Rigidité normale, dévaluation et équilibre général intertemporel

La présente étude analyse les effets dynamiques de la dévaluation du franc CFA, à l’aide d’un modèle monétaire d’équilibre général, intertemporel et multisectoriel. L’accent est particulièrement mis sur les interactions entre dévaluation et accumulation du capital. Dans le modèle, les effets du changement de parité passent par le marché du travail qui se caractérise par l’inertie du salaire nominal. Les résultats montrent que la dévaluation relance l’investissement, avec des effets expansionnistes sur l’activité économique. Le choc monétaire n’a eu qu’un impact limité sur les soldes budgétaire et commercial. Une mesure d’accompagnement telle que la réduction des salaires de la fonction publique améliore ces deux soldes mais déclenche un processus récessif.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.

The Backing of Government Debt and the Price Level

This paper studies the interdependence between fiscal and monetary policies, and their joint role in the determination of the price level. The government is characterized by a long-run fiscal policy rule whereby a given fraction of the outstanding debt, say d, is backed by the present discounted value of current and future primary surpluses. The remaining debt is backed by seigniorage revenue. The parameter d characterizes the interdependence between fiscal and monetary authorities. It is shown that in a standard monetary economy, this policy rule implies that the price level depends not only on the money stock, but also on the proportion of debt that is backed with money. Empirical estimates of d are obtained for OECD countries using data on nominal consumption, monetary base, and debt. Results indicate that debt plays only a minor role in the determination of the price level in these economies. Estimates of d correlate well with institutional measures of central bank independence.

Égalitarisme et Banque centrale

L’inflation a diminué de façon importante dans les pays riches depuis le début des années 80. Cette baisse de l’inflation n’est pas un hasard et peut, en partie, être liée à la mise en place de nouvelles institutions et politiques monétaires. Ce mémoire examine la relation qui existe entre deux de ces institutions, l’indépendance politique et le conservatisme d’une banque centrale, et l’idéal d’égalité économique. Peut-on, demandons-nous, être égalitariste et défendre, à la fois, l’indépendance politique d’une banque centrale et la volonté «conservatrice» de faire de l’inflation une priorité relativement au chômage? Le mémoire se divise en trois grandes parties. Une version crédible de l’égalitarisme économique est d’abord présentée. La relation qui existe entre le phénomène d’inflation et l’égalitarisme est, ensuite, examinée. Une réflexion critique sur les fondements théoriques de l’indépendance politique et du conservatisme est, enfin, développée. Nous concluons que la théorie égalitariste ne permet pas, à elle seule, de déterminer si un modèle particulier de banque centrale est moralement désirable. Pour se porter à la défense d’une banque centrale indépendante et conservatrice, un égalitariste doit adhérer à des prémisses économiques contestées.

La mobilite internationale des facteurs de production en situation de chomage et de libre-echange commercial: une revue de la problematique.

Cet article fait un recensement des analyses theoriques et empiriques concernant les effets possibles de la mobilite internationale des facteurs de production. les resultats et les recommendations du modele de base sont etablis quand prevalent le plein-emploi et l'ajustement complet des marches. les resultats des diverses analyses, dans un contexte de chomage structurel, sont ensuite identifies.

Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

Termes de l'échange endogènes et cycles économiques réels : une application à la Côte-d'Ivoire

À l’aide d’un modèle de cycles réels, la présente étude vise à expliquer, de façon endogène, les fluctuations des termes de l’échange en Côte-d’Ivoire. Pour ce faire, nous cherchons principalement à répondre aux deux questions suivantes : les chocs d’offre et de demande sur le marché d’exportation suffisent-ils à expliquer les variations des termes de l’échange? Et quelle est leur importance relative dans la dynamique des termes de l’échange? Les résultats montrent que les deux chocs considérés expliquent bien la volatilité des termes de l’échange. Nous avons noté que ces deux sources d’impulsions ont un impact significatif sur les fluctuations économiques en Côte-d’Ivoire.

The Wage Rate and the Profit Rate in the Price of Production Equation: a New Solution to an Old Problem

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic concusions remain valid.

Heterodox Inflation Stabilization in Argentina, Brazil, and Israel. A Historical Review and Some Stylized Facts

This article presents a review of the stabilization attempts in Argentina, Brazil, and Israel during the 1980’s. Earlier research is summarized and complemented with additional sources of contemporaneous information and a detailed analysis of institutional features. The examination of these episodes underscores the strong economic and empirical relationship between the governments’ fiscal policy and the rate of inflation.

Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination

This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.

Uncovering Financial Markets Beliefs About Inflation Targets

This paper exploits the term structure of interest rates to develop testable economic restrictions on the joint process of long-term interest rates and inflation when the latter is subject to a targeting policy by the Central Bank. Two competing models that econometrically describe agents’ inferences about inflation targets are developed and shown to generate distinct predictions on the behavior of interest rates. In an empirical application to the Canadian inflation target zone, results indicate that agents perceive the band to be substantially narrower than officially announced and asymmetric around the stated mid-point. The latter result (i) suggests that the monetary authority attaches different weights to positive and negative deviations from the central target, and (ii) challenges on empirical grounds the assumption, frequently made in the literature, that the policy maker’s loss function is symmetric (usually a quadratic function) around a desired inflation value.

Les facteurs declencheurs des crises financieres internationales

Ce rapport s'inscrit dans la problematique soulevée par l'insistance des milieux financiers américains et du Trésor américain à libéraliser et à globaliser les mouvements internationaux de capitaux. Dans cette perspective, il tente de répondre à trois questions, à savoir 1) est-ce que la finance internationale en général et les institutions monétaires et financières nationales et internationales sont sources d'instabilité financière et économique pour les pays? 2) est-il possible d'éviter que les bénéfices découlant de l'accès accru aux marchés internationaux des capitaux soient diminués et même renversés par des crises monétaires et financières internationales et nationales et, comme corollaire, 3) est-ce que le systême actuel des monnaies nationales est dépassé ?

Nonlinear Monetary Policy Rules: Some New Evidence for the U.S.

This paper derives optimal monetary policy rules in setups where certainty equivalence does not hold because either central bank preferences are not quadratic, and/or the aggregate supply relation is nonlinear. Analytical results show that these features lead to sign and size asymmetries, and nonlinearities in the policy rule. Reduced-form estimates indicate that US monetary policy can be characterized by a nonlinear policy rule after 1983, but not before 1979. This finding is consistent with the view that the Fed's inflation preferences during the Volcker-Greenspan regime differ considerably from the ones during the Burns-Miller regime.