A safe place /

This study is an effort to give voice to an experience. The experience in question is the decision of a student to trust a practitioner. The study also describes the features which led the student to believe that the practitioner would provide a "safe place" for interaction around matters of a delicate or personal nature. This study is the gift oftwo coauthors, each with a unique story which offers description of critical incidents, and what made these events meaningful. At the heart of the study is the potential for education and its professionals to provide safe places for students. Analysis of the data determines that a safe place involves two parties, one seeking a safe place and another who provides the safe place-in this study, the student and the practitioner. The student, with urgency, seeks a safe place to disclose personal information. In this urgency the student is confronted with features of control, comfort, respect, felt sense, and nonjudgemental listening. These features are the constitutive elements of a Safe Place. Capacity to recognize and construct safe places is a competency which the existing school lifeworld demands of today's practitioners. Understanding what are deemed to be safe places and how practitioners might work to create them are the extended outcomes of this study.

Amputation and heat induced protein synthesis in the regenerating forelimb of Notophthalmus viridescens

This thesis compares the responses of regenerating forelimb tissues of the newt Notophthalmu..f vlridescens to the stresses of hyperthermia and ID.echanical injury of amputation. In particular, both quantitative and qualitative changes in the synthesis of soluble proteins in stump tissues, including those of the heat shock protein family (HSP70-1ike) were examined. Results from SDS-PAGEfluorography indicate that the trauma of amputation mimics the heat shock response both quantitatively and temporally in its transient repression of the synthesis of most normal cellular proteins, and qualitatively. in the locaJized expression of two unique proteins (hsp30 and hsp70). Fluorography of proteins separated by twodimensional gets revealed that thelCl4:alizedt amputation induced 70kDa protein (amp70) was distinct from the more basic newt hsp/hsc70 isoforms. Although limb amputation resulted in an increase in the synthesis of HSP70 mRNA analogous to that induced by heat 3.b.OCKf amp70 did not cross-react with murine monoclonal antibodies directed against both the inducible and cognate HSP70 proteins of the human. Thus, the possible relationship of amp70 to other members of the HSP70-1ike protein family remains unclear. Western analyses indicated that the levels of the constitutive form of HSP70 (hsc70) were found to be regulated in a stage-dependent manner in the distal stump tissues of the regen,erating forelimb of the newt. The highest levels were found in the mid-late bud stage, a period during which rapidly dividing blastema cells begin to redifferentiate in a proximodistal direction. Immediately after amputation) hsc70 synthesis and accumulation was depressed below steady-state levels measured in the unamputated limb~ The results are discussed in light of a possible role for HSPs and amputatio~ induced proteins in the epimorphic regeneration of the amphibian limb.

Assessment of chromatin activity in mouse and human tissues

Pancreatic deoxyribonuclease preferentially digests active genes during all phases of the cell cycle including mitosis. Recently, a DNAse I-directed in ~ nick translation technique has been used to demonstrate differences in the DNAse I sensitivity of euchromatic and heterochromatic regions of mitotic chromosomes. This ill ~ technique has been used in this study to ask whether facultative heterochromatin of the inactive X chromosome can be distinguished from the active X chromosome in mouse and human tissues. In addition to this, in ~ nick translation has been used to distinguish constitutive heterochromatin in mouse and human mitotic chromosomes. Based on relative levels of DNAse I sensitivity, the inactive X chromosome could not be distinguished from the active X chromosome in either mouse or human tissues but regions of constitutive heterochromatin could be distinguished by their relative DNAse I insensitivity. The use of !D situ nick translation was also applied to tissue sections of 7.5 day mouse embryos to ask whether differing levels of DNAse I sensitivity could be detected between different tissue types. Differences in DNAse I sensitivities were detected in three tissues examined; embryonic ectoderm, an embryo-derived tissue, and two extraembryonic tissues, extraembryonic ectoderm and ectoplacental cone. Embryonic ectoderm and extraembryonic ectoderm nuclei possessed comparable levels of DNAse I sensitivity while ectoplacental cone was significantly less DNAse I sensitive. This suggests that tissue-specific mechanisms such as chromatin structure may be involved in the regulation of gene activity in certain tissue types. This may also shed some light on possible tissue specific mechanisms regulating X chromosome activity in the developing mouse embryo.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Unique and unifying themes in the mechanisms regulating the expression of the arabidopsis thaliana PR-1 and Solanum tuberosum PR-10a inducible defense genes

