14 resultados para whole of catchment
em Brock University, Canada
Resumo:
Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin.Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.
Resumo:
Benjamin Rathburn (1790-1873) was a builder, banker and hotel-keeper who was well-known for his work in the development and expansion of Buffalo in the 1830s. He also conducted business in the Village of Niagara Falls. He purchased large tracts of land (largely on credit) with the intent to sell the land at a profit. However, the sales did not meet his expectations and Rathburn found himself over-extended on credit, ultimately leading to his financial ruin. Jesse P. Haines (1793-1877) was an American cartographer who is credited with mapping the Villages of Lockport and Niagara Falls, New York.
Resumo:
Indenture between the Honourable William Dickson of Niagara and Robert Dickson of Niagara for 1,897 acres contained in the 7th part of the 9th, and the whole of the 8th Concession in Dumphries. This was recorded on Jan. 22, 1848 in Lib. A, folio 165 for Dumphries, Feb. 12, 1840.
Resumo:
It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
Resumo:
Hugh Alexander, b. 1780 arrived in Niagara shortly after his birth. He attended school and later apprenticed as a clerk. In 1797 he was granted 200 acres of land in Bertie township and became a merchant and trader in Fort Erie. He was the owner of a sailing vessel, the Chippawa, which he used to transport goods in the area. The ship was lost and/or confiscated as a result of War of 1812 skirmishes on Lake Erie. By 1812 Hugh Alexander was in business together with his brother Ephraim. The Alexander’s storehouse, store and house were burned by the British military when they abandoned Fort Erie ahead of the invading American military in late May 1813. At the time of the burning, Hugh Alexander was engaged as a Lieutenant with the 3rd Lincoln Militia. Prior to this Hugh Alexander had established a second mercantile in Stamford, opposite the green. Misfortune was to strike at this location as well when the British military abandoned the whole of the Niagara area to the invading American forces and the Stamford location was looted. After the end of the hostilities Alexander went on to rebuild his storehouse in Fort Erie and to re-establish his store in Stamford. Hugh Alexander died on November 2, 1817 and is buried in the Stamford Presbyterian Cemetery. Source: George A. Seibel, The Niagara Portage Road: 200 Years 1790-1990. Niagara Falls: City of Niagara Falls, 1990, p. 259-262.
Resumo:
Membranes are dynamic structures that affect cell structure and function. Compositional changes ofmembranes have been shown with the application of a perturbation; however these are limited to whole tissue analysis. The purpose of this thesis was to compare the phospholipid (PL) fatty acid (FA) composition of rat whole muscle (Wm) to 1) purified and non-purified subsarcolemmal (SS) mitochondria in soleus, plantaris, and red gastrocnemius, and 2) sarcolemma, transverse-tubules, SS and intermyofibrillar (IMF) mitochondria fix)m whole hindlimb. The major findings were that 1) contamination significantly altered the PL FA composition of the SS mitochondrial membrane fraction, 2) Wm and SS mitochondria compositions differed between muscle types, and 3) Wm did not accurately reflect the PL FA composition of any isolated subcellular membranes, with each being unique from each other. As such, the relevancy of the trends reported in the literature of the effects of perturbations on Wm may be limited.
Resumo:
This study investigated three methods for teaching children how to spell. Third grade students were divided into three conditions for a one-week training period consisting of 15- to 20-minute lessons. One of the two experimental conditions used a whole language approach along with explicit strategy instruction. The second condition used strategy instruction within a traditional setting. The control used strictly a whole language approach to le~ing hO\\l to spell. The spelling perfonnance of all three conditions improved after the one-week training period. However, students in the strategy instruction groups did significantly better on the study "'7ords than the whole language only group. The students in whole-Ianguage-plusstrateg)! instruction outperformed both other groups. Significantly better spelling perfonnance was observed even at the nine-week posttest. This study frrst supported the hypothesis that children can make significantly greater improven1ents in their spelling when explicitly taught how to use spelling strategies. Secondl)', this study indicated that whole language provided a relevant context for the study words, clearly giving the students in the whole-Ianguage-plus-strategy condition an additional advantage.
