La structure de marché dans l'industrie brassicole au Canada.

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Gestion des listes d'attente: le cas des chirurgies.

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L'impact de l'accord de libre-échange entre le Canada et les États-Unis sur l'emploi manufacturier canadien.

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La demande de télédistribution au Canada: une étude empirique.

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Analyse de la consommation d'électricité de la clientèle résidentielle du Québec.

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Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas

A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

Bundling under the Threat of Parallel Trade

This paper examines the use of bundling by a firm that sells in two national markets and faces entry by parallel traders. The firm can bundle its main product, - a tradable good- with a non-traded service. It chooses between the strategies of pure bundling, mixed bundling and no bundling. The paper shows that in the low-price country the threat of grey trade elicits a move from mixed bundling, or no bundling, towards pure bundling. It encourages a move from pure bundling towards mixes bundling or no bundling in the high-price country. The set of parameter values for which the profit maximizing strategy is not to supply the low price country is smaller than in the absence of bundling. The welfare effects of deterrence of grey trade are not those found in conventional models of price arbitrage. Some consumers in the low-price country may gain from the threat of entry by parallel traders although they pay a higher price. This is due to the fact that the firm responds to the threat of arbitrageurs by increasing the amount of services it puts in the bundle targeted at consumers in that country. Similarly, the threat of parallel trade may affect some consumers in the hight-price country adversely.

L'influence du risque spécifique des travailleurs sur les firmes: une explication de la discrimination salariale.

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Le ‘Efficient Component Pricing Rule’ en tant que tarif d'accès aux réseaux dans le domaine des télécommunications.

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L'efficacité des fusions horizontales : le cas de la défense d'efficience.

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