Exploring the impact of outgroup membership discoveries on individual outcomes and intergroup relations

Group memberships represent important components of identity, with people holding membership in various groups and categories. The groups that one belongs to are known as ingroups, and the groups that one does not belong to are known as outgroups. Movement between groups can occur, such that an individual becomes a member of a former outgroup. In some cases, this movement between groups can represent a sudden discovery for the self and/or others, especially when one becomes a member of an ambiguous, concealable, or otherwise not readily visible group. The effects of this type of movement, however, are poorly documented. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate these outgroup membership discoveries, examining the individual intrapsychic, interpersonal, and potential intergroup effects of both self- and other-outgroup membership discoveries. Specifically, discoveries of homosexuality were examined in three studies. In Study 1, hypothetical reactions to self- and other-homosexuality discovery were assessed; in Study 2, the effects of discovering self-homosexuality (vs. self-heterosexuality) were experimentally examined; and in Study 3, the effects of discovering another’s homosexuality earlier relative to later in a developing friendship were experimentally examined. Study 1 revealed that, upon a discovery of self-homosexuality, participants expected negative emotions and a more negative change in feelings toward the self. Upon a discovery of a friend’s homosexuality, participants expected a more negative change in feelings toward the friend, but more a positive change in feelings toward homosexuals. For both hypothetical self- and friend- homosexuality discoveries, more negative expected emotions predicted more negative expected change in feelings toward the target individual (the self or friend), which in turn predicted more negative expected change in feelings toward homosexuals as a group. Further, for self-homosexuality discovery, the association between negative expected emotions and negative expected change in feelings toward the self was stronger among those higher in authoritarianism. Study 2 revealed that, upon discovering one’s own homosexuality (vs. heterosexuality), heterosexual participants experienced more negative emotions, more fear of discrimination, and more negative self-evaluations. The effect of the homosexuality discovery manipulation on negative self-evaluations was mediated by fear of discrimination. Further, those higher in authoritarianism or pre-test prejudice toward homosexuals demonstrated more negative emotions following the manipulation. Study 3 revealed that upon discovering an interaction partner’s homosexuality earlier (vs. later) participants reported a more positive contact experience, a closer bond with the partner, and more positive attitudes toward the partner. Earlier (vs. later) discovery predicted more positive contact experience, which in turn predicted a closer bond with the partner. Closer bond with the partner subsequently predicted more positive evaluations of the partner. Interestingly, the association between bond with partner and more positive attitudes toward the partner was stronger among those higher in authoritarianism or pre-test prejudice toward homosexuals. Overall, results suggest that self-homosexuality discovery results in negative outcomes, whereas discovering another’s homosexuality can result in positive outcomes, especially when homosexuality is discovered earlier (vs. later). Implications of these findings for both actual outgroup membership discoveries and social psychological research are discussed.

An exploration of the experience of implementing the second step violence prevention curriculum in one primary general learning disabilities class /

Violence has always been a part of the human experience, and therefore, a popular topic for research. It is a controversial issue, mostly because the possible sources of violent behaviour are so varied, encompassing both biological and environmental factors. However, very little disagreement is found regarding the severity of this societal problem. Most researchers agree that the number and intensity of aggressive acts among adults and children is growing. Not surprisingly, many educational policies, programs, and curricula have been developed to address this concern. The research favours programs which address the root causes of violence and seek to prevent rather than provide consequences for the undesirable behaviour. But what makes a violence prevention program effective? How should educators choose among the many curricula on the market? After reviewing the literature surrounding violence prevention programs and their effectiveness, The Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum surfaced as unique in many ways. It was designed to address the root causes of violence in an active, student-centred way. Empathy training, anger management, interpersonal cognitive problem solving, and behavioural social skills form the basis of this program. Published in 1992, the program has been the topic of limited research, almost entirely carried out using quantitative methodologies.The purpose of this study was to understand what happens when the Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum is implemented with a group of students and teachers. I was not seeking a statistical correlation between the frequency of violence and program delivery, as in most prior research. Rather, I wished to gain a deeper understanding of the impact ofthe program through the eyes of the participants. The Second Step Program was taught to a small, primary level, general learning disabilities class by a teacher and student teacher. Data were gathered using interviews with the teachers, personal observations, staff reports, and my own journal. Common themes across the four types of data collection emerged during the study, and these themes were isolated and explored for meaning. Findings indicate that the program does not offer a "quick fix" to this serious problem. However, several important discoveries were made. The teachers feU that the program was effective despite a lack of concrete evidence to support this claim. They used the Second Step strategies outside their actual instructional time and felt it made them better educators and disciplinarians. The students did not display a marked change in their behaviour during or after the program implementation, but they were better able to speak about their actions, the source of their aggression, and the alternatives which were available. Although they were not yet transferring their knowledge into positive action,a heightened awareness was evident. Finally, staff reports and my own journal led me to a deeper understanding ofhow perception frames reality. The perception that the program was working led everyone to feel more empowered when a violent incident occurred, and efforts were made to address the cause rather than merely to offer consequences. A general feeling that we were addressing the problem in a productive way was prevalent among the staff and students involved. The findings from this investigation have many implications for research and practice. Further study into the realm of violence prevention is greatly needed, using a balance of quantitative and qualitative methodologies. Such a serious problem can only be effectively addressed with a greater understanding of its complexities. This study also demonstrates the overall positive impact of the Second Step Violence Prevention Curriculum and, therefore, supports its continued use in our schools.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Verbal ability, previous practice and load on short-term memory as determiners of differences in a complex learning task: an experimental study

