Directed Technical Change and International Trade

Recent changes in comparative advantage in the largest OECD economies differ significantly from the predictions of Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek theory. Japan's rising share of OECD machinery exports and the improvement in the comparative advantage of the USA and Germany in heavy industry were accompanied by growing scarcities of the factors used intensively in the favored sector of each country. Here we examine Acemoglu's (1998, 2002) hypothesis that technical change may be directed toward raising the marginal productivity of abundant factors. Testing this hypothesis with 1970-1992 export data from 14 OECD countries, we find evidence that international comparative advantage was reshaped by innovation biased toward the abundant factors in the largest economies.

Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation.

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Religion and Economic Growth: Was Weber Right?

Evidence of falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, during the spread of literacy in the vernacular, is inconsistent with most theoretical models of economic growth. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggested an alternative explanation based on culture. Here, a theoretical model confirms that a small change in the subjective cost of cooperating with strangers can generate a profound transformation in trading networks. In explaining urban growth in early-modern Europe, specifications compatible with human-capital versions of the neoclassical model and endogenous-growth theory are rejected in favor of a “small-world” formulation based on the Weber thesis.

Industrial Adjustment: Context, Causes, Impacts and Methods for Analysis

Adjustement is an ongoing process by which factors of reallocated to equalize their returns in different uses. Adjustment occurs though market mechanisms or intrafirm reallocation of resources as a result of changes in terms of trade, government policies, resource availability, technological change, etc. These changes alter production opportunities and production, transaction and information costs, and consequently modify production functions, organizational design, etc. In this paper we define adjustment (section 2); review empirical estimates of the extent of adjustment in Canada and abroad (section 3); review selected features of the trade policy and adjustment context of relevance for policy formulation among which: slow growth, a shift to services, a shift to the Pacific Rim, the internationalization of production, investment distribution communications the growing use of NTB's, changes in foreign direct investment patterns, intrafirm and intraindustry trade, interregional trade flows, differences in micro economic adjustment processes of adjustment as between subsidiaries and Canadian companies (section 4); examine methodologies and results of studies of the impact of trade liberalization on jobs (section 5); and review the R. Harris general equilibrium model (section 6). Our conclusion emphasizes the importance of harmonizing commercial and domestic policies dealing with adjustment (section 7). We close with a bibliography of relevant publications.

Statistical Inference for Computable General Equilibrium Models with Application to a Model of the Moroccan Economy

We study the problem of measuring the uncertainty of CGE (or RBC)-type model simulations associated with parameter uncertainty. We describe two approaches for building confidence sets on model endogenous variables. The first one uses a standard Wald-type statistic. The second approach assumes that a confidence set (sampling or Bayesian) is available for the free parameters, from which confidence sets are derived by a projection technique. The latter has two advantages: first, confidence set validity is not affected by model nonlinearities; second, we can easily build simultaneous confidence intervals for an unlimited number of variables. We study conditions under which these confidence sets take the form of intervals and show they can be implemented using standard methods for solving CGE models. We present an application to a CGE model of the Moroccan economy to study the effects of policy-induced increases of transfers from Moroccan expatriates.

Explaining the Great Divergence: Medium and Message on the Eurasian Land Mass, 1700-1850

Between 1700 and 1850, per-capita income doubled in Europe while falling in the rest of Eurasia. Neither geography nor economic institutions can explain this sudden divergence. Here the consequences of differences in communications technology are examined. For the first time, there appeared in Europe a combination of a standardized medium (national vernaculars with a phonetic alphabet) and a non-standardized message (competing religious, political and scientific ideas). The result was an unprecedented fall in the cost of combining ideas and burst of productivity-raising innovation. Elsewhere, decreasing standardization of the medium and increasing standardization of the message blocked innovation.

Economic Development under Alternative Trade Regimes

How does openness affect economic development? This question is answered in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy, where countries have technological differences that are both sector-neutral and specific to the investment goods sector. Relative to a benchmark case of trade in credit markets only, consider (i) a complete restriction of trade, and (ii) a full liberalization of trade. The first change decreases the cross-sectional dispersion of incomes only slightly, and produces a relatively small welfare loss. The second change, instead, decreases dispersion by a significant amount, and produces a very large welfare gain.

Communication and Economic Growth.

Overs the past millennium, each of the three centuries of most rapid demographic growth in the West Coincided with the diffusion of a new communications technology. This paper examines the hypothesis of Harold Innis (1894-1952) that there is two-way feeback between such innovations and economic growth.

Economic integration in North America: Formal, Informal and Spatial Aspects.

An exemination of a series of indicators of economic integration in the western hemisphere (Canada-USA-Latin America) indicates that it is proceeding under the influence of formal trade agreements and informal forces including technological change, multinational firm rationalization and location strategies, etc.

How Prescribed Policy Can Mislead when Data Are Defective: a Follow-Up to Srinivasan (1994) Using General Equilibrium.

We highlight an example of considerable bias in officially published input-output data (factor-income shares) by an LDC (Turkey), which many researchers use without question. We make use of an intertemporal general equilibrium model of trade and production to evaluate the dynamic gains for Turkey from currently debated trade policy options and compare the predictions using conservatively adjusted, rather than official, data on factor shares.

The Rise and Decline of the East German Economy, 1949-1989.

Why do some organizations decline while other do not? to study this issue , we introduce technological change into a theory of agency proposed by Laffont and Tirole. We show that the optimal organizational form for production depends on the estent of scale ecoomies and on the cost of monitoring workers. When the discrepancy between ideal and actual forms becomes too great, an organization's viability is threatened. We test this structuralist hypothesis for East and west Gemany over the 1949-1989 period. east Germany's relative decline is explained by an institutional structure the proved incompatible with technological change favoring smaller, flatter organizations.