Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Substitution, and Option Pricing

This paper develops a general stochastic framework and an equilibrium asset pricing model that make clear how attitudes towards intertemporal substitution and risk matter for option pricing. In particular, we show under which statistical conditions option pricing formulas are not preference-free, in other words, when preferences are not hidden in the stock and bond prices as they are in the standard Black and Scholes (BS) or Hull and White (HW) pricing formulas. The dependence of option prices on preference parameters comes from several instantaneous causality effects such as the so-called leverage effect. We also emphasize that the most standard asset pricing models (CAPM for the stock and BS or HW preference-free option pricing) are valid under the same stochastic setting (typically the absence of leverage effect), regardless of preference parameter values. Even though we propose a general non-preference-free option pricing formula, we always keep in mind that the BS formula is dominant both as a theoretical reference model and as a tool for practitioners. Another contribution of the paper is to characterize why the BS formula is such a benchmark. We show that, as soon as we are ready to accept a basic property of option prices, namely their homogeneity of degree one with respect to the pair formed by the underlying stock price and the strike price, the necessary statistical hypotheses for homogeneity provide BS-shaped option prices in equilibrium. This BS-shaped option-pricing formula allows us to derive interesting characterizations of the volatility smile, that is, the pattern of BS implicit volatilities as a function of the option moneyness. First, the asymmetry of the smile is shown to be equivalent to a particular form of asymmetry of the equivalent martingale measure. Second, this asymmetry appears precisely when there is either a premium on an instantaneous interest rate risk or on a generalized leverage effect or both, in other words, whenever the option pricing formula is not preference-free. Therefore, the main conclusion of our analysis for practitioners should be that an asymmetric smile is indicative of the relevance of preference parameters to price options.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Population Ethics and the Value of Life

Public policies often involve choices of alternatives in which the size and the composition of the population may vary. Examples are the allocation of resources to prenatal care and the design of aid packages to developing countries. In order to assess the corresponding feasible choices on normative grounds, criteria for social evaluation that are capable of performing variable-population comparisons are required. We review several important axioms for welfarist population principles and discuss the link between individual well-being and the desirability of adding a new person to a given society.

Harsanyi’s Social Aggregation Theorem : A Multi-Profile Approach with Variable-Population Extensions

This paper provides new versions of Harsanyi’s social aggregation theorem that are formulated in terms of prospects rather than lotteries. Strengthening an earlier result, fixed-population ex-ante utilitarianism is characterized in a multi-profile setting with fixed probabilities. In addition, we extend the social aggregation theorem to social-evaluation problems under uncertainty with a variable population and generalize our approach to uncertain alternatives, which consist of compound vectors of probability distributions and prospects.

Correcting the Errors : A Note on Volatility Forecast Evaluation Based on High-Frequency Data and Realized Volatilities

This note develops general model-free adjustment procedures for the calculation of unbiased volatility loss functions based on practically feasible realized volatility benchmarks. The procedures, which exploit the recent asymptotic distributional results in Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2002a), are both easy to implement and highly accurate in empirically realistic situations. On properly accounting for the measurement errors in the volatility forecast evaluations reported in Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2003), the adjustments result in markedly higher estimates for the true degree of return-volatility predictability.

Efficient Priority Rules

We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

The Possibility of Ordering Infinite Utility Streams

This paper revisits Diamond’s classical impossibility result regarding the ordering of infinite utility streams. We show that if no representability condition is imposed, there do exist strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous orderings of intertemporal utility streams with attractive additional properties. We extend a possibility theorem due to Svensson to a characterization theorem and we provide characterizations of all strongly Paretian and finitely anonymous rankings satisfying the strict transfer principle. In addition, infinite horizon extensions of leximin and of utilitarianism are characterized by adding an equity preference axiom and finite translation-scale measurability, respectively, to strong Pareto and finite anonymity.

Relative Uncertainty and Additively Representable Set Rankings

This paper proposes a definition of relative uncertainty aversion for decision models under complete uncertainty. It is shown that, for a large class of decision rules characterized by a set of plausible axioms, the new criterion yields a complete ranking of those rules with respect to the relative degree of uncertainty aversion they represent. In addition, we address a combinatorial question that arises in this context, and we examine conditions for the additive representability of our rules.

Choosing Wisely: The Natural Multi-Bidding Mechanism

Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) propose a multi-bidding mechanism to determine a winner from a set of possible projects. The winning project is implemented and its surplus is shared among the agents. In the multi-bidding mechanism each agent announces a vector of bids, one for each possible project, that are constrained to sum up to zero. In addition, each agent chooses a favorite a object which is used as a tie-breaker if several projects receive the same highest aggregate bid. Since more desirable projects receive larger bids, it is natural to consider the multi-bidding mechanism without the announcement of favorite projects. We show that the merits of the multi-bidding mechanism appear not to be robust to this natural simplification. Specifically, a Nash equilibrium exists if and only if there are at least two individually optimal projects and all individually optimal projects are efficient.

