Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The Lived Experience of Nursing Students With Formative Assessment Formally Embedded in Clinical Courses: A Transcendental Phenomenological Study

The potential of formative assessment (FA) for informing learning in classroom-based nursing courses is clearly established in the literature; however, research on FA in clinical courses remains scarce. This inquiry explored the lived experience of nursing students using transcendental phenomenology and described the phenomenon of being assessed in clinical courses. The research question guiding the study was: How is the phenomenon of assessment experienced by nursing students when FA is formally embedded in clinical courses? Inherent in this question were the following issues: (a) the meaning of clinical experiences for nursing students, (b) the meaning of being assessed through FA, and (c) what it is like to be assessed when FA is formally embedded within clinical experiences. The noematic themes that illuminated the whatness of the participants’ experience were (a) enabled cognitive activity, (b) useful feedback, (c) freedom to be, (d) enhanced focus, (e) stress moderator, and (f) respectful mentorship. The noetic themes associated with how the phenomenon was experienced were related to bodyhood, temporality, spatiality, and relationship to others. The results suggest a fundamental paradigm shift from traditional nursing education to a more pervasive integration of FA in clinical courses so that students have time to learn before being graded on their practice. Furthermore, this inquiry and the literature consulted provide evidence that using cognitive science theory to inform and reform clinical nursing education is a timely option to address the repeated calls from nursing leaders to modernize nursing education. This inquiry contributes to reduce our reliance on assumptions derived from research on FA in nursing classrooms and provides evidence based on the reality of using formative assessment in clinical courses. Recommendations for future research are presented.

Nietzsche's eternal recurrence of the same : the effect of logic abridgement, contradictions and inconsistencies

