Which Legal Standards Should Apply To Web-logs? The present legal position of Internet journals in the European iuris prudence in the light of the European Parliament Committee’s on Culture and Education report and Polish Supreme Court decision

The article discusses the present status of weblogs and examines whether legal standards applicable to traditional press and media should be applied to that specific forum. The analysis is based on two key documents: the Draft Report on the concentration and pluralism in the media in European Union (2007/2253(INI)) of the European Parliament Committee on Culture and Education presented in March 2008 and a landmark decision of the Polish Supreme Court from July 26, 2007 (IV KK 174/07) in the light of present judicial tendency in other European countries. The first of the mentioned documents calls for the “clarification of the legal status of different categories of weblog authors and publishers as well as disclosure of interests and voluntary labelling of weblogs”. It emphasizes that the “undetermined and unindicated status of authors and publishers of weblogs causes uncertainties regarding impartiality, reliability, source protection, applicability of ethical codes and the assignment of liability in the event of lawsuits”. The position of the European Parliament, expressed in the document, raises serious questions on the limits of freedom of thought and speech on the Internet and on the degree of acceptable state control. A recent Polish Supreme Court decision, which caused quite a stir in the Polish Internet community, seems to head in the very direction recommended by the EP Culture Committee. In a case of two editors of a web journal (“czasopismo internetowe”) called “Szyciepoprzemysku”, available on-line, accused of publishing a journal without the proper registration, the Polish Supreme Court stated that “journals and periodicals do not lose the character of a press release due solely to the fact that they appear in the form of an  Internet transmission”, and that ‘’the publishing of press in an electronic form, available on the Internet, requires  registration”. The decision was most surprising, as prior lower courts decisions declined the possibility to register Internet periodicals. The accused were acquitted in the name of the constitutional principle of the rule of law (art. 7 of the Polish Constitution) and the ensuing obligation to protect the trust of a citizen to the state (a conviction in this case would break the collateral estoppel rule), however the decision quickly awoke media frenzy and raised the fear of a need to register all websites that were regularly updated. The spokesman of the Polish Supreme Court later explained that the sentence of the Court was not intended to cause a mass registration of all Internet “periodicals” and that neither weblogs nor Internet sites, that were regularly updated, needed registration. Such an interpretation of the Polish press law did not appear clear based only on the original text of the judgment and the decision as such still raises serious practical questions. The article aims to examine the status of Internet logs as press and seeks the compromise between the concerns expressed by European authorities and the freedom of thought and speech exercised on the Internet.

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies.

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

Arrow's Theorem in Spatial Environments

In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2n strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corrollary, we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave. When the policy space is multi-dimensional, we establish Arrow's impossibility theorem. Among others, we show that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Population Ethics and the Value of Life

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.

Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions

This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.

The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

The Dynamic (In)efficiency of Monetary Policy by Committee

This paper develops a model where the value of the monetary policy instrument is selected by a heterogenous committee engaged in a dynamic voting game. Committee members differ in their institutional power and, in certain states of nature, they also differ in their preferred instrument value. Preference heterogeneity and concern for the future interact to generate decisions that are dynamically ineffcient and inertial around the previously-agreed instrument value. This model endogenously generates autocorrelation in the policy variable and provides an explanation for the empirical observation that the nominal interest rate under the central bank’s control is infrequently adjusted.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Monetary Policy by Committee:Consensus, Chairman Dominance or Simple Majority?

This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under three different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where super-majority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; and a simple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks. The models are estimated by Maximum Likehood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the consensus model is statically superior to the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutionnal differences, committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions.

Quelle régulation pour l’arrêt d’un protocole de recherche clinique de thérapie génique somatique ? État des lieux auprès des cliniciens-chercheurs européens

Depuis 2002, le débat sur les risques associés à la thérapie génique est initié suite à l’annonce que deux enfants inclus dans un essai thérapeutique impliquant une thérapie génique ont développé des effets indésirables important. En Janvier 2005, le débat sur les risques reprit suite à l’interruption du protocole sur les enfants bulle du Pr Fischer à l’hôpital Necker de Paris. Nous avons donc étudié le processus impliqué ainsi que la réflexion éthique associée aux décisions d’arrêt de protocole de recherche. Notre travail a été mené par une équipe pluridisciplinaire combinant chercheurs en santé, généticiens et éthiciens. Nous avons étudié la participation des chercheurs, des patients, des institutions officielles, des comités d’éthique ainsi que des associations de patients dans le processus de décision d’interruption d’un protocole de recherche.Nous avons également analysé les critères jugés les plus pertinents dans l’arrêt d’un protocole de recherche. Enfin nous avons analysé le point de vue des personnes directement impliquées dans la thérapie génique au moyen d’un questionnaire. Toutes les personnes contactées ont présenté un poster de recherche au congrès de la Société Européenne de Thérapie Génique. 62 personnes d’autant d’équipes de recherche différentes, de 17 pays, sur les 350 contactés ont répondu. Selon eux, la décision d’arrêt d’un protocole de recherche doit être prise suite à une consultation des chercheurs, des patients, du ministère de tutelle, d’une agence nationale de régulation ou d’un comité d’éthique ; la légitimité étant accordée à des décisions prises en commun par les chercheurs, les patients et les comités d’éthique. Les incidents sérieux et de façon plus surprenante, les incidents moins graves sont jugés comme étant des critères suffisants pour interrompre un essai. Nous avons fini par analyser les conséquences éthiques, telles que balance bénéfice/risque, processus de régulation ou responsabilité, de ces critères sur l’arrêt d’un protocole de recherche.