Development of hypogene and supergene alteration and copper mineralization patterns, Sar Cheshmeh porphyry copper deposits, Iran /

The formation of the Sar Cheshmeh porphyry Cu-Mo deposit is related to the culmination of calc-alkaline igneous activity in the Kerman region. The deposit comprises a suite of Late Cenozoic intrusive sub-volcanic and extrusive rocks emplaced into a folded series of Eocene andesitic lavas and pyroclastic sediments. The earliest stage of magmatism was emplacement of a large granodiorite stock about 29 m.y.b.p. This was followed by intrusion of two separate porphyritic bodies at 15 (Sar Cheshrneh porphyry) and 12 m.y.b.p. (Late porphyry) and a series of sub-volcanic dikes between 12 and 9 m.y.b.p. Magmatic activity terminated with multi-phase extrusion of a Pelean dacitic dome complex between 10 and 2.8 m.y.b.p. The country rocks and the earlier porphyritic intrusions are pervasively altered to biotite-rich potassium silicate (metasomatic and hydrothermal) sericite-clay, phyllic and chlorite-clay, argillic assemblages. These grade outwards to an extensive propylitic zone. Within the ore body, the later intra-. and post-mineral dikes only reach the propylitic grade. At least three different sets of quartz veins are present, including a sericite-chlorite-quartz set which locally retrogrades pervasive secondary biotite to sericite. In the hypogene zone, metasomatic and hydrothermal alteration is related to all stages of magmatism but copper mineralization and veining are restricted to a period of 15 to 9 m.y.b.p.related to the early intrusive phases. The copper mineralization and silicate alteration do not fit a simple annular ring model but have been greatly modified by, 1. The existence of an ititial, outer ring, of metasomatic alteration overprinted by an inner.ring of hydrothermal alteration and, 2. later extensive dilating effects of intra- and post-mineral dikes. The hydrothermal clay mineral assemblage in the hypogene zone is illite-chlorite-kaolinite-smectite (beidellite). Preliminary studies indicate that the amount of each of these clays varies vertically and that hydrothermal zonation of clay minerals is possible. However, these minerals alter to illite-kaolinite assemblages in the supergene sulfide zone and to more kaolinite-rich assemblages in the supergene leached zone. Hydrothermal biotite breaks down readily in the supergene zone and is not well preserved in surface outcrops. The distribution of copper minerals in the supergene sulfide enrichment zone is only partly related to rock type being more dependent on topography and the availability of fractures.

The effect of motor-encoding activities on memory and performance in a grade one reading program

This study examined the effectiveness of motor-encoding activities on memory and performance of students in a Grade One reading program. There were two experiments in the study. Experiment 1 replicated a study by Eli Saltz and David Dixon (1982). The effect of motoric enactment (Le., pretend play) of sentences on memory for the sentences was investigated. Forty Grade One students performed a "memory-for-sentences" technique, devised by Saltz and Dixon. Only the experimental group used motoric enactment of the sentences. Although quantitative findings revealed no significant difference between the mean scores of the experimental group versus the control group, aspects of the experimental design could have affected the results. It was suggested that Saltz and Dixon's study could be replicated again, with more attention given to variables such as population size, nature of the test sentences, subjects' previous educational experience and conditions related to the testing environment. The second experiment was an application of Saltz and Dixon's theory that motoric imagery should facilitate memory for sentences. The intent was to apply this theory to Grade One students' ability to remember words from their reading program. An experimental gym program was developed using kinesthetic activities to reinforce the skills of the classroom reading program. The same subject group was used in Experiment 2. It was hypothesized that the subjects who experienced the experimental gym program would show greater signs of progress in reading ability, as evidenced by their scores on Form G of the Woodcock Reading Mastery Test--Revised. The data from the WRM--R were analyzed with a 3-way split-plot analysis of variance in which group (experimental vs. control) and sex were the between subjects variables and test-time (pre-test vs. post-test) was the within-subjects variable. Findings revealed the following: (a) both groups made substantial gains over time on the visual-auditory learning sub-test and the triple action of group x sex x time also was significant; (b) children in the experimental and control groups performed similarly on both the pre- and post-test of the letter identification test; (c) time was the only significant effect on subjects' performance on the word identification task; (d) work attack scores showed marked improvement in performance over time for both the experimenta+ and control groups; (e) passage comprehension scores indicated an improvement in performance for both groups over time. Similar to Experiment 1, it is suggested that several modifications in the experimental design could produce significant results. These factors are addressed with suggestions for further research in the area of active learning; more specifically, the effect of motor-encoding activities on memory and academic performance of children.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Annual Variation in Bee Community Structure in the Context of Disturbance (Niagara Region, South-Western Ontario)

This study examined annual variation in phenology, abundance and diversity of a bee community during 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2008 in recovered landscapes at the southern end of St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada. Overall, 8139 individuals were collected from 26 genera and sub-genera and at least 57 species. These individuals belonged to the 5 families found in eastern North America (Andrenidae, Apidae, Colletidae, Halictidae and Megachilidae). The bee community was characterized by three distinct periods of flight activity over the four years studied (early spring, late spring/early summer, and late summer). The number of bees collected in spring was significantly higher than those collected in summer. In 2003 and 2006 abundance was higher, seasons started earlier and lasted longer than in 2004 and 2008, as a result of annual rainfall fluctuations. Differences in abundance for low and high disturbance sites decreased with years. Annual trends of generic richness resembled those detected for species. Likewise, similarity in genus and species composition decreased with time. Abundant and common taxa (13 genera and 18 species) were more persistent than rarer taxa being largely responsible for the annual fluctuations of the overall community. Numerous species were sporadic or newly introduced. The invasive species Anthidium oblongatum was first recorded in Niagara in 2006 and 2008. Previously detected seasonal variation patterns were confirmed. Furthermore, this study contributed to improve our knowledge of temporal dynamics of bee communities. Understanding temporal variation in bee communities is relevant to assessing impacts caused on their habitats by diverse disturbances.

Equational Reasoning about Object-Oriented Programs

Formal verification of software can be an enormous task. This fact brought some software engineers to claim that formal verification is not feasible in practice. One possible method of supporting the verification process is a programming language that provides powerful abstraction mechanisms combined with intensive reuse of code. In this thesis we present a strongly typed functional object-oriented programming language. This language features type operators of arbitrary kind corresponding to so-called type protocols. Sub classing and inheritance is based on higher-order matching, i.e., utilizes type protocols as basic tool for reuse of code. We define the operational and axiomatic semantics of this language formally. The latter is the basis of the interactive proof assistant VOOP (Verified Object-Oriented Programs) that allows the user to prove equational properties of programs interactively.