Traditional psychometric theory and practice classify people according to broad ability dimensions but do not examine how these mental processes occur. Hunt and Lansman (1975) proposed a 'distributed memory' model of cognitive processes with emphasis on how to describe individual differences based on the assumption that each individual possesses the same components. It is in the quality of these components ~hat individual differences arise. Carroll (1974) expands Hunt's model to include a production system (after Newell and Simon, 1973) and a response system. He developed a framework of factor analytic (FA) factors for : the purpose of describing how individual differences may arise from them. This scheme is to be used in the analysis of psychometric tes ts . Recent advances in the field of information processing are examined and include. 1) Hunt's development of differences between subjects designated as high or low verbal , 2) Miller's pursuit of the magic number seven, plus or minus two, 3) Ferguson's examination of transfer and abilities and, 4) Brown's discoveries concerning strategy teaching and retardates . In order to examine possible sources of individual differences arising from cognitive tasks, traditional psychometric tests were searched for a suitable perceptual task which could be varied slightly and administered to gauge learning effects produced by controlling independent variables. It also had to be suitable for analysis using Carroll's f ramework . The Coding Task (a symbol substitution test) found i n the Performance Scale of the WISe was chosen. Two experiments were devised to test the following hypotheses. 1) High verbals should be able to complete significantly more items on the Symbol Substitution Task than low verbals (Hunt, Lansman, 1975). 2) Having previous practice on a task, where strategies involved in the task may be identified, increases the amount of output on a similar task (Carroll, 1974). J) There should be a sUbstantial decrease in the amount of output as the load on STM is increased (Miller, 1956) . 4) Repeated measures should produce an increase in output over trials and where individual differences in previously acquired abilities are involved, these should differentiate individuals over trials (Ferguson, 1956). S) Teaching slow learners a rehearsal strategy would improve their learning such that their learning would resemble that of normals on the ,:same task. (Brown, 1974). In the first experiment 60 subjects were d.ivided·into high and low verbal, further divided randomly into a practice group and nonpractice group. Five subjects in each group were assigned randomly to work on a five, seven and nine digit code throughout the experiment. The practice group was given three trials of two minutes each on the practice code (designed to eliminate transfer effects due to symbol similarity) and then three trials of two minutes each on the actual SST task . The nonpractice group was given three trials of two minutes each on the same actual SST task . Results were analyzed using a four-way analysis of variance . In the second experiment 18 slow learners were divided randomly into two groups. one group receiving a planned strategy practioe, the other receiving random practice. Both groups worked on the actual code to be used later in the actual task. Within each group subjects were randomly assigned to work on a five, seven or nine digit code throughout. Both practice and actual tests consisted on three trials of two minutes each. Results were analyzed using a three-way analysis of variance . It was found in t he first experiment that 1) high or low verbal ability by itself did not produce significantly different results. However, when in interaction with the other independent variables, a difference in performance was noted . 2) The previous practice variable was significant over all segments of the experiment. Those who received previo.us practice were able to score significantly higher than those without it. J) Increasing the size of the load on STM severely restricts performance. 4) The effect of repeated trials proved to be beneficial. Generally, gains were made on each successive trial within each group. S) In the second experiment, slow learners who were allowed to practice randomly performed better on the actual task than subjeots who were taught the code by means of a planned strategy. Upon analysis using the Carroll scheme, individual differences were noted in the ability to develop strategies of storing, searching and retrieving items from STM, and in adopting necessary rehearsals for retention in STM. While these strategies may benef it some it was found that for others they may be harmful . Temporal aspects and perceptual speed were also found to be sources of variance within individuals . Generally it was found that the largest single factor i nfluencing learning on this task was the repeated measures . What e~ables gains to be made, varies with individuals . There are environmental factors, specific abilities, strategy development, previous learning, amount of load on STM , perceptual and temporal parameters which influence learning and these have serious implications for educational programs .

