Understanding value congruence : a sport organization case study

With the recent growth in cultural complexity, many organizations are faced with increasingly diverse employee pools. Gaining a greater understanding of the values that employees possess is the first step in effectively satisfying their needs and achieving a more productive workforce (lung & Avolio, 2000). Values playa significant role in influencing individual behaviours. It is therefore necessary to assess the qualities of employee value systems and directly link them to the values of the organization. The importance of values and value congruence has been emphasized by many organizational behaviour researchers (cf. Adkins & Caldwell, 2004; Erdogan, Kraimer, & Liden, 2004; Jung & Avolio, 2000; Rokeach, 1973); however the emphasis on value studies remains fairly stagnant within the sport industry (Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2002). In order to examine the realities that were constructed by the participants in this study a holistic view of the impact of values within a specific sport organization were provided. The purpose of this case study was to examine organizational and employee values to understand the effects of values and value congruence on employee behaviours within the context of a large Canadian sport organization. A mUltiple methods case study approach was adopted in order to fully serve the purpose and provide a comprehensive view of the organization being examined. Document analysis, observations, surveys, as well as semi-structured interviews were conducted. The process allowed for triangulation and confirmability of the findings. Each method functioned to create an overarching understanding of the values and value congruence within this organization. The analysis of the findings was divided into qualitative and quantitative sections. The qualitative documents were analyzed twice, once manually by the researcher and once via AtIas.ti Version 4 (1998). The a priori and emergent coding that took place was based on triangulating the findings and uncovering common themes throughout the data. The Rokeach Value Survey (1973) that was incorporated into the survey design of the study was analyzed using descriptive statistics, as well as Mann-Whitney U, and Kruskal Wallis formulas. These were deemed appropriate for analysis given the non-parametric nature of the survey instrument (Kinnear & Gray, 2004). The quantitative survey served to help define the values and value congruence that was then holistically examined through the qualitative interviews, document analyses, and observations. The results of the study indicated incongruent value levels between employees and those stated or perceived as the organization's values. Each finding demonstrated that varying levels of congruence may have diverse affects on individual behaviours. These behaviours range from production levels to interactions with fellow employees to turnover. In addition to the findings pertaining to the research questions, a number of other key issues were uncovered regarding departmentalization, communication, and board relations. Each has contributed to a greater understanding of the organization and has created direction for further research within this area of study.

What children value : a scale to guide health promotion programs

Objective. Physical activity is important for the health of all human beings. Although it is important to develop good health promotion programs for children to increase participation in physical activity, to date there appear to be no programs based on what kids value beyond health and physical activity itself. This study proposed to create a scale with strong content and face validity that could uncover what any given population of children value in life regardless of their participation in physical activity and that experts feel could be related to physical activity. These findings will allow the development of targeted health promotion programs to increase children's participation in regular physical activity. Method In this study, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches was used. Data were gathered from seven experts in the field, sixty-seven children in grades three to five, five parents, and three teachers. From these data response groupings were created and sent to four experts to be given single word names. The resulting nine theme names were re-worked into "child-friendly" language. Four children were then asked to discuss theme names to see if they liked and understood them. The next step involved asking children and experts to rank order the nine themes, the children in general and the experts in terms of relevance to physical activity. From these results, possible versions of the scale were then created using the combined expert/children rankings. Each version was examined for content validity. Two versions of a scale resulted. These were sent to experts, parents, teachers and children in order to determine which one they liked better and to suggest any foreseeable problems. Once this information was collected, a beta (final prototype) version of the scale was created. Results. Nine common theme names were created from the response groupings. All four children agreed that they did understand and like each of the nine theme names. Experts and teachers agreed that full coverage of the content had been achieved. Children suggested a single wording change from "Being Accepted" to "Being Included". Five themes were selected for inclusion. The beta version of the scale included 12 forced choice statements, the first ten comparing all themes against one another followed by two anchor statements. Conclusion. At the outset it was recognized that it is essential to know what children think is important in their lives in order to serve as potential benefits in the development of effective physical activity promotion programs. This study developed a scale which could be used to determine what a population of children feel is important in order to focus health promotion programs for physical activity. The scale has strong face and content validity.

