis en évidence.

The Gaia Commission: Climate Change and Moral Responsibility

Travail créatif / Creative Work

Moral Responsibility in the Context of Prenatal Testing: What can be Expected?

Commentaire / Commentary

Implementing Revisionism: Assessing a Revisionist Theory of Moral Responsibility

The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory among others in the set of “revisionist” theories of moral responsibility, namely, Manuel Vargas’ version of the moral influence account of the justification of responsibility- specific practices. Moderate revisionism, which Vargas (2005) endorses, advocates a clear distinction between descriptive and normative questions, which enables a naturalistically plausible account of responsibility that does not jeopardize the normative aspect. However, while Vargas provides a useful framework for thinking about revisionism, I argue that despite its initial appeal, an actual revisionist theory does not seem to track as closely as we would like what I call the “meta-theory” of revisionism, viz. what Vargas defines as the features of moderate revisionism. Outlining these differences enables the formulation of observations about 1) the role of revisionist approaches for theorizing about moral responsibility and 2) how revisionism can be integrated with scientifically informed approaches.