I will argue that the doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same no better interprets cosmology than pink elephants interpret zoology. I will also argue that the eternal-reiurn-of-the-same doctrine as what Magnus calls "existential imperative" is without possibility of application and thus futile. To facilitate those arguments, the validity of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same will be tested under distinct rubrics. Although each rubric will stand alone, one per chapter, as an evaluation of some specific aspect of eternal recurrence, the rubric sequence has been selected to accommodate the identification of what I shall be calling logic abridgments. The conclusions to be extracted from each rubric are grouped under the heading CONCLUSION and appear immediately following rubric ten. Then, or if, at the end of a rubric a reader is inclined to wonder which rubric or topic is next, and why, the answer can be found at the top of the following page. The question is usually answered in the very first sentence, but always answered in the first paragraph. The first rubric has been placed in order by chronological entitlement in that it deals with the evolution of the idea of eternal recurrence from the time of the ancient Greeks to Nietzsche's August, 1881 inspiration. This much-recommended technique is also known as starting at the beginning. Rubric 1 also deals with 20th. Century philosophers' assessments of the relationship between Nietzsche and ancient Greek thought. The only experience of E-R, Zarathustra's mountain vision, is second only because it sets the scene alluded to in following rubrics. The third rubric explores .ii?.ih T jc,i -I'w Nietzsche's evaluation of rationality so that his thought processes will be understood appropriately. The actual mechanism of E-R is tested in rubric four...The scientific proof Nietzsche assembled in support of E-R is assessed by contemporary philosophers in rubric five. E-R's function as an ethical imperative is debated in rubrics six and seven.. .The extent to which E-R fulfills its purpose in overcoming nihilism is measured against the comfort assured by major world religions in rubric eight. Whether E-R also serves as a redemption for revenge is questioned in rubric nine. Rubric ten assures that E-R refers to return of the identically same and not merely the similar. In addition to assemblage and evaluation of all ten rubrics, at the end of each rubric a brief recapitulation of its principal points concludes the chapter. In this essay I will assess the theoretical conditions under which the doctrine cannot be applicable and will show what contradictions and inconsistencies follow if the doctrine is taken to be operable. Harold Alderman in his book Nietzsche's Gift wrote, the "doctrine of eternal recurrence gives us a problem not in Platonic cosmology, but in Socratic selfreflection." ^ I will illustrate that the recurrence doctrine's cosmogony is unworkable and that if it were workable, it would negate self-reflection on the grounds that selfreflection cannot find its cause in eternal recurrence of the same. Thus, when the cosmology is shown to be impossible, any expected ensuing results or benefits will be rendered also impossible. The so-called "heaviest burden" will be exposed as complex, engrossing "what if speculations deserving no linkings to reality. To identify ^Alderman p. 84 abridgments of logic, contradictions and inconsistencies in Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same, I. will examine the subject under the following schedule. In Chapter 1 the ancient origins of recurrence theories will be introduced. ..This chapter is intended to establish the boundaries within which the subsequent chapters, except Chapter 10, will be confined. Chapter 2, Zarathustra's vision of E-R, assesses the sections of Thus Spoke Zarathustra in which the phenomenon of recurrence of the same is reported. ..Nihilism as a psychological difficulty is introduced in this rubric, but that subject will be studied in detail in Chapter 8. In Chapter 2 the symbols of eternal recurrence of the same will be considered. Whether the recurrence image should be of a closed ring or as a coil will be of significance in many sections of my essay. I will argue that neither symbolic configuration can accommodate Nietzsche's supposed intention. Chapter 3 defends the description of E-R given by Zarathustra. Chapter 4, the cosmological mechanics of E-R, speculates on the seriousness with which Nietzsche might have intended the doctrine of eternal recurrence to be taken. My essay reports, and then assesses, the argument of those who suppose the doctrine to have been merely exploratory musings by Nietzsche on cosmological hypotheses...The cosmogony of E-R is examined. In Chapter 5, cosmological proofs tested, the proofs for Nietzsche's doctrine of return of the same are evaluated. This chapter features the position taken by Martin ' Heidegger. My essay suggests that while Heidegger's argument that recurrence of the same is a genuine cosmic agenda is admirable, it is not at all persuasive. Chapter 6, E-R is an ethical imperative, is in essence the reporting of a debate between two scholars regarding the possibility of an imperative in the doctrine of recurrence. Their debate polarizes the arguments I intend to develop. Chapter 7, does E-R of the same preclude alteration of attitudes, is a continuation of the debate presented in Chapter 6 with the focus shifted to the psychological from the cosmological aspects of eternal recurrence of the same. Chapter 8, Can E-R Overcome Nihilism?, is divided into two parts. In the first, nihilism as it applies to Nietzsche's theory is discussed. ..In part 2, the broader consequences, sources and definitions of nihilism are outlined. My essay argues that Nietzsche's doctrine is more nihilistic than are the world's major religions. Chapter 9, Is E-R a redemption for revenge?, examines the suggestion extracted from Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the doctrine of eternal recurrence is intended, among other purposes, as a redemption for mankind from the destructiveness of revenge. Chapter 10, E-R of the similar refuted, analyses a position that an element of chance can influence the doctrine of recurrence. This view appears to allow, not for recurrence of the same, but recurrence of the similar. A summary will recount briefly the various significant logic abridgments, contradictions, and inconsistencies associated with Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same. In the 'conclusion' section of my essay my own opinions and observations will be assembled from the body of the essay.

From inference to affordance : the problem of visual depth-perception in the optical writings of Descartes, Berkeley, and Gibson

This thesis explores the debate and issues regarding the status of visual ;,iferellces in the optical writings of Rene Descartes, George Berkeley and James 1. Gibson. It gathers arguments from across their works and synthesizes an account of visual depthperception that accurately reflects the larger, metaphysical implications of their philosophical theories. Chapters 1 and 2 address the Cartesian and Berkelean theories of depth-perception, respectively. For Descartes and Berkeley the debate can be put in the following way: How is it possible that we experience objects as appearing outside of us, at various distances, if objects appear inside of us, in the representations of the individual's mind? Thus, the Descartes-Berkeley component of the debate takes place exclusively within a representationalist setting. Representational theories of depthperception are rooted in the scientific discovery that objects project a merely twodimensional patchwork of forms on the retina. I call this the "flat image" problem. This poses the problem of depth in terms of a difference between two- and three-dimensional orders (i.e., a gap to be bridged by one inferential procedure or another). Chapter 3 addresses Gibson's ecological response to the debate. Gibson argues that the perceiver cannot be flattened out into a passive, two-dimensional sensory surface. Perception is possible precisely because the body and the environment already have depth. Accordingly, the problem cannot be reduced to a gap between two- and threedimensional givens, a gap crossed with a projective geometry. The crucial difference is not one of a dimensional degree. Chapter 3 explores this theme and attempts to excavate the empirical and philosophical suppositions that lead Descartes and Berkeley to their respective theories of indirect perception. Gibson argues that the notion of visual inference, which is necessary to substantiate representational theories of indirect perception, is highly problematic. To elucidate this point, the thesis steps into the representationalist tradition, in order to show that problems that arise within it demand a tum toward Gibson's information-based doctrine of ecological specificity (which is to say, the theory of direct perception). Chapter 3 concludes with a careful examination of Gibsonian affordallces as the sole objects of direct perceptual experience. The final section provides an account of affordances that locates the moving, perceiving body at the heart of the experience of depth; an experience which emerges in the dynamical structures that cross the body and the world.

