Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S.

This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.

The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

Rational Choice on Arbitrary Domains: A Comprehensive Treatment

The rationalizability of a choice function on arbitrary domains by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. Moreover, characterizations of various versions of consistent rationalizability have appeared in recent contributions. However, not much seems to be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on a rationalization. The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant gap. We provide characterizations of all forms of rationalizability involving quasi-transitive or P-acyclical rationalizations on arbitrary domains.

Domain Closedness Conditions and Rational Choice

The rationalizability of a choice function on an arbitrary domain under various coherence properties has received a considerable amount of attention both in the long-established and in the recent literature. Because domain closedness conditions play an important role in much of rational choice theory, we examine the consequences of these requirements on the logical relationships among different versions of rationalizability. It turns out that closedness under intersection does not lead to any results differing from those obtained on arbitrary domains. In contrast, closedness under union allows us to prove an additional implication.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

Respecting Priorities when Assigning Students to Schools

We consider the problem of assigning students to schools on the basis of priorities. Students are allowed to have equal priority at a school. We characterize the efficient rules which weakly/strongly respect students’ priorities. When priority orderings are not strict, it is not possible to simply break ties in a fixed manner. All possibilities of resolving the indifferences need to be considered. Neither the deferred acceptance algorithm nor the top trading cycle algorithm successfully solve the problem of efficiently assigning the students to schools whereas a modified version of the deferred acceptance algorithm might. In this version tie breaking depends on students’ preferences.

Le transfert informel des connaissances tacites chez les gestionnaires municipaux en situation de coordination

Ce rapport de recherche porte sur une étude s’intéressant au transfert des connaissances tacites chez les gestionnaires, c’est-à-dire le partage de ces connaissances et leur utilisation informelle, durant une situation de coordination dans un service municipal. La thèse est articulée autour des questions suivantes : Quelles sont les situations de coordination vécues par les gestionnaires municipaux? Quelles sont les sources de connaissances tacites partagées et utilisées? Quelles sont les relations de connaissances mobilisées de façon informelle lors du transfert des connaissances tacites? Quels sont les facteurs encourageant ou inhibant le transfert informel des connaissances tacites? À partir d’un modèle basé sur une approche situationnelle (Taylor, 1989 et 1991), nous avons revu la documentation touchant nos questions de recherche. Nous avons défini notamment la récursivité des connaissances et le réseau de connaissances, de même que présenté le modèle de la conversion des connaissances (Nonaka, 1994) et celui de l’actualisation de soi (St-Arnaud, 1996). Nous avons questionné 22 répondants à l’aide d’instruments de mesure qui combinent les techniques de l’incident critique, de l’entrevue cognitive et réflexive, le questionnement sur les réseaux organisationnels et l’observation participante. Tels des filets, ces instruments ont permis de traquer et d’obtenir des données d’une grande richesse sur les connaissances tacites et les comportements informels durant le transfert de connaissances en situation de coordination. Ces données ont été analysées selon une approche méthodologique essentiellement qualitative combinant l’analyse de contenu, la schématisation heuristique et l’analyse des réseaux sociaux. Nos résultats montrent que la complexité d’une situation de coordination conditionne le choix des mécanismes de coordination. De plus, les sources de connaissances sont, du point de vue individuel, le gestionnaire et ses artefacts, de même que son réseau personnel avec ses propres artefacts. Du point de vue collectif, ces sources sont réifiées dans le réseau de connaissances. Les connaissances clés d’une situation de coordination sont celles sur le réseau organisationnel, le contexte, les expériences en gestion et en situation complexe de coordination, la capacité de communiquer, de négocier, d’innover et celle d’attirer l’attention. Individuellement, les gestionnaires privilégient l’actualisation de soi, l’autoformation et la formation contextualisée et, collectivement, la coprésence dans l’action, le réseautage et l’accompagnement. Cette étude fournit un modèle valide du transfert contextualisé des connaissances qui est un cas de coordination complexe d’activités en gestion des connaissances. Ce transfert est concomitant à d’autres situations de coordination. La nature tacite des connaissances prévaut, de même que le mode informel, les médias personnels et les mécanismes d’ajustement mutuel. Les connaissances tacites sont principalement transférées au début des processus de gestion de projet et continuellement durant la rétroaction et le suivi des résultats. Quant aux connaissances explicites, les gestionnaires les utilisent principalement comme un symbole à la fin des processus de gestion de projet. Parmi les personnes et les groupes de personnes d’une situation de transfert contextualisé des connaissances, 10 % jouent des rôles clés, soit ceux d’experts et d’intermédiaires de personnes et d’artefacts. Les personnes en périphérie possèdent un potentiel de structuration, c’est-à-dire de connexité, pour assurer la continuité du réseau de connaissances organisationnel. Notre étude a élargi le modèle général de la complexité d’une situation (Bystrom, 1999; Choo, 2006; Taylor, 1986 et 1991), la théorie de la coordination (Malone et Crowston, 1994), le modèle de la conversion des connaissances (Nonaka, 1994), celui de l’actualisation de soi (St-Arnaud, 1996) et la théorie des réseaux de connaissances (Monge et Contractor, 2003). Notre modèle réaffirme la concomitance de ces modèles généraux selon une approche constructiviste (Giddens, 1987) où la dualité du structurel et la compétence des acteurs sont confirmées et enrichies.