Fidélité et validité des mesures de force de la pince et du pouce chez les sujets ayant une maladie de De Quervain

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Étude de la fidélité des paramètres de la raideur passive de l'articulation de la hanche et analyse de leurs relations avec les mesures cliniques

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Problème des données manquantes dans un plan d'analyse de variance à mesures répétées

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

Mesures physiologiques de la réactivité émotionnelle des personnes souffrant d'acouphènes

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

« Médecine à deux vitesses à la manière de SUCCESs » ou « Deux poids deux mesures ou Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi c'est-à-dire : "ce qui est permis à Jupiter ne l'est pas auxvaches" »

Travail créatif / Creative Work

Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

The Axiomatic Approach to Population Ethics

This paper examines several families of population principles in the light of a set of axioms. In addition to the critical-level utilitarian, number-sensitive critical-level utilitarian and number-dampened families and their generalized counterparts, we consider the restricted number-dampened family (suggested by Hurka) and introduce two new families : the restricted critical-level and restricted number-dependent critical-level families. Subsets of the restricted families have nonnegative critical levels and avoid both the repugnant and sadistic conclusions but fail to satisfy an important independence condition. We defend the critical-level principles with positive critical levels.

The Measurement of Diversity

The notion of diversity is an issue that is of relevance in several contexts. For example, the biodiversity of a given ecological environment and the diversity of the options available to a decision maker have attracted some attention in recent research. This paper provides an axiomatic approach to the measurement of diversity. We characterize two nested classes of ordinal measures of diversity and an important member of these classes. We prove that the latter special case is equivalent to a diversity ordering proposed by Weitzman.

Similarity of Options and the Measurement of Diversity

This paper analyzes the measurement of the diversity of sets based on the dissimilarity of the objects contained in the set. We discuss axiomatic approaches to diversity measurement and examine the considerations underlying the application of specific measures. Our focus is on descriptive issues: rather than assuming a specific ethical position or restricting attention to properties that are appealing in specific applications, we address the foundations of the measurement issue as such in the context of diversity.

Responsibility and Cross-Subsidization in Cost Sharing

We propose two axiomatic theories of cost sharing with the common premise that agents demand comparable -though perhaps different- commodities and are responsible for their own demand. Under partial responsibility the agents are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function: two agents consuming the same amount of output always pay the same price; this holds true under full responsibility only if the cost function is symmetric in all individual demands. If the cost function is additively separable, each agent pays her stand alone cost under full responsibility; this holds true under partial responsibility only if, in addition, the cost function is symmetric. By generalizing Moulin and Shenker’s (1999) Distributivity axiom to cost-sharing methods for heterogeneous goods, we identify in each of our two theories a different serial method. The subsidy-free serial method (Moulin, 1995) is essentially the only distributive method meeting Ranking and Dummy. The cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont, 1998) is the only distributive method satisfying Separability and Strong Ranking. Finally, we propose an alternative characterization of the latter method based on a strengthening of Distributivity.

Population Ethics and the Value of Life

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.

Correcting the Errors : A Note on Volatility Forecast Evaluation Based on High-Frequency Data and Realized Volatilities

This note develops general model-free adjustment procedures for the calculation of unbiased volatility loss functions based on practically feasible realized volatility benchmarks. The procedures, which exploit the recent asymptotic distributional results in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2002a), are both easy to implement and highly accurate in empirically realistic situations. On properly accounting for the measurement errors in the volatility forecast evaluations reported in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2003), the adjustments result in markedly higher estimates for the true degree of return-volatility predictability.

Exact Skewness-Kurtosis Tests for Multivariate Normality and Goodness-of-fit in Multivariate Regressions with Application to Asset Pricing Models

We study the problem of testing the error distribution in a multivariate linear regression (MLR) model. The tests are functions of appropriately standardized multivariate least squares residuals whose distribution is invariant to the unknown cross-equation error covariance matrix. Empirical multivariate skewness and kurtosis criteria are then compared to simulation-based estimate of their expected value under the hypothesized distribution. Special cases considered include testing multivariate normal, Student t; normal mixtures and stable error models. In the Gaussian case, finite-sample versions of the standard multivariate skewness and kurtosis tests are derived. To do this, we exploit simple, double and multi-stage Monte Carlo test methods. For non-Gaussian distribution families involving nuisance parameters, confidence sets are derived for the the nuisance parameters and the error distribution. The procedures considered are evaluated in a small simulation experi-ment. Finally, the tests are applied to an asset pricing model with observable risk-free rates, using monthly returns on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) portfolios over five-year subperiods from 1926-1995.

Efficient Priority Rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”