Righteous sounds and reproductive justice : the influence of Ani DiFranco's music for reproductive rights activists

In this thesis, I explore how the folk-rock music of Ani DiFranco has influenced the activist commitments, sensibilities, and activities of reproductive rights activists. My interest in the relation of popular music to social movements is informed by the work of Simon Frith (1987, 1996a, 1996b), Rob Rosenthal (2001), and Ann Savage (2003). Frith argues that popular music is an important contributor to personal identity and the ways that listeners see the world. Savage (2003) writes that fans develop a unique relationship with feminist/political music, and Rosenthal (2001) argues that popular music can be an important factor in building social movements. I use these arguments to ask what the influence of Ani DiFranco's music has been for reproductive rights activists who are her fans. I conducted in-depth interviews with ten reproductive rights activists who are fans of Ani DiFranco's music. All ten are women in their twenties and thirties living in Ontario or New York. Each has been listening to DiFranco's music for between two and fifteen years, and has considered herself a reproductive rights activist for between eighteen months and twenty years. I examine these women's narratives of their relationships with Ani DiFranco's music and their activist experience through the interconnected lenses of identity, consciousness, and practice. Listening to Ani DiFranco's music affects the fluid ways these women understand their identities as women, as feminists, and in solidarity with others. I draw on Freire's (1970) understanding of conscientization to consider the role that Ani's music has played in heightening women's awareness about reproductive rights issues. The feeling of solidarity with other (both real and perceived) activist fans gives them more confidence that they can make a difference in overcoming social injustice. They believe that Ani's music encourages productive anger, which in turn fuels their passion to take action to make change. Women use Ani's music deliberately for energy and encouragement in their continued activism, and find that it continues to resonate with their evolving identities as women, feminists, and activists. My study builds on those of Rosenthal (2001) and Savage (2003) by focusing on one artist and activists in one social movement. The characteristics of Ani DiFranco, her fan base, and the reproductive rights movement allow new understanding of the ways that female fans who are members of a female-dominated feminist movement interact with the music of a popular independent female artist.

Ethical space in a secondary school: a case study /

Discourse in the provincial education system that includes Aboriginal peoples is a convoluted one-sided affair. This has contributed to the limited academic success for Aboriginal secondary students in the provincial school system. The Office of the Auditor General (2004) announced a 27-28 year gap in Academic success compared to non- Aboriginal students (p. I). Both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal stakeholders are fiiistrated and confused with the lack of support for long-term solutions to address academic success for Aboriginal students. The boundaries in education that exist between the dominant society of Canada and Aboriginal peoples in education are hindering the development of ethical space in which to negotiate and apply "concrete arguments and concepts" (Ermine, 2000, p. 140) for 'best' solutions across the cultural divide. Recent literature suggests a gap in knowledge to address this cultural divide. This study reveals racism is still prevalent and the problem lies in the fallacy of Euro-Western pedagogical beliefs. There is a need to design ethical space that will assist transformation of cross-relations in education for inclusion of Aboriginal voices and content. I submit that ethical space involves physical and abstract space. This report is a qualitative, exploratory, and single case study of one northern Ontario secondary school attended by First Nations and Metis peoples who comprise 35% of the school population. Twenty-six stakeholders volunteered to participate in six interviews. The volunteers in this study are Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal. Aboriginal peoples are firom two First Nations, and Metis peoples. It is an Aboriginal designed and delivered study that a) describes an Aboriginally-designed research method to gather data across cultural divides in a secondary school, b) reviews Tri-Council Policy Section 6 (TCPS) regarding 'good practices' in ethical research involving Aboriginal peoples, and c) summarizes stakeholder perspectives of the 'best educational environment' for one secondary school.

