Teachers' processes of negotiating meaning of new curriculum

This qualitative study addresses the question of how teachers negotiate meaning of new curriculum to better understand how curriculum is transformed from a theoretical construct to a practical one. Through interviews with 5 teachers, their experiences were examined as they negotiated the process of implementing new curriculum. Three theoretical constructs provided the entry point into the study: epistemology, teacher knowledge, and teacher learning. Using inductive analysis, 4 points or attributes of negotiation emerged: reference, growth, autonomy, and reconciliation. These attributes provided a theoretical framework from which a constructivist conceptualization of teacher learning and teacher knowledge could serve to understand the process of how teachers negotiate meaning of curriculum. Studied and theorized in this way, teacher knowledge and teacher learning are seen to be inextricably linked in a relationship that is dynamically changed by forces of stability and instability. Theorizing the negotiation of meaning from a constructivist epistemology also strengthened the assertion that negotiating meaning is a unique structural process, and that knowledge construction is therefore unique to each knower and subject to experience in a particular time and place. The implications for such a theory are, first, that it questions the legitimacy of privatized teacher practice and, second, that it calls for a renewed conceptualization of collegial network and relationship to strengthen the capacity for negotiating meaning of curricular initiatives. Understanding the relationship of curricular theory and negotiating meaning also has implications for curriculum development. In particular, the study highlights the necessity of professional discretion and the generative process of negotiating meaning.

Experiences and meaning of the aquatic environment for individuals with physical disabilities

This study examines the experiences and meaning of physical activity in the aquatic environment to enhance social, cultural and political understanding of its impact in the lives of individuals with physical disabilities. Interviews, lived experience descriptions and artifacts present an explanation of the felt sense oftheir bodies as they engage in swimming or scuba diving. 11 Combining written, verbal and visual descriptions generated by informants provides a detailed account of the unique qualities of physical activity in the water for those with physical disabilities. Participants' descriptions highlight that context is an important aspect of physical activity among individuals with physical disabilities through discussion of motility and the role of the lived body. Aspects of the aquatic environment create a setting that facilitates forgetfulness of the lived body's presence. Instructors and participants alike will benefit from learning the difference between the object body and the lived body, listening to the body's voice as they participate in physical activity .

Escape and connection : a phenomenological investigation into the meaning of an after-school program for adolescent boys

The purpos e of this phenomenological research is to explore the meaning of a YMCA-sponsored after-school recreation program in the lives of four adolescent boys. Listening to youth voice is impor t ant to the ability of othe r s to design, implement and evaluate high-quality programs tha t facilitate learning opportunities tha t a r e meaningful to participants. Within the context of interviews, task-based activities we r e used to ga the r data. Guided by Creswell's analytic spiral (1998), data wa s analyzed according to van Manen's (1990) thematic analysis and Caeilli's (2000) creative narrative analysis. It wa s found tha t this after-school progr am provided the s e adolescents with the opportunity to escape from the i r monotonous after-school activities and the instability of the i r home and school environments. Also, they we r e connected wi th positive peers, caring adults and the wide r community, opportunities tha t we r e limited in othe r aspects of the i r lives. Methodological issues a r e also discussed.

The Meaning of the Virtual YMCA After School Program for Former Participants: An Exploratory Study

Research has shown that after school programs can provide children with opportunities that help foster positive development and adaptation. Current research meets the need for identifying short term outcomes, program standards, and short term evaluation techniques, however less understood is the lasting meaning of participation for previous participants after their participation. The purpose of this study was to explore the meaning and perceived impacts of participation in a preventative, skill-building after school program for former participants. Using an exploratory case study approach, interviews were conducted with six previous participants of the Virtual YMCA and a former school principal. Reconstructed narratives and analyzed transcripts show that participants do still derive meaning and significance from their participation in the program, although highly individualized. Significant aspects of the program are identified, as well as the participant’s perceived impacts which are still present today. Discussion for practitioners, researchers, and funders is provided.

The meaning of multiple medication use in adults: A qualitative study

Over half of prescribed medications are not taken as prescribed, resulting in health and economic consequences. Using constructivist grounded theory, 15 interviews were conducted to develop a theory on understanding the medication adherence choices of individuals, who were between the ages of 40 to 55, were diagnosed with a chronic condition, and taking three or more medications. The results indicate that participants are engaging in self-management strategies, with massive variance in adherence behaviours. Medications are sacrificed for personal and financial reasons, resonating with feelings of fear for the person’s current situation and future. Individuals are struggling with who they have become to who they once were, which becomes related to their medications. Finally, individuals are citing the impact of their physician; citing barriers to communication and Canada’s health care system. Participants’ experiences provided an understanding of the meanings individuals associate with their medications and how this impacts their decision-making.