A DFT Guided/Experimental Approach to Asymmetric Allylation and Phase-Transfer Catalysis

The Dudding group is interested in the application of Density Functional Theory (DFT) in developing asymmetric methodologies, and thus the focus of this dissertation will be on the integration of these approaches. Several interrelated subsets of computer aided design and implementation in catalysis have been addressed during the course of these studies. The first of the aims rested upon the advancement of methodologies for the synthesis of biological active C(1)-chiral 3-methylene-indan-1-ols, which in practice lead to the use of a sequential asymmetric Yamamoto-Sakurai-Hosomi allylation/Mizoroki Heck reaction sequence. An important aspect of this work was the utilization of ortho-substituted arylaldehyde reagents which are known to be a problematic class of substrates for existing asymmetric allylation approaches. The second phase of my research program lead to the further development of asymmetric allylation methods using o-arylaldehyde substrates for synthesis of chiral C(3)-substituted phthalides. Apart from the de novo design of these chemistries in silico, which notably utilized water-tolerant, inexpensive, and relatively environmental benign indium metal, this work represented the first computational study of a stereoselective indium-mediated process. Following from these discoveries was the advent of a related, yet catalytic, Ag(I)-catalyzed approach for preparing C(3)-substituted phthalides that from a practical standpoint was complementary in many ways. Not only did this new methodology build upon my earlier work with the integrated (experimental/computational) use of the Ag(I)-catalyzed asymmetric methods in synthesis, it provided fundamental insight arrived at through DFT calculations, regarding the Yamamoto-Sakurai-Hosomi allylation. The development of ligands for unprecedented asymmetric Lewis base catalysis, especially asymmetric allylations using silver and indium metals, followed as a natural extension from these earlier discoveries. To this end, forthcoming as well was the advancement of a family of disubstituted (N-cyclopropenium guanidine/N-imidazoliumyl substituted cyclopropenylimine) nitrogen adducts that has provided fundamental insight into chemical bonding and offered an unprecedented class of phase transfer catalysts (PTC) having far-reaching potential. Salient features of these disubstituted nitrogen species is unprecedented finding of a cyclopropenium based C-H•••πaryl interaction, as well, the presence of a highly dissociated anion projected them to serve as a catalyst promoting fluorination reactions. Attracted by the timely development of these disubstituted nitrogen adducts my last studies as a PhD scholar has addressed the utility of one of the synthesized disubstituted nitrogen adducts as a valuable catalyst for benzylation of the Schiff base N-diphenyl methylene glycine ethyl ester. Additionally, the catalyst was applied for benzylic fluorination, emerging from this exploration was successful fluorination of benzyl bromide and its derivatives in high yields. A notable feature of this protocol is column-free purification of the product and recovery of the catalyst to use in a further reaction sequence.

Infrared thermography: A non-invasive window into thermal physiology

Infrared thermography is a non-invasive technique that measures mid to long-wave infrared radiation emanating from all objects and converts this to temperature. As an imaging technique, the value of modern infrared thermography is its ability to produce a digitized image or high speed video rendering a thermal map of the scene in false colour. Since temperature is an important environmental parameter influencing animal physiology and metabolic heat production an energetically expensive process, measuring temperature and energy exchange in animals is critical to understanding physiology, especially under field conditions. As a non-contact approach, infrared thermography provides a non-invasive complement to physiological data gathering. One caveat, however, is that only surface temperatures are measured, which guides much research to those thermal events occurring at the skin and insulating regions of the body. As an imaging technique, infrared thermal imaging is also subject to certain uncertainties that require physical modeling, which is typically done via built-in software approaches. Infrared thermal imaging has enabled different insights into the comparative physiology of phenomena ranging from thermogenesis, peripheral blood flow adjustments, evaporative cooling, and to respiratory physiology. In this review, I provide background and guidelines for the use of thermal imaging, primarily aimed at field physiologists and biologists interested in thermal biology. I also discuss some of the better known approaches and discoveries revealed from using thermal imaging with the objective of encouraging more quantitative assessment.