CEO Compensation, Compensation Risk, and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Technology Firms

Literature suggests that CEOs of technology firms earn higher pay than CEOs of non-technology firms. I investigate whether compensation risk explains the difference in compensation between technology firms and non-technology firms. Controlling for firm size and performance, I find that CEOs in technology firms have higher pay, but also have much higher compensation risk compared to non-technology firms. Compensation risk explains the major part of the difference in CEO pay. My study is consistent with the labor market economics view that CEOs earn competitive risk-adjusted total compensation.

Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance, And Managerial Risk-Taking

This dissertation investigates the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and managerial risk-taking, as well as the differences in governance structure that affect this association. Using a sample of US public firms from 1995 to 2009, we find that firms with strong CSR records engage in higher risk-taking. Furthermore, we find that this relationship is robust when accounting for differences in governance structure and correcting for endogeneity via simultaneous equations modeling. Additional testing indicates that performance in the employee relations dimension of CSR in particular increases with risk-taking, while high firm visibility dampens the association between CSR and the accounting-based measures of risk-taking. Prior literature establishes that high managerial risk-tolerance is necessary for the undertaking of risky yet value-enhancing investment decisions. Thus, the main findings suggest that CSR, rather than being a waste of scarce corporate resources, is instead an important aspect of shareholder value creation. They contribute to the debate on CSR by documenting that corporate risk-taking is one mechanism among others through which CSR maps into higher firm value.

Untangling the Organizational Ambiguities in Supply Chain Risk Recognition, Assessment, and Response: The Role of Network Embeddedness

In this thesis, I focus on supply chain risk related ambiguity, which represents the ambiguities firms exhibit in recognizing, assessing, and responding to supply chain disruptions. I, primarily, argue that ambiguities associated with recognizing and responding to supply chain risk are information gathering and processing problems. Guided by the theoretical perspective of bounded rationality, I propose a typology of supply chain risk related ambiguity with four distinct dimensions. I, also, argue that the major contributor to risk related ambiguity is often the environment, specifically the web of suppliers. Hence, I focus on the characteristics of these supplier networks to examine the sources of ambiguity. I define three distinct elements of network embeddedness – relational, structural, and positional embeddedness – and argue that the ambiguity faced by a firm in appropriately identifying the nature or impacts of major disruptions is a function of these network properties. Based on a survey of large North American manufacturing firms, I found that the extent of the relational ties a firm has and its position in the network are significantly related to supply chain risk related ambiguity. However, this study did not provide any significant support for the hypothesized relationship between structural embeddedness and ambiguity. My research contributes towards the study of supply chain disruptions by using the idea of bounded rationality to understand supply chain risk related ambiguity and by providing evidence that the structure of supply chain networks influences the organizational understanding of and responses to supply chain disruptions.

Effect of executive compensation on firm performance

The paper finds evidence that the equity-based CEO pay is positively related to firm performance and risk-taking. Both stock price and operating performance as well as firm's riskiness increase in the pay-performance sensitivities (PPS) provided by CEO stock options and stock holdings. PPS can explain stock returns better as an additional factor to the Fama-French 3-factor model. When CEOs are compensated with higher PPS, firms experience higher return on asset (ROA). The higher PPS also leads to the higher risk-taking. While CEO incentive compensation has been perceived mixed on its effectiveness, this study provides support to the equity-based CEO compensation in reducing agency conflicts between CEOs and shareholders.

Effects of credit rating change on risk-taking

This thesis investigates whether there are changes in risk-taking behavior following an upgrade or downgrade in credit ratings. Research on effects of rating changes on capital markets is well-documented but the literature on how rating changes may affect firm behavior is sparse. Following, a downgrade in credit rating, managers may increase risk-taking to improve their overall performance or reduce risk-taking following upgrades to ensure that their performance is assessed more on the basis of what they may deem success in the form of an upgrade. Using a sample of firms trading in the U.S from 1994-2013, we find evidence of change in risk-taking behavior. We use cross-sectional regressions and matching using propensity scores and Barber and Lyon (1997) methodology to measure changes in risk-taking and we do find evidence of changes in managerial risk-taking behavior. Furthermore, we find that the direction of change (increase or decrease) in some cases is dependent on the type of measure rather than the type of rating change.