845 resultados para RMR de Montréal


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Affiliation: Pascal Michel : Département de pathologie et microbiologie, Faculté dedecine vétérinaire, Université de Montréal

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Affiliation: Maude Loignon, Lise Cyr & Emil Toma : Département de microbiologie et immunologie, Faculté dedecine, Université de Montréal

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Affiliation: Unité de recherche en Arthrose, Centre de recherche du Centre Hospitalier de l'Université de Montréal, Hôpital Notre-Dame

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Présentation vulgarisée pour faire apparaitre le potentiel de transformation de service et de soutien de services communs d'une pareille infrastructure.

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Affiliation: H. Philippe: Département de Biochimie, Université de Montréal

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Affiliation: Département de Biochimie, Université de Montréal

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Affiliation: Département de Biochimie, Université de Montréal

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Affiliation: J. O'Loughlin: Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, Centre de recherche CHUM, Université de Montréal

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Traduction française de l'article du professeur David Vaver, « The public image of publishers and copyright ». Texte d’une présentation au 6e Symposium international sur le droit d’auteur de l’Union internationale des éditeurs, tenu à Montréal, les 24-26 avril 2006.

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Rapport annuel des activités de la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal en 2005-2006.

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Présentation donnée le 1er mars 2007 à l'Association des bibliothèques de droit de Montréal (ABDM) / Montreal Association of Law Libraries (MALL).

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We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that for stable (matching) mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under complete information and Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. That is,given a common belief, a strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common belief, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true profile in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism. This result may help to explain the success of stable mechanisms in these markets.