The law and economics of good faith in the civil law of contract

Good faith plays a central role in most legal systems, yet appears to be an intractable concept. This article proposes to analyse it economically as the absence of opportunism in circumstances which lend themselves to it. One of the objectives underlying the law of contract on an economic view is to curtail opportunism. In spelling out what this means, the paper proposes a three-step test: bad faith is present where a substantial informational or other asymmetry exists between the parties, which one of them turns into an undue advantage, considered against the gains both parties could normally expect to realise through the contract, and where loss to the disadvantaged party is so serious as to provoke recourse to expensive self-protection, which significantly raises transactions costs in the market. The three-step test is then used to analyse a set of recent decisions in international commercial transactions and three concepts derived from good faith: fraud, warranty for latent defects and lesion.

Environmental Risks : Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Temporary Natural Resource Cartels

We analyze the behavior of a nonrenewable resource cartel that anticipates being forced, at some date in the future, to break-up into an oligopolistic market in which its members will then have to compete as rivals. Under reasonable assumptions about the value function of the individual firms in the oligopolistic equilibrium that follows the break-up, we show that the cartel will then produce more over the same interval of time than it would if there were no threat of dissolution, and that its rate of extraction is a decreasing function of the cartel's life; that there are circumstances under which the cartel will attach a negative marginal value to the resource stocks, in which case the rate of depletion will be increasing over time during the cartel phase; that, for a given date of dissolution, the equilibrium stocks allocated to the post-cartel phase will increase as a function of the total initial stocks, whereas those allocated to the cartel phase will increase at first, but begin decreasing beyond some level of the total initial stocks.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

Parliamentary Debates in Statutory Interpretation: A Question of Admissibility or of Weight?

The article was first published in the McGill Law Journal. Un résumé en français est disponible.

Driedger's 'Modern Principle' at the Supreme Court of Canada: Interpretation, Justification, Legitimization

Un résumé en français est également disponible

On the Manipulability of Proportional Representation

This paper presents a new model of voter behaviour under methods of proportional representation (PR). We abstract away from rounding, and assume that a party securing k percent of the vote wins exactly k percent of the available seats. Under this assumption PR is not manipulable by any voter aiming at maximisation of the number of seats in the parliament of her most preferred party. However in this paper we assume that voters are concerned, first and foremost, with the distribution of power in the post-election parliament. We show that, irrespective of which positional scoring rule is adopted, there will always exist circumstances where a voter would have an incentive to vote insincerely. We demonstrate that a voter’s attitude toward uncertainty can influence her incentives to make an insincere vote. Finally, we show that the introduction of a threshold - a rule that a party must secure at least a certain percentage of the vote in order to reach parliament - creates new opportunities for strategic voting. We use the model to explain voter behaviour at the most recent New Zealand general election.

Les obligations du franchiseur : étude du droit civil et du guide d'Unidroit sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.

Les questions de compétence internationale des tribunaux québécois soulevées par le recours collectif multi-juridictionnel : pragmatisme ou cohérence théorique

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LL.M. en droit des affaires"

Le hardship : vers une reconnaissance du principe par les tribunaux arbitraux du commerce international

"Mémoire présenté à la faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise, option droit des affaires (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 10% des mémoires de la discipline.

Juger les lois la légitimité démocratique et la fonction du contrôle judiciaire de constitutionnalité

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de doctorat en droit (LL.D.)"

L'intérêt d'assurance comme élément constitutif de la déclaration initiale de risque en assurance de dommages

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)"

Aspects de droit d'auteur liés à la distribution d'oeuvres cinématographiques par Internet au Canada

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit des technologies de l'information"

La légitimité d'une éventuelle application de la thérapie germinale humaine : les aspects juridiques et éthiques

La thérapie germinale est une avenue médicale qui est loin de pouvoir être appliquée de manière sécuritaire et responsable car les connaissances médicales actuelles sont insuffisantes. De surcroît, l'encadrement normatif qui l'entoure est unanime et clame la non-acceptabilité de son application humaine. Certains instruments adoptent une approche rigide en la prohibant formellement, d'autres adoptent une approche flexible en demeurant ouverts à une éventuelle application. Il y a donc divergence quant à la légitimité de cette technique. La médecine moderne doit reposer sur des principes directeurs issus de diverses sources, empruntées au droit et à l'éthique. Les principes retenus pour examiner la légitimité de la thérapie germinale sont tirés, d'une part, des droits et libertés fondamentales: ce sont les principes fondamentaux de dignité, de liberté, d'égalité. D'autre part, ils sont issus des règles d'éthique de la recherche: plus particulièrement le principe de bienfaisance (nonmalfaisance) et celui du respect de la personne. La perspective d'une éventuelle application humaine de la thérapie germinale ne porte pas nécessairement atteinte aux principes fondamentaux, dépendamment du genre d'application qui est envisagé. Une application restreinte, appliquée dans des circonstances particulières et en vue de soulager ou d'éliminer certaines formes de détresses et de souffrances, pourrait être conforme aux principes qui soutiennent les droits et libertés fondamentales. La thérapie germinale soulève des questions éthiques difficiles et parfois inédites, notamment l'extension des risques aux générations futures et l'obligation d'un suivi à long terme pour des descendants qui n'auront pas eux-mêmes donné leur consentement à cette «thérapie». La thérapie germinale est présentement non acceptable mais ne devrait pas faire l'objet d'une prohibition totale.