The Conceptualization and Exploration of Place Allegiance: Towards a Unified Model of Person-Place Relationships within Outdoor Recreation

The academic study of place has been generally defined by two distinct and highly refined discourses within outdoor recreation research: place attachment and sense of place. Place attachment generally describes the intensity of the place relationship, whereas sense of place approaches place from a more holistic and intimate orientation. This study bridges these two methodological and theoretical separate areas of place research together by re-conceptualizing the way in which place relationships are viewed within outdoor recreation research. The Psychological Continuum Model is used to extend the language of place attachment to incorporate more of the philosophy of sense of place while attending to the empirical strength and utility of place attachment. This extension results in the term place allegiance being coined to depict the strong and profound relationships outdoor recreationists build with their places of outdoor recreation. Using a concurrent mixed methods research design, this study explored place allegiance via an online survey (n = 437) and thirteen in-depth qualitative interviews with outdoor recreationists. Results indicate that place allegiance can be measured through a multi-dimensional model of place allegiance that incorporates behaviours, importance, resistance, knowledge and symbolic value. In addition, place allegiance was found to be related to an individual's influence on life course and his/her willingness to exhibit preservation and protection tendencies. Place allegiance plays an important role in acknowledging the importance of authentic place relationships in an effort to confront placelessness. Wilderness recreation is an important avenue for outdoor recreationists to build strong place relationships.

The development of self directedness in public health nurses

This qualitative study examined the perceived thoughts, feelings and experiences of seven public health nurses employed in a southern ontario health department, regarding the initial phase of the introduction of a self-directed orientation program in their place of employment. A desire to understand what factors facilitate public health nurses in the process of becoming self-directed learners was the purpose of this study. Data were gathered by three methods: 1) a standard open-ended interview was conducted by the researcher with each nurse for approximately one hour; 2) personal notes were kept by the researcher throughout the study; and 3) a review of all pertinent health department documents such as typed minutes of meetings and memos which referred to the introduction of the self-directed learning model was conducted. The meaning of the experience for the nurses provided some insights into what does and does not facilitate public health nurses in the process of becoming self-directed learners. Implications and recommendations for program planners, nurse administrators, facilitators of learning and researchers evolved from the findings of this study.

Pausing at the river's edge : a narrative inquiry into the practice of a reading teacher /

In this narrative self-study I retell and connect the stories ofmy personal journey with literacy from childhood to the present. I use narrative as both methodology and method as I story my life experiences and my personal encounters with literacy. The heart ofmy reflections comes from the pages of personal journals written and storied over many years of trying to make meaning of powerful literacy experiences in my life. Now, in going back through the stories and reconstructing meaning, I make connections between the memories along the journey and the place from which I now tell my story. The interpretations I construct give voice to beliefs 1 have lived by and illuminations to moments in time that I have come to see with new eyes as I have engaged in this inquiry. The journey and self-reflection within the pages of this inquiry provide understanding of the driving force behind my personal passion for literacy. I am better able to understand my motivations and share the stories that validate my personal and professional path through time.

Heidegger on the way of thinking

This thesis attempts to clarify what Heidegger meant by the term "thinking" (Denken), where this ^'meanr is submitted in the double sense: firstly, in the sense of what Heidegger intended by the use and exposition of this term that we find in his lecture series. Was Heisst Denken?, where Heidegger quickly makes it clear that this intention is to actually bring thinking on the way, viz. making provision for the leap into thinking, and where this intention was carried out with the employment of a specific guiding phrase. In the second sense, it is an attempt at clarifying the meaning of the term. But this is not to say that we are here simply out to see how Heidegger defines the word '*thinking." It is in fact precisely within such definitive discourse that thought dies out. It is not merely be a case of defining a word, because this enterprise would be just as shallow as much as it would be unworkable. It is for this reason that Heidegger decided to establish for himself the task, not merely of explaining thinking as something to be beheld at a distance, but rather of bringing thinking underway by means of his lecture, proclaiming that, "Only the leap into the river tells us what is swimming. The question 'What is called thinking?' can never be answered by proposing a definition of the concept thinking, and then diligently explaining what is contained in that definition." (WCT, 21) This being Heidegger's intention, in order to understand Heidegger in his treatment of the term thinking, it is clear that we must also undergo an experience with thinking. It is in this spirit that the present work was written so as to collaborate the two senses of what Heidegger meant by "thinking."