The nature of avidyÄ in Buddhism and VedÄ nta

This thesis deals with the nature of ignorance as it was interpreted in the Upani~adic tradition, specifically in Advaita Vedanta, and in early and Mahayana Buddhism , e specially in the Madhyamika school of Buddhism. The approach i s a historical and comparative one. It examines the early thoughts of both the upanis.a ds and Buddhism abou t avidya (ignorance), shows how the notion was treated by the more speculative and philosphically oriented schools which base d themselves on the e arly works, and sees how their views differ. The thesis will show that the Vedinta tended to treat avidya as a topic for metaphysical s peculation as t he s chool developed, drifting from its initial e xistential concerns, while the Madhyamika remained in contact with the e xistential concerns evident in the first discourses of the Buddha. The word "notion" has been chosen for use in referring t o avidya, even though it may have non-intellectual and emotional connotations, to avoid more popular a lternatives such as "concept" or "idea". In neither the Upani,ads, Advaita Vedanta, or Buddhism is ignorance merely a concept or an idea. Only in a secondary sense, in texts and speech , does it become one. Avidya has more to do with the lived situation in which man finds himself, with the subjectobject separation in which he f eels he exists, than with i i i intel lect ual constr ucts . Western thought has begun to r ealize the same with concerns such as being in modern ontology, and has chosen to speak about i t i n terms of the question of being . Avidya, however, i s not a 'question' . If q ue stions we r e to be put regarding the nature of a vidya , they would be more of t he sort "What is not avidya?", though e ven here l anguage bestows a status t o i t which avidya does not have. In considering a work of the Eastern tradition, we f ace t he danger of imposing Western concepts on it. Granted t hat avidya is customari ly r endered i n English as ignorance, the ways i n which the East and West view i gno rance di f f er. Pedagogically , the European cultures, grounded in the ancient Greek culture, view ignorance as a l ack or an emptiness. A child is i gnorant o f certain t hings and the purpose o f f ormal education , in f act if not in theory, is to fill him with enough knowledge so that he can cope wit h t he complexities and the e xpectations of s ociety. On another level, we feel t hat study and research will l ead t o the discovery o f solutions, which we now lack , for problems now defying solut i on . The East, on the o t her hand, sees avidya in a d i fferent light.Ignorance isn't a lack, but a presence. Religious and philosophical l iterature directs its efforts not towards acquiring something new, but at removing t.he ideas and opinions that individuals have formed about themselves and the world. When that is fully accomplished, say the sages , t hen Wisdom, which has been obscured by those opinions, will present itself. Nothing new has to be learned, t hough we do have t o 'learn' that much. The growing interest in t he West with Eastern religions and philosophies may, in time, influence our theoretical and practical approaches to education and learning, not only in the established educati onal institutions, but in religious , p sychological, and spiritual activities as well. However, the requirements o f this thesis do no t permit a formulation of revolutionary method or a call to action. It focuses instead on the textual arguments which attempt to convince readers that t he world in which they take themselves to exist is not, in essence, real, on the ways i n which the l imitations of language are disclosed, and on the provisional and limited schemes that are built up to help students see through their ignorance. The metaphysic s are provisional because they act only as spurs and guides. Both the Upanisadic and Buddhist traditions that will be dealt with here stress that language constantly fails to encompass the Real. So even terms s uch as 'the Real', 'Absolute', etc., serve only to lead to a transcendent experience . The sections dealing with the Upanisads and Advaita Vedanta show some of the historical evolution of the notion of avidya, how it was dealt with as maya , and the q uestions that arose as t o its locus. With Gau?apada we see the beginnings of a more abstract treatment of the topic, and , the influence of Buddhism. Though Sankhara' S interest was primarily directed towards constructing a philosophy to help others attain mok~a ( l iberation), he too introduced t echnica l t e rminology not found in the works of his predecessors. His work is impressive , but areas of it are incomplete. Numbers of his followers tried to complete the systematic presentation of his insi ghts . Their work focuses on expl anat i ons of adhyasa (superimposition ) , t he locus and object of ignorance , and the means by which Brahman takes itself to be the jiva and the world. The section on early Buddhism examines avidya in the context o f the four truths, together with dubkha (suffering), the r ole it p l ays in t he chain of dependent c ausation , a nd t he p r oblems that arise with t he doctrine of anatman. With t he doct rines of e arly Buddhism as a base, the Madhyamika elaborated questions that the Buddha had said t e nded not t o edi f ication. One of these had to do with own - being or svabhava. Thi s serves a s a centr e around which a discussion o f i gnorance unfolds, both i ndividual and coll ective ignorance. There follows a treatment of the cessation of ignorance as it is discussed within this school . The final secti on tries to present t he similarities and differences i n the natures o f ignorance i n t he two traditions and discusses the factors responsible for t hem . ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank Dr. Sinha for the time spent II and suggestions made on the section dealing with Sankara and the Advait.a Vedanta oommentators, and Dr. Sprung, who supervised, direoted, corrected and encouraged the thesis as a whole, but especially the section on Madhyamika, and the final comparison.

