386 resultados para Jeux de mots
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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
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Ce mémoire s’intéresse aux processus de formation de mots. Nous postulons que les notions de productivité et de polysémie guident les locuteurs dans la sélection des procédés de formation de mots. Afin de vérifier notre hypothèse, nous avons porté nos observations sur un répertoire de mots suffixés de l’espagnol, le « Diccionario de los sufijos de la lengua española (DISULE) » de Faitelson-Weiser (2010, cf. www.sufijos.lli.ulaval.ca ). Nous avons évalué les degrés de productivité et de polysémie de chaque segment identifié comme étant un suffixe. Nous avons ensuite mis en relation les valeurs obtenues pour chacune des propriétés. Cette démarche, que nous avons testée, reconnaît le morphème comme unité d’analyse, ce qui se correspond au modèle grammatical Item et arrangement (Hockett, 1954). Bien que le résultat de nos analyses ne nous permette pas d’établir des corrélations fortes entre les deux variables pour l’ensemble des suffixes, lorsque nous délimitons des contextes de concurrence spécifiques, nous pouvons constater que les relations entre productivité et polysémie suivent des patrons spécifiques à ceux-ci. En outre, nous remarquons que le modèle adopté est plus efficace dans la description de la polysémie que pour expliquer la productivité; ce qui nous amène à nous questionner sur la pertinence de l’opposition établie entre mot et morphème en tant qu’unités d’analyse. Nous concluons que les deux notions sont essentielles en morphologie.
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Dans le cadre du cours PHT-6123 : Travail d’intégration
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It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.
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This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.
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The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.
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A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.
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This paper tests the predictions of the Barro-Gordon model using US data on inflation and unemployment. To that end, it constructs a general game-theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model and a version of Cukierman’s model as special cases. Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of Cukierman’s model is not. Reduced-form estimates are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate.
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We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.
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We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.
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We propose methods for testing hypotheses of non-causality at various horizons, as defined in Dufour and Renault (1998, Econometrica). We study in detail the case of VAR models and we propose linear methods based on running vector autoregressions at different horizons. While the hypotheses considered are nonlinear, the proposed methods only require linear regression techniques as well as standard Gaussian asymptotic distributional theory. Bootstrap procedures are also considered. For the case of integrated processes, we propose extended regression methods that avoid nonstandard asymptotics. The methods are applied to a VAR model of the U.S. economy.