Rights jurisprudence and the charter : evaluating the changing structure of Canadian federalism /

Abstract . Rights jiirisprudence in Canada dates back as far as Confederation in 1867. Between this date and 1982, the organizing principle of Confederation - federalism - has kept this jurisprudence solely within the supremacy of Parliament, subject to its confines and division of powers. After 1982, however, a new constitutional organizing principle was introduced, when Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced the patriation initiative, touted as the "people's package". Individual rights and freedoms were now guaranteed by the Constitution. Citizens of Canada now had a direct link to the Constitution via the Charter and there were now two significantly different organizing principles within the constitutional order widch created an unstable coexistence. This instability has led to a clash between judicially enforced Charter rights and federalism. The Charter has since had both a nationalizing and centralizing effect on Canadian federalism. This thesis explores the relationship between rights and federalism in Canada fix)m Confederation to present day by comparing the jurisprudence of pre and post Charter Canada. An analysis of Supreme Court's (and its predecessor's, the JCPC) decisions shows the profound effect the Charter has had on Canadian federalism. The result has been an undermining of federalism in Canada, with Parliamentary Supremacy replaced by Constitutional supremacy, and ultimately. Judicial Supremacy. Moreover, rights discourse has largely replaced federalism discourse. Canadians have become very attached to their Charter, and are unwilling to allow any changes to the constitution that may affect their rights as political elites discovered the hard way after the collapse of the Meech and Charlottetown Accords. If federalism is to remain a relevant and viable organizing principle in the Constitution, then governments, especially at the provincial level, must find new and iimovative ways to assert their importance within the federation.

Rethinking Fiscal Decentralization Policies in Developing Economies: A Case Study of Ghana

This thesis invites geographers to pay more attention to public policy research by addressing the need to rethink fiscal decentralization policies in Ghana. By applying “Simandan’s wise stance in human geography” and “Grix’s building blocks of social research design”, I developed a conceptual framework that unites two incommensurable ontological and epistemological research positions in geography—the positive and normative positions. I used the framework to investigate two key research questions. First, does fiscal decentralization actually work in Ghana? Through quantitative analysis of empirical revenue and expenditure data (1994-2011) of local governments in Ghana, this study reveals significant issues of inefficiency, inequity, and unaccountability. Local governments generate less revenue, and therefore depend largely on central government transfers for developing their jurisdictions. Worse yet, these transfers are highly unpredictable in terms of amount and timing. Even though a multivariate regression analysis revealed that these transfers are apolitical, the actual disbursement formula tends to focus on equality instead of equity. Additionally, the unclear expenditure assignments in each locality make accountability difficult. In view of these problems, I addressed the question: why is fiscal decentralization held out as a good thing in Ghana? By drawing lessons from Foucault’s and Escobar’s critical discourse analysis, I traced a genealogy of Ghana’s fiscal decentralization. I found that the policy is held out as a good thing in Ghana because of the triangular operation of multiplicities of power, knowledge, and truth regimes at the local, national and international scale. I concluded that although nation-states remains a necessary causal link in fiscal decentralization policy process in Ghana, direct and indirect international involvement have profound effect on these policies. Therefore, rethinking fiscal decentralization involves acknowledging the complex intermingling effects that global, national, and local territories produce.