First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

L'expérience anglaise des appels d'offres obligatoires (Compulsory competitive tendering).

Rapport de recherche

Identidty, displacement and embodiment in women's independent cinema

Ma thèse examine les déplacements multiples – déportation, exil, voyage – et l‟expérience diasporique de différentes communautés ethniques dans le cinéma indépendant de trois réalisatrices et artistes contemporaines : Julie Dash, Rea Tajiri et Trinh T. Minh-ha. J‟analyse la déconstruction et reconstruction de l‟identité à travers le voyage et autres déplacements physiques ainsi que les moyens d‟expression et stratégies cinématographiques utilisées par ces artistes pour articuler des configurations identitaires mouvantes. Je propose de nouvelles lectures de la position des femmes dans des milieux culturels différents en considérant la danse comme une métaphore de la reconfiguration de l‟identité féminine qui se différencie et s‟émancipe des traditions culturelles classiques. Les expériences de l‟histoire et de la mémoire, qui sont vécues dans les corps des femmes, sont aussi exprimées par le biais des relations intermédiales entre la photographie, la vidéo et le film qui proposent des images de femmes variées et complexes.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.