Asia-Pacific: a new agenda for the times ahead

The rapid growth of the populous Asian economies provokes profound economic changes and a shift in the balance of power. On the economic front, Asian leaders are confronted with the need to preserve the stability that has underpinned their prosperity, maintain an environment conducive to trade and investments and encourage domestic consumption while avoiding ecological disasters. Internationally, business competition will intensify with the strong presence of Asian manufacturers in global supply chains, growing price competition from Asian firms in domestic markets and global competition for energy, food, minerals and other commodities. Geopolitical concerns stem, in part, from Asia’s global quest for critical resources, conflicting territorial and maritime disputes and increasing military expenditures which affect security dynamics. China’s assertiveness over its periphery prompts an arm’s race in the region and concerns about Sino-American relations even though U.S.-Chinese relations may be less risky than China’s relations with its neighbours. The United States remains a key player in the Asia-Pacific region, with the capacity to alter balances and affect outcomes. Globally, the United States capacity to lead is now diminished and will continue to be so for the foreseeable future. Since no rising power is capable of exercising global leadership, a return to the "old normal" where no one power in geopolitical or economic terms dominates the world is to be expected.

Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies.

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Could the Asian Crisis Have Been More Accurately Predicted? Improving and Early Warning System Model.

Rapport de recherche

Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.

We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. the efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible.

Dynamic linear economies with social interactions

Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to e.g., peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure strategies), ergodicity, and welfare results. Also, we characterize equilibria in terms of agents' policy function, spatial equilibrium correlations and social multiplier effects, depending on the nature of interactions. Most importantly, we study formally the issue of the identification of social interactions, with special emphasis on the restrictions imposed by dynamic equilibrium conditions.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.