Trainer, Coach, Player, and Manager

Likely a picture of Tom Kearney (Trainer), Al Kellogg (Coach), Eric Stevens (Player), and Randy Olling (Manager) circa 1971.

Nursing staffs' perceptions of a generic service manager position

The recent reengineering within the health care industry has challenged many assumptions regarding traditional structures and roles. Within a product-line management structure, the traditional viewpoint that those who manage patient care areas must have a nursing background, is an example of one such assumption being challenged. The nursing profession is often seen as the greatest obstacle to the implementation of a product-line management structure and generic manager positions (does not require a nursing background), due to the perceived loss of professional identity. This qualitative study focused on how nursing staff within a chronic care and rehabilitation facility perceived a generic service manager position. Focus groups were conducted in three phases, over a 14 month period of time. The data collected from the focus groups were then coded according to common themes. Each phase was analyzed independently, with the study concluding with an analysis and interpretation of the collective results. The results of this study revealed a significant shift in how the nursing staff perceived their professional identity and accountability in light of the implementation of the generic Service Manager position. Initial reactions of personal and professional vulnerability and resentment were seen to transform into an increased ability to explicitly articulate the role of nursing. Changes in behavior that were described included: increased consultation and collaboration with other

CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Managerial Risk-Taking and CEO Excess Compensation

This paper examines risk taking and CEO excess compensation problems in U.S firms to determine their impact on shareholders wealth. Literature suggests a positive effect of CEO incentive risk and strong corporate governance on CEO risk taking. Furthermore, the strong governance mitigates excess compensation problem. Controlling for governance quality and incentive risk, I provide empirical evidence of a significant association between risk taking and CEO excess compensation. When I also control for pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and feedback effects of incentive compensation on CEO risk taking, I find that higher use of incentive pay encourages risk taking, and due to a high exposure to risk CEOs draws excess compensation. Furthermore, I find that the excess compensation problem is more serious with CEOs taking high risk than with those taking low risk. Finally, I find that CEO risk taking also has structural impacts on CEO compensation

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Letter addressed to Press and Radio Friends which is attached to an informal history of the Whirlpool Rapids Bridge. The letter was sent from A.E. Parsons, manager of the Whirlpool Rapids Bridge

Letter (10 typed pages) addressed to Press and Radio Friends which is attached to an informal history of the Whirlpool Rapids Bridge. The letter was sent from A.E. Parsons, manager of the Whirlpool Rapids Bridge, n.d.

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board, Oct. 8, 1886.

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board, Nov. 8, 1886.

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board, Dec. 8, 1886

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board, Jan. 8, 1887.

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board, Feb. 8, 1887.

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for 10 poles, Mar. 5, 1887.

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board

Receipt from E. Carroll, manager of the Welland House, St. Catharines for board, Mar. 8, 1887.