Resumo:
The optical cross section of PS I in whole cells of Porphyridium cruentum (UTEX 161), held in either state 1 or state 2, was determined by measuring the change in absorbance at 820nm, an indication of P700+; the X-section of PS2 was determined by measuring the variable fluorescence, (Fv-Fo)/Fo, from PS2. Both cross-sections were 7 determined by fitting Poisson distribution equations to the light saturation curves obtained with single turnover laser flashes which varied in intensity from zero to a level where maximum yield occurred. Flash wavelengths of 574nm, 626nm, and 668nm were used, energy absorbed by PBS, by PBS and chla, and by chla respectively. There were two populations of both PSi and PS2. A fraction of PSi is associated with PBS, and a fraction of PS2 is free from PBS. On the transition S1->S2, only with PBS-absorbed energy (574nm) did the average X-section of PSi increase (27%), and that of PS2 decrease (40%). The fraction of PSi associated with PBS decreased, from 0.65 to 0.35, and the Xsection of this associated PS 1 increased, from 135±65 A2 to 400±300A2. The cross section of PS2 associated with PBS decreased from 150±50 A2 to 85±45 A2, but the fraction of PS2 associated with PBS, approximately 0.75, did not change significantly. The increase in PSi cross section could not be completely accounted for by postulating that several PSi are associated with a single PBS and that in the transition to state2, fewer PSi share the same number of PBS, resulting in a larger X-section. It is postulated that small changes occur in the attachment of PS2 to PBS causing energy to be diverted to the attached PSi. These experiments support neither the mobile-PBS model of state transitions nor that of spillover. From cross section changes there was no evidence of energy transfer from PS2 to PSi with 668nm light. The decrease in PS2 fluorescence which occurred at this wavelength cannot be explained by energy transfer; another explanation must be sought. No explanation was found for an observed decrease in PSi yield at high flash intensities.
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Cover title: Guide to Niagara Falls.
Resumo:
Marshall McLuhan's "global village", and his theories on communications and technology, in conjunction with Patrick McGoohan's television series The Prisoner (ATV, 1967-1968) are explored in this thesis. The Prisoner, brainchild of McGoohan, is about the abduction and confinement of a British government agent imprisoned within the impenetrable boundaries of a benign but totalitarian city -state called "The Village". The purpose of his abduction and imprisonment is for the extraction of information regarding his resignation as a government spy. Marshall McLuhan originally popularized the phrase "the global village" in The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making o/the Topographic Man (1962), asserting that, "The new electronic interdependence recreates the world in the image of a global village" (p. 31). This thesis argues that valid parallels exist between McGoohan's conception of "village", as manifested in The Prisoner, and McLuhan's global village. The comprehensive methodological stratagem for this thesis includes Marshall McLuhan's "mosaic" approach, Mikhail Bakhtin's concept ofthe "chronotope", as well as a Foucauldian genealogicallhistorical discourse analysis. In the process of deconstructing McLuhan's texts and The Prisoner as products of the 1960s, an historical "constellation" (to use Walter Benjamin's concept) of the same present has been executed. By employing this synthesized methodology, conjunctions have been made between McLuhan's theories and the series' main themes of bureaucracy as dictatorship, the perversion of science and technology, freedom as illusion, and the individual in opposition to the collective. A thorough investigation of the global village and The Prisoner will determine whether or not Marshall McLuhan and/or Patrick McGoohan visualize the village as an enslaving technological reality.
Resumo:
Cardiovascular disease is a leading cause of mortality in the spinal cord injured (SCI) population. Reduced arterial compliance is a cardiovascular risk factor and whole body vibration (WBV) has be en shown to improve arterial compliance in able-bodied individuals. The study investigated the effect of an acute session ofWBV on arterial compliance as measured by pulse wave velocity (PWV). On separate days, arm, leg and aortic PWV were measured pre- and post- a 45 minute session of passive stance (PS) and WBV. The WBV was intermittent with a set frequency of 45Hz and amplitude of O.6mm. There was no condition by time effect when comparing PWV after WBV and PS. Following WBV, aortic (928.6±127.7 vs. 901.1±96.6cm/sec), leg (1035.2±113.8 vs.l099.8±114.2cm/sec) and arm PWV (1118.9±119.8 vs. 1181.1±124.4cm/s) did not change. As such, WBV did not reduce arterial compliance, however future research with protocol modifications is recommended.