Canadian investors and the discount on closed-end funds

Small investors' sentiment has been proposed by behaviouralists to explain the existence and behavior of discount on closed-end funds (CEFD). The empirical tests of this sentiment hypothesis so far provide equivocal results. Besides, most of out-of-sample tests outside U.S. are not robust in the sense that they fail to well control other firm characteristics and risk factors that may explain stock return and to provide a formal cross-sectional test of the link between CEFD and stock return. This thesis explores the role of CEFD in asset pricing and further validates CEFD as a sentiment proxy in Canadian context and augments the extant studies by examining the redemption feature inherent in Canadian closed-end funds and by enhancing the robustness of the empirical tests. Our empirical results document differential behaviors in discounts between redeemable funds and non-redeemable funds. However, we don't find supportive evidence of CEFD as a priced factor. Specifically, the stocks with different exposures to CEFD fail to provide significantly different average return. Nor does CEFD provide significant incremental explanatory power, after controlling other well-known firm characteristics and risk factors, in cross-sectional as well as time-series variation of stock return. This evidence, together with the findings from our direct test of CEFD as a sentiment index, suggests that CEFD, even the discount on traditional non-redeemable closed-end funds, is unlikely to be driven by elusive sentiment in Canada.

An Act to authorise the stock held by private parties in the Welland Canal to be purchased on behalf of the Province [Welland Canal Stock Bill], 1841

The bill is a proposal by the government to purchase Welland Canal stock held in private hands. The bill was read for the first time on Wednesday 4 August, 1841, and received second reading on 10th August, 1841. One hundred and fifty copies were printed of the bill. This example was addressed to Samuel Street at the Falls of Niagara, by William Hamilton Merritt, September 1841.

Stock market reactions to changes in the FTSE SmallCap and S&P/TSX SmallCap indices

Stocks added to (deleted from) the Russell 2000 and the S&P 600 indexes experience positive (negative) abnormal returns following the announcement. However, researchers disagree on whether these abnormal returns are permanent or temporary and offer competing explanations. I address this controversy by examining market reactions for firms that are added to or deleted from the FTSE Small Cap index (the main testing sample) and the S&P/TSX SmallCap index (the comparison sample). For the main testing sample, all stocks except pure additions, experience a permanent price change that is accompanied by a permanent change in liquidity. However, for the comparison sample, abnormal returns over the announcement period fully reverted within 30 days. In further examination of stock liquidity for the main testing sample, sample stocks experience permanent change in liquidity. Taken together, the observed results support the price pressure and liquidity hypotheses.

Electrical Development Company of Ontario certificate of stock ownership, ca. 1910.

The Electrical Development Company of Ontario was created in 1903. It was one of three private power companies that had water power leases with the Niagara Parks Commission, but was the only one that was financed with Canadian capital. The company built the Toronto Power Generating Station at Niagara Falls beginning in 1906, and the power house was completed in 1913. During the construction, there was much debate about whether the utility should remain privately operated or become a public utility. In 1920, the company became part of the public utility.

O.S. Rixford Manufacturing Company corporate stock book, 1883-1898.

Around 1837, Luther Rixford founded a tool manufacturing business (originally known as the Luther Rixford Manufacturing Co.) in East Highgate, Vermont, that specialized in manufacturing scythes and other agricultural tools. A branch of this business was established in Upper Bedford, Quebec, around the late 1840's. Subsequent generations of the Rixford family took over the operations of both facilities, and in 1857 Oscar S. Rixford renamed the company the O.S. Rixford Manufacturing Co. The company was incorporated in 1883. Around 1920, the O.S. Rixford Manufacturing Company (of Canada) was acquired by Welland Vale Manufacturing, in St. Catharines, Ontario. The Rixford Company in Vermont continued operations until 1956, when decreasing demand for the tools they manufactured caused them to close their doors.

A stochastic dynamic programming approach for pricing options on stock-index futures

The aim of this thesis is to price options on equity index futures with an application to standard options on S&P 500 futures traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. Our methodology is based on stochastic dynamic programming, which can accommodate European as well as American options. The model accommodates dividends from the underlying asset. It also captures the optimal exercise strategy and the fair value of the option. This approach is an alternative to available numerical pricing methods such as binomial trees, finite differences, and ad-hoc numerical approximation techniques. Our numerical and empirical investigations demonstrate convergence, robustness, and efficiency. We use this methodology to value exchange-listed options. The European option premiums thus obtained are compared to Black's closed-form formula. They are accurate to four digits. The American option premiums also have a similar level of accuracy compared to premiums obtained using finite differences and binomial trees with a large number of time steps. The proposed model accounts for deterministic, seasonally varying dividend yield. In pricing futures options, we discover that what matters is the sum of the dividend yields over the life of the futures contract and not their distribution.