Research in the clinical setting : a qualitative study of the value of play research in the continuing education of occupational therapists.

Occupational therapists have always recognized playas an important part of a child's life. However, until recently play has been viewed as a medium for reaching treatment goals, rather than as an activity that is valuable in and of itself. If occupational therapists think of playas the primary activity or occupation of childhood, then play should be a very important area of focus for paediatric clinicians. In order to assist children to become as independent as possible with play and to have fulfilling play experiences the occupational therapist needs to have a clear understanding of how to assess, set goals which lead towards competence in play, and promote play. Recent play literature has placed importance on play behaviours and looking at the relationship between the child and both the human and nonhuman environment. Believing that play and playfulness can and should be promoted, for children with physical disabilities, requires that therapists learn new assessment and intervention strategies. A new assessment tool, The Test of Playfulness, was developed by Bundy in 1994. It addressed play behaviours and environmental influences. The author, a co-investigator and eight occupational therapists were involved in a playfulness study using this test to compare the playfulness of children with physical disabilities with their able-bodied peers. After the study was completed the author questioned whether or not involvement in the playfulness study was enough of a change agent to bring about transformative learning in order to further the eight occupational therapists' education about play.This study investigated changes in either the therapists' thinking about play or their behaviour in their clinical practice. The study also examined the participants' retention of knowledge about the Test of Playfulness. The eight therapists who had been involved in the playfulness study (participants) were matched with eight therapists who had not been involved (nonparticipants). The therapists were interviewed 9 to 12 months after completion of the playfulness study. They were asked to describe various scenarios of play and open ended prompts were used to elicit the therapists' perceptions of play, good play, the role or value of play, environmental and gender influences on play, play assessment and intervention, and play research, for children with and without disabilities. The participants were also prompted to discuss their experience with the playfulness study. A self-report questionnaire was also completed at the end of the interview. The results of the study demonstrated that: (a) the play research project was a good format for continuing the participants' education about play; (b) their thinking had changed about play; (c) according to self report, they had used this new knowledge in their clinical practice; and (d) the participants remembered the items on the Test of Playfulness and could use them in describing various aspects of play. This study found that participating in a play research project had been an effective method of professional development. It also highlighted the need for increased awareness of the recent literature on play and the developing role of the occupational therapist in the assessment and intervention of play.

This infinite, unanimous dissonance : a study in mathematical existentialism through the work of Jean-Paul Sartre and Alain Badiou

This thesis seeks to elucidate a motif common to the work both of Jean-Paul Sartre and Alain Badiou (with special attention being given to Being and Nothingness and Being and Event respectively): the thesis that the subject 's existence precedes and determines its essence. To this end, the author aims to explicate the structural invariances, common to both philosophies, that allow this thesis to take shape. Their explication requires the construction of an overarching conceptual framework within which it may be possible to embed both the phenomenological ontology elaborated in Being and Event and the mathematical ontology outlined in Being and Event. Within this framework, whose axial concept is that of multiplicity, the precedence of essence by existence becomes intelligible in terms of a priority of extensional over intensional determination. A series of familiar existentialist concepts are reconstructed on this basis, such as lack and value, and these are set to work in the task of fleshing out the more or less skeletal theory of the subject presented in Being and Event.

"Where is the value in education for me?": experiences and perspectives of Ontario secondary students at risk of non-completion of their Ontario Secondary School Diploma /

This study examined students considered at risk of non-completion of their Ontario Secondary School Diploma and aimed to offer insight into the questions, "What factors currently lead to school disconnect" and "How can these factors be addressed?" Eight students currently enrolled in an alternative learning environment participated in the study. Each was asked to take part in two, digitally recorded interviews that were subsequently transcribed by the researcher. The data were then coded and analysed according to specific themes: obstacles, empowerment, goals, views about success, opinions of school, and power of the teacher. From these themes, three broad focus areas emerged that were used to keep the data analysis focused: worldview, school effects, and self-image. Variances between the data collected and ideas presented in the current literature were highlighted as a reminder that when dealing with a human population, we cannot rely on textbook definitions and theory alone.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.