Incentives and Principles for Individuals in Rawls’s Theory of Justice

Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantaged—are an integral part of a Rawlsian political conception of justice. It concludes that incentive payments will have a clearly limited role in a Rawlsian theory of justice.

The reform of electronic consumer contracts in Europe: towards an effective legal framework?

Christine Riefa is a lecturer in Consumer Law and Intellectual Property Law at Brunel University in the UK. She is an elected board member of the International Association of Consumer Law and an academic correspondent to the Euro-American Chair for the legal protection of consumers (University of Cantabria, Spain). In 2009-2010, Dr Riefa is a Fulbright EU Scholar-in-Residence at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Ohio USA. A first version of this article was presented at the Summer School in Consumer Law, organised by the GREDICC (Groupe de recherche en droit international et comparé de la consummation), UQAM, Montréal, 29th June – 4th July 2009.

Implementing Revisionism: Assessing a Revisionist Theory of Moral Responsibility

The aim of this paper is to examine a particular substantive theory among others in the set of “revisionist” theories of moral responsibility, namely, Manuel Vargas’ version of the moral influence account of the justification of responsibility- specific practices. Moderate revisionism, which Vargas (2005) endorses, advocates a clear distinction between descriptive and normative questions, which enables a naturalistically plausible account of responsibility that does not jeopardize the normative aspect. However, while Vargas provides a useful framework for thinking about revisionism, I argue that despite its initial appeal, an actual revisionist theory does not seem to track as closely as we would like what I call the “meta-theory” of revisionism, viz. what Vargas defines as the features of moderate revisionism. Outlining these differences enables the formulation of observations about 1) the role of revisionist approaches for theorizing about moral responsibility and 2) how revisionism can be integrated with scientifically informed approaches.