Consistent Relations

Consistency, a natural weakening of transitivity introduced in a seminal contribution by Suzumura (1976b), has turned out to be an interesting and promising concept in a variety of areas within economic theory. This paper summarizes its recent applications and provides some new observations in welfarist social choice and in population ethics. In particular, it is shown that the conclusion of the welfarism theorem remains true if transitivity is replaced by consistency and that an impossibility result in variable-population social-choice theory turns into a possibility if transitivity is weakened to consistency.

Solidarity in Choosing a Location on a Cycle

We study the implications of two solidarity conditions on the efficient location of a public good on a cycle, when agents have single-peaked, symmetric preferences. Both conditions require that when circumstances change, the agents not responsible for the change should all be affected in the same direction: either they all gain or they all loose. The first condition, population-monotonicity, applies to arrival or departure of one agent. The second, replacement-domination, applies to changes in the preferences of one agent. Unfortunately, no Pareto-efficient solution satisfies any of these properties. However, if agents’ preferred points are restricted to the vertices of a small regular polygon inscribed in the circle, solutions exist. We characterize them as a class of efficient priority rules.

La transformation du rôle de représentante d’aidantes familiales pendant l’hébergement de leur parent atteint de démence : une théorisation ancrée

RÉSUMÉ L‘hébergement en centre de soins de longue durée d'un parent âgé atteint de démence marque une transition pour les personnes qui occupent un rôle d’aidant familial principal. Ces personnes, principalement des femmes, poursuivent leur engagement après l’hébergement et souhaitent être impliquées dans les décisions concernant les soins offerts à leur parent. Souvent l'hébergement survient au moment où la personne âgée n'est plus en mesure, compte tenu de ses déficiences cognitives, d'exprimer clairement ses besoins; les aidantes accordent alors une place centrale au rôle de représentante de leur proche hébergé. Cette étude avait pour but d’expliquer la transformation du rôle de représentante chez des aidantes familiales dont le parent atteint de démence vit dans un centre d’hébergement et de soins de longue durée (CHSLD). La méthode qualitative de la théorisation ancrée a été retenue pour expliquer ce processus social. Les résultats obtenus reposent sur 14 entrevues en profondeur réalisées auprès de filles dont le parent atteint de démence était hébergé depuis plus de six mois dans un CHSLD. Ces aidantes ont été sélectionnées selon une procédure d’échantillonnage théorique et l’analyse des données a été réalisée à partir de la transcription intégrale des entrevues en suivant trois niveaux d'analyse, soit la codification ouverte, axiale et sélective. Une proposition théorique, générée par voie inductive, met en lumière trois processus intermédiaires interreliés expliquant la transformation du rôle de représentante pendant l’hébergement du proche : 1) l’intégration dans le milieu ; 2) l’évaluation de la qualité des soins et 3) le développement de la confiance envers le milieu d’hébergement. Plus précisément, les aidantes déploient différentes stratégies d’intégration dans le milieu d’hébergement, soit l’établissement de relations de réciprocité et d’une collaboration avec le personnel soignant, ainsi que l’utilisation d’un style de communication diplomatique. Parallèlement, elles évaluent la qualité des soins en trois étapes : jugement, pondération et action. Finalement, une relation de confiance avec les membres du personnel de l’établissement se développe en lien avec cinq facteurs spécifiques, soit les premières impressions, la comparaison avec d’autres CHSLD, l’intérêt démontré par le personnel envers le proche, le fait d’être entendue et prise au sérieux et la transparence du milieu d’hébergement. Ces trois processus contribuent au bien-être du parent hébergé et à celui de l’aidante. Le développement de la confiance étant associé aux deux autres processus intermédiaires ainsi qu’au bien-être de l’aidante, il est le processus central de la théorie contextuelle qui émerge de cette recherche. Cette étude contribue au développement des connaissances, notamment en fournissant plusieurs éléments inédits de compréhension du processus de transformation du rôle de représentante des aidantes familiales, de même que des pistes pour soutenir ces aidantes dont le parent, souffrant de démence, n’est plus en mesure de prendre des décisions. La théorie contextuelle proposée dans le cadre de cette étude constitue les prémices d’une théorie de niveau intermédiaire portant sur le rôle de représentant des aidants familiaux dans le contexte plus général du système de santé. Des études réalisées dans d’autres contextes de soins et auprès d’aidants de proches vulnérables ayant d’autres types d’affections sont ainsi recommandées.