Crowland Municipality : an act for regulating and governing auctioneers, and other persons putting up for sale, goods, wares, and merchandise to the highest or best bidder., 1854

On February 1st, 1854 an act was passed in order to regulate the sale of goods, wares and merchandise. Section I pertained to the fact that any merchant would first obtain a license. Section II deemed that no merchant should sell any wine or spirituous liquors, beer or ale within the municipality of Crowland in any less quantity than 5 gallons or less than 12 bottles in any place other than a House of Public Entertainment without having obtained a license. Section III was in regard to licensing any person who would use a billiard table which was set up for hire or gain. Section IV stated that all sums of money paid by the keepers of Houses of Public Entertainment plus the imperial duty of 2 pound would be payable to the Treasurer of the Municipality of Crowland. Section V was written regarding the continuance of the act to regulate inns, taverns, temperance houses and other Houses of Public Entertainment. Section VI specified that all recesses (not authorized to sell liquor) would pay the sum of 2 pounds. Section VII declared that Peter Benedict was appointed Revenue Inspector of the township and section VIII stated that recess-keepers who took out liquor licenses would be required to pay 6 pounds 5 shillings and for violating this they would pay a penalty. This document was written by Leonard M. Matthews, Township reeve and Alex Reid, clerk.

Accounting for Human Rights Violations Risk: Conflict Minerals Mandatory Disclosures under the Dodd Frank Act

This paper examines the equity market response to firms’ disclosure of human rights violation risk with regard to conflict mineral usage as required by Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act (the Act). This paper assesses the aggregate equity market response to regulatory events leading to the passage of the Act, the equity market reaction to voluntary early disclosures and mandatory disclosures of conflict mineral information in Form SD, as well as the determinants of the equity market response. Using a sample of 4,399 US registrants from January 1, 2008 to September 30, 2014, we document a significant negative stock market reaction to the passage of the Act and to conflict minerals disclosures on Form SD. The equity market reaction is more negative and limited to companies that source their minerals from conflict zones, companies with human rights violations, and companies with ambiguous disclosures. Taken together, the results of this study provide an economic justification for companies with poor conflict minerals practices to improve in order to avoid high costs that will arise if firms are forced to disclose human rights abuses. This paper also provides preliminary evidence that Form SD is successful in reducing the governance gap that exposes investors to unnecessary sanction, litigation and reputation risk from firms’ activities in conflict minerals usage.