Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

News in the age of empire : two war scandals

This thesis argues that the motivations underpinning the mainstream news media have fundamentally changed in the 21 sl century. As such, the news is no longer best understood as a tool for propaganda or agenda setting; instead it seems that the news is only motivated by the flow of global network capitalism. The author contrasts the work of Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman with that of Gilles Deleuze. Chomsky and Herman's 'Propaganda Model' has been influential within the fields of media studies and popular culture. The 'propaganda model' states that the concentration of ownership of the media has allowed the media elite to exert a disproportionate amount of influence over the mass media. Deleuze, on the other hand, regards the mass media as being yet another cog within the global capitalist mechanism, and is therefore separate from ideology or propaganda. The author proposes that 'propaganda' is no longer a sufficient word to describe the function of the news as terms like 'propaganda' imply some form of national sovereignty or governmental influence. To highlight how the news has 'changed from an instrument of propaganda to an instrument of accumulation, the author compares and contrasts the· coverage of the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal with that of the Haditha Civilian Massacre. Although similar in nature, the author proposes that the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal received a disproportionate amount of coverage within the mainstream press because of its exciting and sensational nature.

Top-down and Bottom-up influences on ACC activation: Evaluation of a proposed model of the feedback-related negativity

The Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) is thought to reflect the dopaminergic prediction error signal from the subcortical areas to the ACC (i.e., a bottom-up signal). Two studies were conducted in order to test a new model of FRN generation, which includes direct modulating influences of medial PFC (i.e., top-down signals) on the ACC at the time of the FRN. Study 1 examined the effects of one’s sense of control (top-down) and of informative cues (bottom-up) on the FRN measures. In Study 2, sense of control and instruction-based (top-down) and probability-based expectations (bottom-up) were manipulated to test the proposed model. The results suggest that any influences of medial PFC on the activity of the ACC that occur in the context of incentive tasks are not direct. The FRN was shown to be sensitive to salient stimulus characteristics. The results of this dissertation partially support the reinforcement learning theory, in that the FRN is a marker for prediction error signal from subcortical areas. However, the pattern of results outlined here suggests that prediction errors are based on salient stimulus characteristics and are not reward specific. A second goal of this dissertation was to examine whether ACC activity, measured through the FRN, is altered in individuals at-risk for problem-gambling behaviour (PG). Individuals in this group were more sensitive to the valence of the outcome in a gambling task compared to not at-risk individuals, suggesting that gambling contexts increase the sensitivity of the reward system to valence of the outcome in individuals at risk for PG. Furthermore, at-risk participants showed an increased sensitivity to reward characteristics and a decreased response to loss outcomes. This contrasts with those not at risk whose FRNs were sensitive to losses. As the results did not replicate previous research showing attenuated FRNs in pathological gamblers, it is likely that the size and time of the FRN does not change gradually with increasing risk of maladaptive behaviour. Instead, changes in ACC activity reflected by the FRN in general can be observed only after behaviour becomes clinically maladaptive or through comparison between different types of gain/loss outcomes.