Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.

Understanding economic decision-making under social norms prescribing behaviours

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Le libérallisme politique de John Rawls et la reconnaissance des peuples

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Quels principes de justice pour la sphère internationale ? : une critique de Rawls

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Dialogue sur l'avenir de la démocratie libérale : John Rawls, Richard Rorty et Leo Strauss

Réalisé en cotutelle avec l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne (Paris IV).

Démocratie et justice sociale : Arrow-Harsanyi- Rawls-Sen, un quatuor dissonant

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