Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation.

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

Depoliticization, instrumentalization and legitimacy of Czech development cooperation: A case of imposed altruism?

This paper draws on James Ferguson’s concept of ‘anti-politics machine’ and Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of illusio to explore the nature of the international development cooperation programmes financed by the Czech government. It argues that its character as an ‘anti-politics machine’ turns development into a highly technical issue and dismisses essential political questions of global equity and policy coherence from the public debate. Moreover, the actors in the field of development cooperation are held in an illusio: they are required to appear as altruistic, which obscures their particular interests. This instrumentalization of development aid contributes to further isolation of the Czech development constituency and raises fundamental questions for the democratic legitimacy of development cooperation.

Les répercussions du plan Marshall sur les comportements économiques du Canada durant la période de l'après-guerre

La période de l’après-guerre posa d’importants défis commerciaux à l’économie canadienne. Les années entre 1945 et 1950 furent effectivement marquées par la rupture de son système commercial traditionnel et la recherche d’une stratégie alternative. Le pays dut composer avec un déficit commercial croissant à l’égard des États-Unis, ainsi qu’une chute de ses exportations à destination du Royaume-Uni, ruiné par les années de guerre. Ce déséquilibre commercial qui menaçait d’épuiser les réserves canadiennes de dollars américains reflétait l’écart entre les capacités productives des deux rives de l’Atlantique. Le programme de reconstruction des économies européennes, ou plan Marshall, fut accueilli avec enthousiasme à Ottawa puisqu’il devait non seulement rétablir les marchés du Vieux Continent, mais également faciliter la mise en place d’un réseau multilatéral d’échanges et la libéralisation du commerce international. Les tensions de la guerre froide limitèrent toutefois l’ouverture de ces marchés aux marchandises canadiennes, puisque l’endiguement du communisme commanda une consolidation européenne qui privilégia le démantèlement des entraves aux échanges intra-européens, aux dépens du commerce transatlantique. Les préoccupations de Washington en matière de sécurité collective devaient néanmoins laisser place à une stratégie alternative pour le Canada, en poussant la coopération économique des deux pays, dans le but d’optimiser une production de défense destinée aux pays membres de l’OTAN, dont la demande était soutenue par l’aide Marshall. L’incorporation du Canada dans ce dispositif de défense élargie à la communauté atlantique permit ainsi d’assurer un accès privilégié à ses marchandises sur le marché américain, et par conséquent de progresser vers l’équilibre commercial.