The Social Enterprise as an Alternative Work Option for Persons with Developmental Disabilities: A Case Study of Staff Perspectives at Common Ground Co-operative

Traditional employment options for persons with developmental disabilities are lacking. Employment options available for persons with developmental disabilities are reflective of the medical and social model perspectives of disability; with segregated and supported employment reinforcing the idea that persons with developmental disabilities are incapable and competitive employment missing the necessary accommodations for persons to be successful. This study examined social enterprises as an alternative employment option that can balance both medical and social model perspectives by accommodating for weaknesses or limitations and recognizing the strengths and capabilities of persons with developmental disabilities in the workplace. Moreover, this study is part of a broader case study which is examining the nature and impacts of a social enterprise, known as Common Ground Co-operative (CGC), which supports five social purpose businesses that are owned and operated by persons with developmental disabilities. This study is part of the Social Business and Marginalized Social Groups Community-University Research Alliance. To date, a case study has been written describing the nature and impacts of CGC and its related businesses from the perspectives of the Partners, board members, funders and staff (Owen, Readhead, Bishop, Hope & Campbell, in press & Readhead, 2012). The current study used a descriptive case study approach to provide a detailed account of the perceptions and opinions of CGC staff members who support each of the Partners in the five related businesses. Staff members were chosen for the focus of this study because of the integral role that they play in the successful outcomes of the persons they support. This study was conducted in two phases. In the first phase five staff members were interviewed. During this stage of interviews, several themes were presented which needed to be examined in further detail, specifically staff stress and burnout and duty of care for business Partners versus the promotion of their autonomy. A second phase of interviews was then conducted with one individual participant and a focus group of seven. During both interview phases, Staff participants described an employment model that creates a non-judgemental environment for the business Partners that promotes their strengths, accommodates for their limitations, provides educational opportunities and places the responsibility for the businesses on the persons with developmental disabilities cultivating equality and promoting independence. Staff described the nature of their role including risk factors for stress, the protective factors that buffer stress, and the challenges associated with balancing many role demands. Issues related to the replication of this social enterprise model are described.

Buddhism and the earth : environmental thought in early Buddhist philosophy

Introduction Fundamental to the philosophy of Buddhism, is the insight that there is "unsatisfactohness" (dukkha) in the world and that it can be eliminated through the practice of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Buddhism also maintains that the world as we experience and entities that exist are bereft of any substantiality. Instead existence is manifest through dependent origination. All things are conditional; nothing is permanent. However, inherent in this dependent existence is the interconnectedness of all beings and their subjection to the cosmic law of karma. Part of cultivating the Eight Fold path includes a deep compassion for all other living things, 'trapped' within this cycle of dependent origination. This compassion or empathy (karuna) is crucial to the Buddhist path to enlightenment. It is this emphasis on karuna that shows itself in Mahayana Buddhism with respect to the theory of the boddhisatva (or Buddha-to-be) since the boddhisatva willingly postpones his/her own enlightenment to help others on the same path. One of the ramifications of the theory of dependent origination is that there is no anthropocentric bias placed on humans over the natural world. Paradoxically the doctrine of non-self becomes an ontology within Buddhism, culminating in the Mayahana realization that a common boundary exists between samsara and nirvana. Essential to this ontology is the life of dharma or a moral life. Ethics is not separated from ontology. As my thesis will show, this basic outlook of Buddhism has implications toward our understanding of the Buddhist world-view with respect to the current human predicament concerning the environment. While humans are the only ones who can 4 attain "Buddhahood", it is because of our ability to understand what it means to follow the Eight fold path and act accordingly. Because of the interconnectedness of all entities {dharmas), there is an ontological necessity to eliminate suffering and 'save the earth' because if we allow the earth to suffer, we ALL suffer. This can be understood as an ethical outlook which can be applied to our interaction with and treatment of the natural environment or environment in the broadest sense, not just trees plants rocks etc. It is an approach to samsara and all within it. It has been argued that there is no ontology in Buddhism due to its doctrine of "non-self". However, it is a goal of this thesis to argue that there does exist an original ontology in Buddhism; that according to it, the nature of Being is essentially neither "Being nor non-being nor not non-being" as illustrated by Nagarjuna. Within this ontology is engrained an ethic or 'right path' (samma marga) that is fundamental to our being and this includes a compassionate relationship to our environment. In this dissertation I endeavour to trace the implications that the Buddhist worldview has for the environmental issues that assail us in our age of technology. I will explore questions such as: can the Buddhist way of thinking help us comprehend and possibly resolve the environmental problems of our day and age? Are there any current environmental theories which are comparable to or share common ground with the classical Buddhist doctrines? I will elucidate some fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism from an environmental perspective as well as identify some comparable modern environmental theories such as deep ecology and general systems theory, that seem to share in the wisdom of classical Buddhism and have much to gain from a deeper appreciation of Buddhism.

Trends in fish prey capture by common terns following zebra mussel invasion : do terns track fish species abundance? /

The Common Tern (Sterna hirundo) is a ground nesting colonial seabird. Terns rely primarily on small prey fishes which they obtain through plunge diving for their survival as well as the survival of their offspring during the breeding season. The zebra mussel (Dreissena polymorpha) is a small bivalve mollusk that invaded North American waters in the late 1980's. Through its suspension feeding, the zebra mussel has the ability to alter the entire aquatic ecosystem, ultimately leading to a reduction in pelagic organisms including small prey fish. The objective of the study was to determine what (if any) indirect effects the invasion of the zebra mussel has had on fish prey captured by terns. The study took place in two separate two-year periods, 1990-91 and 1995-96 on a concrete breakwall off the north shore of Lake Erie near Port Colborne, Ontario. Daily nest checks revealed clutch initiation dates, egg-laying chronology, hatching success and morphological egg characteristics (length and breadth). Behavioural observations included time each sex spent in attendance with its brood, the frequency of feeding chicks and the prey species composition and size fed to chicks as well as to females (courtship feeding). Egg sizes did not differ between study periods, nor did feeding rates to chicks, suggesting that food was not a limiting resource. Terns spent less time with their broods (more time foraging) in the 1995-96 period. However, they also had significantly larger broods and fledged more offspring. The time of each individual foraging trip decreased, suggesting that fish were easier to obtain in 1995 and 1996. Lastly, kleptoparasitism rates decreased, suggesting that the costs of foraging (time, energy) actually decreased as fewer birds adopted this strategy to compensate for what I assumed to be a lack of available food (fish). The only significant difference between the periods of 1990, 1991 and 1995, 1996 was a change in diet. Terns delivered significantly fewer rainbow smelt and more emerald shiner in 1995 and 1996. However, the average size of fish delivered did not change. Thus, there was little impact on prey captured by Common Terns in Lake Erie since the invasion of the zebra mussel.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).