The lived experience of women with recurrent ovarian cancer /

The purpose of this study was to understand the Hved experience of 6 women with recurrent ovarian cancer. Six women were interviewed 2-20 weeks after the recurrence of their ovarian cancer. Interview questions focused on the meaning of the recurrence and their communication with others. Women were asked about the information and support that they felt they needed at that time, van Manen's method of reflection and writing guided the inquiry. Analysis of the data revealed the themes of: my cancer is back; it means that I will die; talking about it; we are people, we are not a disease; information; and life has changed/life hasn't changed. This study revealed the perspectives of these 6 women with recurrent ovarian cancer. It provided an understanding and knowledge about the lives of these women. Future research should explore the experiences of a larger group of women with recurrent ovarian cancer in order to address their unique needs.

The nature experiences of wilderness recreation leaders : throwing a stone

Through this descriptive exploratory study, the ways that wilderness recreation leaders experience nature are illuminated, deconstructing the assumed environmental benefits of and practices used in outdoor recreation (Haluza-Delay, 2001). This study also offers a foundation for advancing an environmental ethic among wilderness recreation leaders, participants, and organizations. With the continued degradation of and threats to natural environments, and the rising popularity of outdoor recreation participation, the outdoor recreation professional can be a leader in promoting human reconnections to the Earth (Henderson, 1999). Leaders of outdoor recreation experiences play an important role in encouraging these revived relationships to natural settings and can contribute to the necessary environmental consciousness shift needed within Western society (Hanna, 1995; Jordan, 1996). The purpose of this research was to describe the lived-experience in nature of wilderness recreation leaders. Specifically, a phenomenological method of inquiry was used to describe the meaning of nature, the connections and relationships to nature, and the behaviours and emotions experienced in nature by a group of wilderness canoe trip leaders employed by a residential summer camp. In addition to the implications of this research, achieving this outcome provides a rich descriptive understanding of wilderness leaders' experiences—a basis from which to extend future research endeavours and programmatic practices that promote effective environmental outcomes of outdoor recreation participation. Each of the five study participants was employed in the summer of 2003 by an Ontario residential summer camp organization that sponsors extended wilderness river canoe trips for youth. Two in-depth and semi-structured interviews were performed with each participant, asking them to reflect on the canoe trip that they led for the summer camp organization during 2003. Phenomenological data was analyzed according to Colaizzi's (1978) thematic analysis process. Consistent with van Manen's (1997) emphasis on phenomenological writing, the final result presents the essence of the nature experiences of wilderness recreation leaders in the format of a narrative description. This narrative piece is the culmination of this research effort. Throughout the journey, however, various foundations within the outdoor recreation field, such as minimum impact principles, environmentally responsible behaviours, anthropocentric and ecocentric worldviews, and effective leadership are deconstructed and discussed.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Is technology a threat to education? : the contribution of George Parkin Grant

Thesis (M.Ed.)-- Brock University, 1995.

The impact of hospital downsizing on registered nurses displaced from full-time employment

This research identified and explored the various responses often women Registered Nurses displaced from full-time elnployment as staff nurses in general hospitals in southern Ontario. These nurses were among the hundreds in Ontario who were displaced between October 1991 and October 1995 as a result of organizational downsizing and other health care reform initiatives. The purpose ofthis research was to document tIle responses of nurses to job displacement, and how that experience impacted on a nurse's professional identity and her understanding of the nature and utilization of nursing labour. This study incorporated techniques consistent with the principles of naturalistic inquiry and the narrative tradition. A purposive sample was drawn from the Health Sector Training and Adjustment Program database. Data collection and analysis was a three-step process wherein the data collection in each step was informed by the data analysis in the preceding step. The main technique used for qualitative data collection was semistructured, individual and group interviews. Emerging from the data was a rich and textured story ofhow job displacement disrupted the meaningful connections nurses had with their work. In making meaning of this change, displaced nurses journeyed along a three-step path toward labour adjustment. Structural analysis was the interpretive lens used to view the historical, sociopolitical and ideological forces which constrained the choices reasonably available to displaced nurses while Kelly's personal construct theory was the lens used to view the process of making choices and reconstruing their professional identity.