Impacts de la compétition électorale sur les inégalités de revenus au Brésil

Ce mémoire a pour but d’étudier si le fait d’avoir des élections compétitives au Brésil a mené à des politiques de redistribution de revenus plus efficaces. Le chapitre 1 présente les critères retenus pour mesurer la compétitivité électorale au poste de Gouverneur. À partir des 27 États du pays, on distingue un groupe de 5 États où la compétition électorale est forte et un autre groupe de 5 États pour lequel elle est faible. Pour chacun de ces groupes, un État a été retenu. Le chapitre 2 détaille les facteurs qui expliquent les inégalités au Brésil. La suite du mémoire se consacre à l’analyse des politiques favorisant une meilleure redistribution de revenus pour l’État retenu de chaque groupe (chapitre 3) et pour l’ensemble des deux groupes (chapitre 4). L’analyse révèle qu’un plus important niveau de compétition électorale ne mène pas nécessairement à de meilleures politiques de redistribution de revenus.

Party Members as an Electoral Linking Mechanism

While party membership figures are clearly in decline in several Western countries, different interpretations have been offered on the likely consequences of this trend. Some authors stress that members have lost most of their importance for political parties that increasingly rely on professionalized campaign techniques. Other scholars have expressed concern about the decline of party membership. They emphasize the fact that party members continue to function as an important linkage mechanism providing a structural alignment between the party and society (and thus also to potential voters). By means of an election forecasting model for Belgium, we test whether party membership figures still can be related to election results. Results show that party membership has a strong effect on election results, and furthermore, that this relation does not weaken during the period under investigation (1981-2010). The analysis also demonstrates that forecasting models can also be used in a complex multiparty system like Belgium.

Electoral Volatility, Political Sophistication, Trust and Efficacy

In this article we investigate voter volatility and analyze the causes and motives of switching vote intentions. We test two main sets of variables linked to volatility in literature; political sophistication and ‘political (dis)satisfaction’. Results show that voters with low levels of political efficacy tend to switch more often, both within a campaign and between elections. In the analysis we differentiate between campaign volatility and inter-election volatility and by doing so show that the dynamics of a campaign have a profound impact on volatility. The campaign period is when the lowly sophisticated switch their vote intention. Those with higher levels of interest in politics have switched their intention before the campaign has started. The data for this analysis are from the three wave PartiRep Belgian Election Study (2009).

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.