800 resultados para fonction respiratoire
Resumo:
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Thèse numérisée par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.
Resumo:
Présenté au 34e congrès de la Corporation des bibliothécaires professionnels du Québec (CBPQ).
Resumo:
Latent variable models in finance originate both from asset pricing theory and time series analysis. These two strands of literature appeal to two different concepts of latent structures, which are both useful to reduce the dimension of a statistical model specified for a multivariate time series of asset prices. In the CAPM or APT beta pricing models, the dimension reduction is cross-sectional in nature, while in time-series state-space models, dimension is reduced longitudinally by assuming conditional independence between consecutive returns, given a small number of state variables. In this paper, we use the concept of Stochastic Discount Factor (SDF) or pricing kernel as a unifying principle to integrate these two concepts of latent variables. Beta pricing relations amount to characterize the factors as a basis of a vectorial space for the SDF. The coefficients of the SDF with respect to the factors are specified as deterministic functions of some state variables which summarize their dynamics. In beta pricing models, it is often said that only the factorial risk is compensated since the remaining idiosyncratic risk is diversifiable. Implicitly, this argument can be interpreted as a conditional cross-sectional factor structure, that is, a conditional independence between contemporaneous returns of a large number of assets, given a small number of factors, like in standard Factor Analysis. We provide this unifying analysis in the context of conditional equilibrium beta pricing as well as asset pricing with stochastic volatility, stochastic interest rates and other state variables. We address the general issue of econometric specifications of dynamic asset pricing models, which cover the modern literature on conditionally heteroskedastic factor models as well as equilibrium-based asset pricing models with an intertemporal specification of preferences and market fundamentals. We interpret various instantaneous causality relationships between state variables and market fundamentals as leverage effects and discuss their central role relative to the validity of standard CAPM-like stock pricing and preference-free option pricing.
Resumo:
This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.
Resumo:
This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.