Using a Bayesian model for bankruptcy prediction : a comparative approach

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of the choice of cut-off points, sampling procedures, and the business cycle on the accuracy of bankruptcy prediction models. Misclassification can result in erroneous predictions leading to prohibitive costs to firms, investors and the economy. To test the impact of the choice of cut-off points and sampling procedures, three bankruptcy prediction models are assessed- Bayesian, Hazard and Mixed Logit. A salient feature of the study is that the analysis includes both parametric and nonparametric bankruptcy prediction models. A sample of firms from Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database in the U. S. was used to evaluate the relative performance of the three models. The choice of a cut-off point and sampling procedures were found to affect the rankings of the various models. In general, the results indicate that the empirical cut-off point estimated from the training sample resulted in the lowest misclassification costs for all three models. Although the Hazard and Mixed Logit models resulted in lower costs of misclassification in the randomly selected samples, the Mixed Logit model did not perform as well across varying business-cycles. In general, the Hazard model has the highest predictive power. However, the higher predictive power of the Bayesian model, when the ratio of the cost of Type I errors to the cost of Type II errors is high, is relatively consistent across all sampling methods. Such an advantage of the Bayesian model may make it more attractive in the current economic environment. This study extends recent research comparing the performance of bankruptcy prediction models by identifying under what conditions a model performs better. It also allays a range of user groups, including auditors, shareholders, employees, suppliers, rating agencies, and creditors' concerns with respect to assessing failure risk.

A game-theoretic network formation model

We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to seek for game-theoretic network formation models in which links are formed due to strategic behaviors of individuals, rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by Even-Dar and Kearns (2007), we consider a more realistic model in which the cost of establishing each link is dynamically determined during the course of the game. Moreover, players are allowed to put transfer payments on the formation of links. Also, they must pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the game. We show that there is a small diameter of at most 4 in the general set of equilibrium networks in our model. Unlike earlier model, not only the existence of equilibrium networks is guaranteed in our model, but also these networks coincide with the outcomes of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation. Furthermore, we provide a network formation simulation that generates small-world networks. We also analyze the impact of locating players in a hierarchical structure by constructing a strategic model, where a complete b-ary tree is the seed network.

Examining Bullying Intervention Motivations Through a Cost/Benefit Analysis

The purpose of the present study was to examine the role of the bystander in bullying situations. A cost/benefit model was explored in researching factors adolescents consider in deciding whether to intervene when witnessing bullying. Adolescents in the present study (N = 101 (50.5% female), between the ages of 12 to 18, M = 15.37 years; SD = 1.71 years) completed self-report questionnaires, and also responded to bullying scenarios, stating how the bystander would react, while explaining potential personal costs and benefits. Adolescents were able to articulate various personal costs and benefits when making the decision to intervene. Conclusions of the present study include: 1) the evolutionary approach is quite informative in illuminating the decision process of the bystander, 2) adolescents’ beliefs about bullying and the role of bystanders are different from their teachers’, and 3) the rather explicit cost/benefit model could be used to develop more targeted anti-bullying programs.