Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Securing Tenure for Sustainable Livelihoods: A Case of Women Land Ownership in Anglophone Cameroon

The majority of women in Third World countries depend on land for their livelihood. Security of tenure is important for them to ensure sustainable development, especially in rural areas. In most parts of Africa, land ownership is affected by traditional values, inheritance rights, and government influence. These forces have provided varying types of tenure which are detrimental to the women in rural and urban areas. Land acquisition and its development has been an emotive issue due to traditional pressures and the law as regards the process of land certification. The government and traditional administrations are highly involved in the way women own land and subsequently develop it in Anglophone Cameroon. State authority over land acquisition is important, but the process for obtaining land title is herculean especially for the rural woman. This study illustrates that land acquisition and development by women constitute a problem because of traditional pressures and the law guiding the process of land certification. There is need to exhume the barriers of government’s legal instrument (The Land Consultative Board) that regulates the ownership of land and to revisit some traditional practices as regards land ownership that impact negatively on women in a changing and globalizing world. A compromise approach is advocated for land acquisition that can transcend traditional barriers as well as render the process of land registration more realistic especially for women.

Transferring ownership of public housing to existing tenants: a mechanism design approach

This paper explores situations where tenants in public houses, in a specific neighborhood, are given the legislated right to buy the houses they live in or can choose to remain in their houses and pay the regulated rent. This type of legislation has been passed in many European countries in the last 30-35 years (the U.K. Housing Act 1980 is a leading example). The main objective with this type of legislation is to transfer the ownership of the houses from the public authority to the tenants. To achieve this goal, selling prices of the public houses are typically heavily subsidized. The legislating body then faces a trade-off between achieving the goals of the legislation and allocating the houses efficiently. This paper investigates this specific trade-off and identifies an allocation rule that is individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable in a restricted preference domain that contains “almost all” preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified rule is the equilibrium selecting rule that transfers the maximum number of ownerships from the public authority to the tenants. This rule is preferred to the current U.K. system by both the existing tenants and the public authority. Finally, a dynamic process for finding the outcome of the identified rule, in a finite number of steps, is provided.