Arabidopsis is a model plant used to study disease resistance; Solanum tuberosum or potato is a crop species. Both plants possess inducible defense mechanisms that are deployed upon recognition of pathogen invasion. Transcriptional reprogramming is crucial to the activation of defense responses. The Pathogenesis-Related (PR) genes are activated in these defense programs. Expression of Arabidopsis PR-l and potato PR-10a serve as markers for the deployment of defense responses in these plants. PR-l expression indicates induction of systemic acquired resistance (SAR). Activation of SAR requires accumulation of salicylic acid (SA), in addition to the interaction of the non-expressor of pathogenesis-related genes I (NPRI), with the TGA transcription factors. The PR-10a is activated in response to pathogen invasion, wounding and elicitor treatment. PR-10a induction requires recruitment of the Whirly I (Whyl) activator to the promoter. This locus is also negatively regulated by the silencer element binding factor (SEBF). We established that both the PR-l and PR-10a are occupied by repressors under non-inducing conditions. TGA2 was found to be a constitutive resident and repressor of PR-l, which mediates repression by forming an oligomeric complex on the promoter. The DNA-binding activity of this oligomer required the TGA2 N-terminus (NT). Under resting conditions we determined that the PR-10a is bound by a repressosome containing SEBF and curiously the activator Pto interacting protein 4 (Pti4). In the context of this repressosome, SEBF is responsible for PR-10a binding, yet rWe also showed that PR-l and PR-10a are activated by different means. In PR-l activation the NPRI NT domain alleviates TGA2-mediated repression by interacting with the TGA2 NT. TGA2 remains at the PR-l but adopts a dimeric conformation and forms an enhanceosome with NPRl. In contrast, the PR-10a is activated by evicting the repressosome and recruiting Why! to the promoter. These results advance our understanding of the mechanisms regulating PR-l and PR-10a expression under resting and inducing conditions. This study also revealed that the means of regulation for related genes can differ greatly between model and crop s

Personal soundtracks on public transit : personal listening devices and socio-spatial negotiations of students' bus journeys

One way of exploring the power of sound in the experience and constitution of space is through the phenomenon of personal listening devices (PLDs) in public environments. In this thesis, I draw from in-depth interviews with eleven Brock University students in S1. Catharines, Ontario, to show how PLDs (such as MP3 players like the iPod) are used to create personalized soundscapes and mediate their public transit journeys. I discuss how my interview participants experience the space-time of public transit, and show how PLDs are used to mediate these experiences in acoustic and non-acoustic ways. PLD use demonstrates that acoustic and environmental experiences are co-constitutive, which highlights a kinaesthetic quality of the transit-space. My empirical findings show that PLDs transform space, particularly by overlapping public and private appropriations of the bus. I use these empirical findings to discuss the PLD phenomenon in the theoretical context of spatiality, and more specifically, acoustic space. J develop the ontological notion of acoustic space, stating that space shares many of the properties of sound, and argue that sound is a rich epistemological tool for understanding and explaining our everyday experiences.

Singing Nature, Dancing Buddha: Zen, Language, and the Groundlessness of Silence

This thesis presents Zen experience as aesthetic in nature. This is done through an analysis of language, a central concern for Zen Buddhism. The thesis develops two modes of language at work in Zen: representational and indexical. What these modes of language entail, the kind of relations that are developed through their use, are explored with recourse to a variety of Zen platforms: poetry, the koan, zazen, music, and suizen. In doing so, a primacy of listening is found in Zen - a listening without a listener. Given this primacy of listening, silence comes to the forefront of the investigation. An analysis of John Cage's 4'33" provides this thesis with justification of the groundlessness of silence, and the groundlessness of subjectivity. Listening allows for the abyssal subject to emerges, which in tum allows for reality to present itself outside of the constitutive function of language.