L’accès gratuit à l’eau potable bénéficie-t-il nécessairement au plus défavorisé ? Une discussion critique à l’aune du cas de la Flandre

This article discusses the 1997 Flemish reform in the domestic water sector (Belgium). It abolished a previously existing social correction of the wastewater charge. Instead, a tax exemption for some disadvantaged categories was introduced. Moreover, water consumers receive 15 m3 of drinking-water per person per year for free. This policy change was assumed to contribute better to social equity. However, the reform led to changes in the drinking water tariffs by the water companies. Furthermore, a study conducted by Van Humbeeck (1998) shows that the distributive impact of the new water regulation is negative. As a matter of fact, the water reform increased the regressivity of the total wastewater and drinking water expenses. The Flemish example shows that ex ante evaluation of any reform of public services is a prerequisite for more social justice in the provision of basic goods to underprivileged citizens.

Justice coopérative et gratuité des transports en commun

Cooperative Justice and Free Public Transit - Urban transportation is a central issue for theories of urban justice. The current car culture is unjust because it discriminates against those who cannot afford to be a part of it, and it is inefficient because it creates a collectively disadvantageous situation. In this paper, I will first argue that public policies should encourage a modal transfer from car to public transit. Drawing on a theory of cooperative justice, I will then argue that free public transit is mutually advantageous and can be defended from both the perspectives of equality and efficiency.

Social Opportunities and Individual Responsibility: The Capability Approach and the Third Way

The fashionable widespreading of Sen’s ideas coincides with a new mood in the shaping of public policies in affluent societies. In Europe indeed, an “opportunity”-based approach to social security has been implemented through the European Employment Strategy. Public action tends to rely on a procedural concern with individual opportunities or potentialities in the labour market. The underlying ethics is that individuals are then responsible to use these background opportunities in order to lead the kind of life they value most. More broadly, the discourse and practice of the so-called “Third Way” shares with the capability approach an appeal for a procedural and enabling depiction of the role of the State. The paper intends to clarify the relation between procedural and opportunity-based approaches to social justice, among them the capability approach, and these new patterns of public action. Our vision goes in the way of a yet renewed, but deeper action of the welfare state, where social agency is envisaged as the very condition of individual agency. Drawing on the various critics of mainstream equality of opportunity, two opposed approaches to responsibility are identified: on the one hand, responsibility is conceived of as i) a “luck vs. choice” fixed starting point, ii) a backward-looking conception and iii) a highly individualistic framework. On the other hand, responsibility is envisaged as i) an outcome of public policies rather than a starting point, ii) a forward-looking conception, and iii) a combined institutional-individual framework. We situate here Sen’s capability approach, as well as critics of the luck egalitarianism path. The Third Way rhetoric is assessed against both these perspectives. The issue eventually boils down to an ethical reflection on the articulation of responsibilities, and to a pragmatic and substantial concern for the content of what providing security should mean in practice.

Responsabilité, Handicaps, Accidents et Opportunités sociales en Mauritanie

L’analyse économique des capabilités proposée par A. Sen ouvre la voie à une réflexion sur la pauvreté. Cependant, cette approche est insuffisante dans un cadre social où la responsabilité est primordiale. Cet article vise à montrer que la responsabilité est première. Elle se construit à partir de principes culturels et religieux qui déterminent à leur tour les mécanismes de redistributions et donc les inégalités. Dans un tel cadre, les opportunités sociales offertes aux individus découlent directement de leur statut social dans la société.

A Reading of the conception of man in Hans Jonas’ works: Between Nature and Responsibility. An Environmental Ethics Approach

Hans Jonas is considered one of the principal leaders of the ecological doctrine that fights against the hegemony of technical power upon society. We will study the conception of man in Jonas’ ideology through the lens of nature and of responsibility. He brandishes the specter of disaster (“heuristics of fear”) as a guard against technological excesses. He appeals to a prospective, universal and categorical responsibility to protect nature and to save future generations. Jonas considers responsibility as a method of anticipating the threat to that which is vulnerable, ephemeral, and perishable. Thus, the responsibility that Jonas decrees implies an ethics of conservation. Jonas’ writings aim to procure a new dimension of acting, which necessitates an ethics of foresight and responsibility.

Two approaches to stakeholder identification

The paper presents two fundamentally different ways to approach the identification of stakeholders. The first is the relationship approach. According to this approach, special obligations arise between individuals or groups only if a specific relationship exists between them. The rival approach is the assignment approach. This approach challenges the claim that obligations only arise if a particular relationship exists between the company and a group. It holds that the distribution of responsibilities should be viewed as a set of pragmatic rules derived from general moral considerations. The paper discusses the extent to which these two approaches can justify the main features of the traditional stakeholder model.

A Moral Stakeholder Theory of the Firm

To be a coherent and genuinely alternative conception to the shareholder model, any moral stakeholder theory must meet the following conditions: (1) It must be an ethical theory; (2) It must identify a limited group as stakeholders; (3) The group must be identified on morally relevant grounds; (4) Stakeholder claims must be non-universal; (5) And not held against everyone. A principle for identifying the stakeholder is suggested as a person who has much to lose – financially, socially, or psychologically – by the failure of the firm. The emerging picture contrasts sharply with the conventional conception of the firm.