The mechanism of the regulation of energy distribution between photosystems 1 and 2 in the cyanobacterium Synechococcus sp. strain PCC 7002 /

Cyanobacteria are able to regulate the distribution of absorbed light energy between photo systems 1 and 2 in response to light conditions. The mechanism of this regulation (the state transition) was investigated in the marine cyanobacterium Synechococcus sp. strain PCC 7002. Three cell types were used: the wild type, psaL mutant (deletion of a photo system 1 subunit thought to be involved in photo system 1 trimerization) and the apcD mutant (a deletion of a phycobilisome subunit thought to be responsible for energy transfer to photo system 1). Evidence from 77K fluorescence emission spectroscopy, room temperature fluorescence and absorption cross-section measurements were used to determine a model of energy distribution from the phycobilisome and chlorophyll antennas in state 1 and state 2. The data confirm that in state 1 the phycobilisome is primarily attached to PS2. In state 2, a portion of the phycobilisome absorbed light energy is redistributed to photo system 1. This energy is directly transferred to photo system 1 by one of the phycobilisome terminal emitters, the product of the apcD gene, rather than via the photo system 2 chlorophyll antenna by spillover (energy transfer between the photo system 2 and photo system 1 chlorophyll antenna). The data also show that energy absorbed by the photo system 2 chlorophyll antenna is redistributed to photo system 1 in state 2. This could occur in one of two ways; by spillover or in a way analogous to higher plants where a segment of the chlorophyll antenna is dissociated from photo system 2 and becomes part of the photo system 1 antenna. The presence of energy transfer between neighbouring photo system 2 antennae was determined at both the phycobilisome and chlorophyll level, in states 1 and 2. Increases in antenna absorption cross-section with increasing reaction center closure showed that there is energy transfer (connectivity) between photosystem 2 antennas. No significant difference was shown in the amount of connectivity under these four conditions.

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.