On the design of customized risk measures in insurance, the problem of capital allocation and the theory of fluctuations for Lévy processes

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions quelques problèmes fondamentaux en mathématiques financières et actuarielles, ainsi que leurs applications. Cette thèse est constituée de trois contributions portant principalement sur la théorie de la mesure de risques, le problème de l’allocation du capital et la théorie des fluctuations. Dans le chapitre 2, nous construisons de nouvelles mesures de risque cohérentes et étudions l’allocation de capital dans le cadre de la théorie des risques collectifs. Pour ce faire, nous introduisons la famille des "mesures de risque entropique cumulatifs" (Cumulative Entropic Risk Measures). Le chapitre 3 étudie le problème du portefeuille optimal pour le Entropic Value at Risk dans le cas où les rendements sont modélisés par un processus de diffusion à sauts (Jump-Diffusion). Dans le chapitre 4, nous généralisons la notion de "statistiques naturelles de risque" (natural risk statistics) au cadre multivarié. Cette extension non-triviale produit des mesures de risque multivariées construites à partir des données financiéres et de données d’assurance. Le chapitre 5 introduit les concepts de "drawdown" et de la "vitesse d’épuisement" (speed of depletion) dans la théorie de la ruine. Nous étudions ces concepts pour des modeles de risque décrits par une famille de processus de Lévy spectrallement négatifs.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.

Ambiguity on the insurer's side: the demand for insurance

Empirical evidence suggests that ambiguity is prevalent in insurance pricing and underwriting, and that often insurers tend to exhibit more ambiguity than the insured individuals (e.g., [23]). Motivated by these findings, we consider a problem of demand for insurance indemnity schedules, where the insurer has ambiguous beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss, whereas the insured is an expected-utility maximizer. We show that if the ambiguous beliefs of the insurer satisfy a property of compatibility with the non-ambiguous beliefs of the insured, then there exist optimal monotonic indemnity schedules. By virtue of monotonicity, no ex-post moral hazard issues arise at our solutions (e.g., [25]). In addition, in the case where the insurer is either ambiguity-seeking or ambiguity-averse, we show that the problem of determining the optimal indemnity schedule reduces to that of solving an auxiliary problem that is simpler than the original one in that it does not involve ambiguity. Finally, under additional assumptions, we give an explicit characterization of the optimal indemnity schedule for the insured, and we show how our results naturally extend the classical result of Arrow [5] on the optimality of the deductible indemnity schedule.