A social-cognitive model of monitoring and its relationship to behaviour in a naturalistic observation : development and individual differences

years 8 months) and 24 older (M == 7 years 4 months) children. A Monitoring Process Model (MPM) was developed and tested in order to ascertain at which component process ofthe MPM age differences would emerge. The MPM had four components: (1) assessment; (2) evaluation; (3) planning; and (4) behavioural control. The MPM was assessed directly using a referential communication task in which the children were asked to make a series of five Lego buildings (a baseline condition and one building for each MPM component). Children listened to instructions from one experimenter while a second experimenter in the room (a confederate) intetjected varying levels ofverbal feedback in order to assist the children and control the component ofthe MPM. This design allowed us to determine at which "stage" ofprocessing children would most likely have difficulty monitoring themselves in this social-cognitive task. Developmental differences were obselVed for the evaluation, planning and behavioural control components suggesting that older children were able to be more successful with the more explicit metacomponents. Interestingly, however, there was no age difference in terms ofLego task success in the baseline condition suggesting that without the intelVention ofthe confederate younger children monitored the task about as well as older children. This pattern ofresults indicates that the younger children were disrupted by the feedback rather than helped. On the other hand, the older children were able to incorporate the feedback offered by the confederate into a plan ofaction. Another aim ofthis study was to assess similar processing components to those investigated by the MPM Lego task in a more naturalistic observation. Together the use ofthe Lego Task ( a social cognitive task) and the naturalistic social interaction allowed for the appraisal of cross-domain continuities and discontinuities in monitoring behaviours. In this vein, analyses were undertaken in order to ascertain whether or not successful performance in the MPM Lego Task would predict cross-domain competence in the more naturalistic social interchange. Indeed, success in the two latter components ofthe MPM (planning and behavioural control) was related to overall competence in the naturalistic task. However, this cross-domain prediction was not evident for all levels ofthe naturalistic interchange suggesting that the nature ofthe feedback a child receives is an important determinant ofresponse competency. Individual difference measures reflecting the children's general cognitive capacity (Working Memory and Digit Span) and verbal ability (vocabulary) were also taken in an effort to account for more variance in the prediction oftask success. However, these individual difference measures did not serve to enhance the prediction oftask performance in either the Lego Task or the naturalistic task. Similarly, parental responses to questionnaires pertaining to their child's temperament and social experience also failed to increase prediction oftask performance. On-line measures ofthe children's engagement, positive affect and anxiety also failed to predict competence ratings.

Top-down and Bottom-up influences on ACC activation: Evaluation of a proposed model of the feedback-related negativity

The Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) is thought to reflect the dopaminergic prediction error signal from the subcortical areas to the ACC (i.e., a bottom-up signal). Two studies were conducted in order to test a new model of FRN generation, which includes direct modulating influences of medial PFC (i.e., top-down signals) on the ACC at the time of the FRN. Study 1 examined the effects of one’s sense of control (top-down) and of informative cues (bottom-up) on the FRN measures. In Study 2, sense of control and instruction-based (top-down) and probability-based expectations (bottom-up) were manipulated to test the proposed model. The results suggest that any influences of medial PFC on the activity of the ACC that occur in the context of incentive tasks are not direct. The FRN was shown to be sensitive to salient stimulus characteristics. The results of this dissertation partially support the reinforcement learning theory, in that the FRN is a marker for prediction error signal from subcortical areas. However, the pattern of results outlined here suggests that prediction errors are based on salient stimulus characteristics and are not reward specific. A second goal of this dissertation was to examine whether ACC activity, measured through the FRN, is altered in individuals at-risk for problem-gambling behaviour (PG). Individuals in this group were more sensitive to the valence of the outcome in a gambling task compared to not at-risk individuals, suggesting that gambling contexts increase the sensitivity of the reward system to valence of the outcome in individuals at risk for PG. Furthermore, at-risk participants showed an increased sensitivity to reward characteristics and a decreased response to loss outcomes. This contrasts with those not at risk whose FRNs were sensitive to losses. As the results did not replicate previous research showing attenuated FRNs in pathological gamblers, it is likely that the size and time of the FRN does not change gradually with increasing risk of maladaptive behaviour. Instead, changes in ACC activity reflected by the FRN in general can be observed only after behaviour becomes clinically maladaptive or through comparison between different types of gain/loss outcomes.