Subjective Ambivalence and the Expression of Anti-Gay Bias

Univalent attitudes toward gay people have been widely studied, but no research to date has examined ambivalent (i.e., torn, conflicted) attitudes toward gay people. However, the Justification-Suppression Model (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) proposes that ambivalence leads to biased expressions through intrapsychic processes which facilitate biased expression, particularly in contexts presenting strong justifications for expressing prejudice and weak pressures to suppress prejudice. I test these implications in the context of bias toward gay people. In Study 1, the measurement of ambivalence is examined in terms of both subjective ambivalence (i.e., the reported experience of “torn” attitudes) and calculated ambivalence (i.e., mathematical conflict between positive and negative attitude components). I find that higher subjective ambivalence is only associated with more negative attitudes toward gay people (and not positive attitudes toward gay people), and that higher subjective ambivalence predicts less gay rights support even after taking negative and positive attitudes toward gay people into account. Further, higher subjective ambivalence is associated with ideological opposition to gay people and more negative intergroup emotions (e.g., intergroup disgust). These findings suggest it is valuable to examine the unique component of subjective ambivalence separate from univalent negativity. Because calculated ambivalence measures are mathematically dependent upon a univalent negative measure, they cannot be examined separately from negativity. Therefore, subjective ambivalence is the focus of Study 2. The main goals of Study 2 were to determine why and when subjective ambivalence is related to bias. I examined the extent to which the negative relation between subjective ambivalence and opposition to anti-gay bullying can be accounted for by lower intergroup empathy and lower collective guilt, which may facilitate the expression of bias in keeping with the JSM. The relation between subjective ambivalence and anti-gay bullying opposition was examined within four social contexts based on a 2 (high vs. low offensiveness) x 2 (normatively unjustified vs. normatively justified) manipulation. I expected that higher subjective ambivalence would be most strongly related to lower intergroup empathy and collective guilt when there are the strongest justifications for bias expression, and that lower intergroup empathy and collective guilt would lead to less opposition to anti-gay bullying. Higher subjective ambivalence predicted less anti-gay bullying opposition. After accounting for positivity and negativity, the direct effect of subjective ambivalence was no longer significant, yet subjective ambivalence uniquely predicted intergroup empathy, which in turn predicted less anti-gay bullying opposition. These findings provide evidence that subjective ambivalence is largely negative in nature, but also presents evidence for a unique component of subjective ambivalence (separate from univalent attitudes) associated with low intergroup empathy and negativity. In contrast to previous research, I found very little evidence for the context-dependency of subjective ambivalence. Further research on subjective ambivalence, including subjective ambivalence toward other social groups, may expand our understanding of the factors leading to biased expressions.

Top-down and Bottom-up influences on ACC activation: Evaluation of a proposed model of the feedback-related negativity

The Feedback-Related Negativity (FRN) is thought to reflect the dopaminergic prediction error signal from the subcortical areas to the ACC (i.e., a bottom-up signal). Two studies were conducted in order to test a new model of FRN generation, which includes direct modulating influences of medial PFC (i.e., top-down signals) on the ACC at the time of the FRN. Study 1 examined the effects of one’s sense of control (top-down) and of informative cues (bottom-up) on the FRN measures. In Study 2, sense of control and instruction-based (top-down) and probability-based expectations (bottom-up) were manipulated to test the proposed model. The results suggest that any influences of medial PFC on the activity of the ACC that occur in the context of incentive tasks are not direct. The FRN was shown to be sensitive to salient stimulus characteristics. The results of this dissertation partially support the reinforcement learning theory, in that the FRN is a marker for prediction error signal from subcortical areas. However, the pattern of results outlined here suggests that prediction errors are based on salient stimulus characteristics and are not reward specific. A second goal of this dissertation was to examine whether ACC activity, measured through the FRN, is altered in individuals at-risk for problem-gambling behaviour (PG). Individuals in this group were more sensitive to the valence of the outcome in a gambling task compared to not at-risk individuals, suggesting that gambling contexts increase the sensitivity of the reward system to valence of the outcome in individuals at risk for PG. Furthermore, at-risk participants showed an increased sensitivity to reward characteristics and a decreased response to loss outcomes. This contrasts with those not at risk whose FRNs were sensitive to losses. As the results did not replicate previous research showing attenuated FRNs in pathological gamblers, it is likely that the size and time of the FRN does not change gradually with increasing risk of maladaptive behaviour. Instead, changes in ACC activity reflected by the FRN in general can be observed only after behaviour becomes clinically maladaptive or through comparison between different types of gain/loss outcomes.