The Dynamic Evolution of Factor Accumulations and Revealed Comparative Advantage in Canada.

Rapport de recherche

Ordinal Cost Sharing.

We ask how the three known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions - the value, the proportional, and the serial mechanisms - should be extended to arbitrary problem. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares be invariante under all transactions preserving the nature of a cost sharing problem.

A Systematic Framework for Analyzing the Dynamic Effects of Permanent and Transitory Shocks.

This paper proposes a systematic framework for analyzing the dynamic effects of permanent and transitory shocks on a system of n economic variables.

On the Profitability of Production Constraints in a Dynamic Natural Resource Oligopoly

Static oligopoly analysis predicts that if a single firm in Cournot equilibrium were to be constrained to contract its production marginally, its profits would fall. on the other hand, if all the firms were simultaneously constrained to reduce their productino, thus moving the industry towards monopoly output, each firm's profit would rise. We show that these very intuitive results may not hold in a dynamic oligopoly.

The Exchange Rate in a Dynamic-Optimizing Current Account Model with Nominal Rigidities: a Quantitative Investigation.

This paper studies a dynamic-optimizing model of a semi-small open economy with sticky nominal prices and wages. the model exhibits exchange rate overshooting in response to money supply shocks. the predicted variability of nominal and real exchange rates is roughly consistent with that of G7 effective exchange rates during the post-Bretton Woods era.

Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.