The law and economics of good faith in the civil law of contract

Good faith plays a central role in most legal systems, yet appears to be an intractable concept. This article proposes to analyse it economically as the absence of opportunism in circumstances which lend themselves to it. One of the objectives underlying the law of contract on an economic view is to curtail opportunism. In spelling out what this means, the paper proposes a three-step test: bad faith is present where a substantial informational or other asymmetry exists between the parties, which one of them turns into an undue advantage, considered against the gains both parties could normally expect to realise through the contract, and where loss to the disadvantaged party is so serious as to provoke recourse to expensive self-protection, which significantly raises transactions costs in the market. The three-step test is then used to analyse a set of recent decisions in international commercial transactions and three concepts derived from good faith: fraud, warranty for latent defects and lesion.

Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

How to measure the intensity of competition : the mark-up estates for turkish manufacturing industries.

Rapport de recherche

The Economics Of Civil Law Contract And Of Good Faith

Prepared for the Symposium in honour of Michael J. Trebilcock, 1-2 October 2009, in Toronto

The Civil Law Of Contract

Cet article sera publié dans Ghent Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Gerrit De Geest (General Editor), 2nd edition, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2010.

Neutrality and the social contract

Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.

Choice of contract maturity with applications to international and mortgage lending

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Wage Discrimination Between White and Visible Minority Immigrants in the Canadian Manufacturing Sector.

Rapport de recherche présenté à la Faculté des arts et des sciences en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en sciences économiques.

Impact de la nouvelle loi sur le contrat du travail (dite «loi de 2008») sur les stratégies de gestion des multinationales étrangères en chine

En Chine la croissance économique observée durant ces trois dernières décennies, s’est accompagnée d’importants changements sociaux. Jusqu’en 2008, le droit du travail hérité de l’ère socialiste et inadapté à l’économie de marché, servait les intérêts de la croissance au détriment de ceux des travailleurs. La nouvelle loi sur le contrat de travail de 2008 a pour ambition de corriger cette situation en rééquilibrant les relations du travail dans un contexte de redistribution plus juste des nouvelles richesses. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre comment les entreprises étrangères présentes en Chine appréhendent ce changement institutionnel. Cela impacte-t-il leur gestion et leur stratégie de localisation ? Cette question est traitée, à travers l’étude du cas d’une entreprise étrangère implantée à Shanghai depuis 10 ans. Le premier effet observé est une professionnalisation du secteur des ressources humaines. L’augmentation des coûts de fonctionnement à laquelle la nouvelle loi participe a également pour effet une relocalisation des activités de production dans des régions à moindres coûts dans le centre de la Chine. L’expertise spécifiquement acquise localement est une des raisons majeures interdisant une délocalisation dans un pays tierce.