The Impact of a Corporate Name Change on Stock Price and Trading Volume of Canadian Companies

This thesis examines the impact of a corporate name change on stock price and trading volume of Canadian companies around the announcement date, the approval date, and the adoption date over the time period from 1997 to 2011. Name changes are classified into six categories: major and minor, structural and pure, diversified and focused, accompanied with a change in ticker symbol and without a change in ticker symbol, “Gold” name addition and deletion, and different reasons for name changes (e.g., merger and acquisition, change of structure, change of strategy, and better image). The thesis uses the standard event study methodology to perform abnormal return and trading volume analyses. In addition, regression analysis is employed to examine which type of a name change has the largest impact on cumulative abnormal returns. Sample stocks exhibit a significant positive abnormal return one-day prior to the approval day and one day after the adoption date. Around the approval date we observe significant abnormal returns for stocks with a structural name change. On the day after the adoption date we document abnormal returns for stocks with major, minor, structural, pure, focused, and ticker symbol name changes. If a merger or acquisition is the reason for a name change, companies tend to experience a significant positive abnormal return one-day before the approval date and on the adoption date. If a change of structure is the reason for a name change, companies exhibit a significant positive abnormal return on the approval date and a significant negative abnormal return on the adoption date. In case of a change of strategy as the reason for a name change, companies show a significant negative abnormal return around the approval date and a significant positive abnormal return around the adoption date.

Are Idiosyncratic Skewness and Idiosyncratic Kurtosis Priced?

This thesis investigates the pricing effects of idiosyncratic moments. We document that idiosyncratic moments, namely idiosyncratic skewness and idiosyncratic kurtosis vary over time. If a factor/characteristic is priced, it must show minimum variation to be correlated with stock returns. Moreover, we can identify two structural breaks in the time series of idiosyncratic kurtosis. Using a sample of US stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ markets from January 1970 to December 2013, we run Fama-MacBeth test at the individual stock level. We document a negative and significant pricing effect of idiosyncratic skewness, consistent with the finding of Boyer et al. (2010). We also report that neither idiosyncratic volatility nor idiosyncratic kurtosis are consistently priced. We run robustness tests using different model specifications and period sub-samples. Our results are robust to the different factors and characteristics usually included in the Fama-MacBeth pricing tests. We also split first our sample using endogenously determined structural breaks. Second, we divide our sample into three equal sub-periods. The results are consistent with our main findings suggesting that expected returns of individual stocks are explained by idiosyncratic skewness. Both idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic kurtosis are irrelevant to asset prices at the individual stock level. As an alternative method, we run Fama-MacBeth tests at the portfolio level. We find that idiosyncratic skewness is not significantly related to returns on idiosyncratic skewness-sorted portfolios. However, it is significant when tested against idiosyncratic kurtosis sorted portfolios.

Are Idiosyncratic Skewness and Idiosyncratic Kurtosis Priced?

This thesis investigates the pricing effects of idiosyncratic moments. We document that idiosyncratic moments, namely idiosyncratic skewness and idiosyncratic kurtosis vary over time. If a factor/characteristic is priced, it must show minimum variation to be correlated with stock returns. Moreover, we can identify two structural breaks in the time series of idiosyncratic kurtosis. Using a sample of US stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ markets from January 1970 to December 2013, we run Fama-MacBeth test at the individual stock level. We document a negative and significant pricing effect of idiosyncratic skewness, consistent with the finding of Boyer et al. (2010). We also report that neither idiosyncratic volatility nor idiosyncratic kurtosis are consistently priced. We run robustness tests using different model specifications and period sub-samples. Our results are robust to the different factors and characteristics usually included in the Fama-MacBeth pricing tests. We also split first our sample using endogenously determined structural breaks. Second, we divide our sample into three equal sub-periods. The results are consistent with our main findings suggesting that expected returns of individual stocks are explained by idiosyncratic skewness. Both idiosyncratic volatility and idiosyncratic kurtosis are irrelevant to asset prices at the individual stock level. As an alternative method, we run Fama-MacBeth tests at the portfolio level. We find that idiosyncratic skewness is not significantly related to returns on idiosyncratic skewness-sorted portfolios. However, it is significant when tested against idiosyncratic kurtosis sorted portfolios.

List of Prices Totalling 7 Pounds 55 Pence

List of prices totaling 7 pounds, 55 pence [no indication what this list refers to] Sept. 15, 1848.

List of Names and Prices Signed by Albert W. Sampson

List of names and prices signed by Albert W. Sampson, n.d.

Certificate for One Share of Capital Stock in Nicola Valley Coal and Coke Company

Certificate for 1 share of capital stock in Nicola Valley Coal and Coke Company to Welland D. Woodruff, May 13, 1905.

Certificate for Twenty-One Shares of Capital Stock in Nicola Valley Coal and Coke Company

Certificate for 21 shares of capital stock in Nicola Valley Coal and Coke Company to Welland D. Woodruff, Oct. 16, 1905.

Certificate for One Thousand Shares of Capital Stock in Lincoln-Nipissing Development Co. Ltd.

Certificate for 1,000 shares of capital stock in Lincoln-Nipissing Development Co. Ltd. to Hamilton K. Woodruff, Feb. 21, 1907.