The effects of language complexity in a counterattitudinal appeal to laypeople : an application of the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion to a legal issue

The effects of a complexly worded counterattitudinal appeal on laypeople's attitudes toward a legal issue were examined, using the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) of persuasion as a theoretical framework. This model states that persuasion can result from the elaboration and scrutiny of the message arguments (i.e., central route processing), or can result from less cognitively effortful strategies, such as relying on source characteristics as a cue to message validity (i.e., peripheral route processing). One hundred and sixty-seven undergraduates (85 men and 81 women) listened to eitller a low status or high status source deliver a counterattitudinal speech on a legal issue. The speech was designed to contain strong or weak arguments. These arguments were 'worded in a simple and, therefore, easy to comprehend manner, or in a complex and, therefore, difficult to comprehend manner. Thus, there were three experimental manipulations: argument comprehensibility (easy to comprehend vs. difficult to comprehend), argumel11 strength (weak vs. strong), and source status (low vs. high). After listening to tIle speec.J] participants completed a measure 'of their attitude toward the legal issue, a thought listil1g task, an argument recall task,manipulation checks, measures of motivation to process the message, and measures of mood. As a result of the failure of the argument strength manipulation, only the effects of the comprehel1sibility and source status manipulations were tested. There was, however, some evidence of more central route processing in the easy comprehension condition than in the difficult comprehension condition, as predicted. Significant correlations were found between attitude and favourable and unfavourable thoughts about the legal issue with easy to comprehend arguments; whereas, there was a correlation only between attitude and favourable thoughts 11 toward the issue with difficult to comprehend arguments, suggesting, perhaps, that central route processing, \vhich involves argument scrutiny and elaboration, occurred under conditions of easy comprehension to a greater extent than under conditions of difficult comprehension. The results also revealed, among other findings, several significant effects of gender. Men had more favourable attitudes toward the legal issue than did women, men recalled more arguments from the speech than did women, men were less frustrated while listening to the speech than were ,vomen, and men put more effort into thinking about the message arguments than did women. When the arguments were difficult to comprehend, men had more favourable thoughts and fewer unfavourable thoughts about the legal issue than did women. Men and women may have had different affective responses to the issue of plea bargaining (with women responding more negatively than men), especially in light of a local and controversial plea bargain that occurred around the time of this study. Such pre-existing gender differences may have led to tIle lower frustration, the greater effort, the greater recall, and more positive attitudes for men than for WOlnen. Results· from this study suggest that current cognitive models of persuasion may not be very applicable to controversial issues which elicit strong emotional responses. Finally, these data indicate that affective responses, the controversial and emotional nature ofthe issue, gender and other individual differences are important considerations when experts are attempting to persuade laypeople toward a counterattitudinal position.

Corporal punishment : understanding the debate in Canada

There has been considerable debate over whether corporal punishment against children should be prohibited in Canada. Various organizations, most notably the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law, have argued that the Canadian Government should ban the use of corporal punishment by repealing the specific section of the Canadian Criminal Code that provides parents with a legal defence to use corporal punishment against their children; this provision is outlined in Section 43 of the Criminal Code. Recently, the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law challenged the constitutionality of Section 43 before the Supreme Court of Canada. The organization claimed Section 43 is unconstitutional. It violates children's Charter rights, such as the right to security of a person (Section 7), the right to be protected from cruel and unusual treatment (Section 12), and denies children the same protection adults receive under the law. Both the Canadian government and the Supreme Court of Canada reject the Foundation's arguments. Examining the federal government and the judicial system's rationale for refusing to remove Section 43 of the Canadian Criminal Code discloses how the parent-child relationship is perceived. This thesis examines how the parent-child relationship is perceived by the Canadian government and the issues that arise from such a view. This examination is essential for the comprehension of why Canada's corporal punishment law was enacted and remains in effect today.

Winâ Foy : functional object-oriented programming language

This thesis will introduce a new strongly typed programming language utilizing Self types, named Win--*Foy, along with a suitable user interface designed specifically to highlight language features. The need for such a programming language is based on deficiencies found in programming languages that support both Self types and subtyping. Subtyping is a concept that is taken for granted by most software engineers programming in object-oriented languages. Subtyping supports subsumption but it does not support the inheritance of binary methods. Binary methods contain an argument of type Self, the same type as the object itself, in a contravariant position, i.e. as a parameter. There are several arguments in favour of introducing Self types into a programming language (11. This rationale led to the development of a relation that has become known as matching [4, 5). The matching relation does not support subsumption, however, it does support the inheritance of binary methods. Two forms of matching have been proposed (lJ. Specifically, these relations are known as higher-order matching and I-bound matching. Previous research on these relations indicates that the higher-order matching relation is both reflexive and transitive whereas the f-bound matching is reflexive but not transitive (7]. The higher-order matching relation provides significant flexibility regarding inheritance of methods that utilize or return values of the same type. This flexibility, in certain situations, can restrict the programmer from defining specific classes and methods which are based on constant values [21J. For this reason, the type This is used as a second reference to the type of the object that cannot, contrary to Self, be specialized in subclasses. F-bound matching allows a programmer to define a function that will work for all types of A', a subtype of an upper bound function of type A, with the result type being dependent on A'. The use of parametric polymorphism in f-bound matching provides a connection to subtyping in object-oriented languages. This thesis will contain two main sections. Firstly, significant details concerning deficiencies of the subtype relation and the need to introduce higher-order and f-bound matching relations into programming languages will be explored. Secondly, a new programming language named Win--*Foy Functional Object-Oriented Programming Language has been created, along with a suitable user interface, in order to facilitate experimentation by programmers regarding the matching relation. The construction of the programming language and the user interface will be explained in detail.

A Pragmatic Approach to Ethical Inquiry on Transhuman Athletes and Gene Doping in Sport

Gene doping is the most recent addition to the list of banned practices formulated by the World Anti-doping Agency. It is a subset of doping that utilizes the technology involved in gene therapy. The latter is still in the experimental phase but has the potential to be used as a type of medical treatment involving alterations of a patient‘s genes. I apply a pragmatic form of ethical inquiry to evaluate the application of this medical innovation in the context of sport for performance-enhancement purposes and how it will affect sport, the individual, society and humanity at large. I analyze the probable ethical implications that will emerge from such procedures in terms of values that lie at the heart of the major arguments offered by scholars on both affirmative and opposing sides of the debate on gene doping, namely fairness, autonomy and the conception of what it means to be human.

The vocation of responsibility : a conceptual analysis of a modern idea

Please consult the paper edition of this thesis to read. It is available on the 5th Floor of the Library at Call Number: Z 9999 P55 N48 2004

“You Know What I Mean?”- Language and Cultural Retention in Luso-Canadian Mothers in the Greater Toronto Area

The Portuguese community is one of the largest diasporic groups in the Greater Toronto Area and the choice of retention and transmission of language and culture to Luso-Canadians is crucial to the development and sustainability of the community. The overall objective of this study is to learn about the factors that influence Luso-Canadian mothers’ inclination to teach Portuguese language and cultural retention to their children. To explore this topic I employed a qualitative research design that included in-depth interviews conducted in 2012 with six Luso-Canadian mothers. Three central arguments emerged from the findings. First, Luso-Canadian mothers interviewed posses a pronounced desire for their children to succeed academically, and to provide opportunities that their children that they did not have. Second, five of the mothers attempt to achieve this mothering objective partly by disconnecting from their Portuguese roots, and by disassociating their children from the Portuguese language and culture. Third, the disconnection they experience and enact is influenced by the divisions evident in the Portuguese community in the GTA that divides regions and hierarchically ranks dialects, and groups. I conclude that the children in these households inevitably bear the prospects of maintaining a vibrant Portuguese community in the GTA and I propose that actions by the community in ranking dialects influence mothers’ decisions about transmitting language and culture to their children.