Sperm utilization patterns in Gryllus integer (orthoptera: gryllidae

Sperm competition is the competition for fertilizations between ejaculates, within a female, following multiple mating. There are four sperm utilization or precedence patterns: first male precedence, where the first male to mate fertilizes most of the eggs laid by a female; last male precedence, where the last male to mate fertilizes most of the eggs laid by a female; "all-or-none" pattern, where sperm from either male fertilizes all the eggs laid by a female but which male's sperm that is used is random; or sperm mixing, where sperm from each male is used equally in fertilizing eggs laid by a female. Intermediate utilization patterns are also possible. Sperm competition occurs in a wide variety of insect species as well as other animals. This study was undertaken to study sperm competition in the field cricket, Gryllus integer. Four experiments were conducted: a radiation and sterilization experiment, a diapause experiment, and 2 competition experiments. It was found that 7,000 rad of gamma radiation sterilized adult ~ integer males. There was no diapause in the laboratory in ~ integer eggs. In the first competition experiment, three groups of females were used: females mated with a normal male, then with a second normal male (NN group); females mated with a normal male, and then with a sterile male (NR group); and females mated with a sterile male, and then with a normal male (RN group). The results obtained from this experiment showed that the mean proportion of eggs hatched was significantly different between 3 groups of females, with the proportion hatched much greater in the NN group than in either the NR or RN groups. The pattern for the proportion of eggs hatched following a double mating most closely resembled a pattern expected if sperm mixing is occurring. Results obtained in the replicate competition experiment showed that the mean proportion of eggs hatched for the females in the NR group was significantly lower than the proportion hatched in the other two groups. This also supports a model of sperm mixing as a precedence pattern. Values calculated following Boorman and Parker (1976), for the proportion of eggs fertilized by the second male to mate following a double mating, were 0.57 in competition experiment 1 and 0.62 in the replicate. These values indicate that sperm mixing occurs in~ integer.

Letter to William Collver or John Roberts, 1849

A letter to “my dear Mr. Collver and co.” The writer mentions the “circuit” that she has traveled, and a conference which she attended. In regard to the circuit, she talks about her interest in the Welland Canal. The references all seem to be religious in nature. She asks Mr. Collver how he likes the new preacher and says that in a letter that the preacher published in the newspaper he refers to the “breaking of Jordan Chapel”. She says that a society of teetotalers has been established in her town and they are known as “Sons of Temperance”. She also mentions “my man Brown” who was there but has left, leaving her to have the circuit by herself. She signs off with “I am yours affectionately [Eleanor Corman]. The second part of the letter is addressed to “my dear Mr. Roberts”. She asks him for some music that she would like, but cannot find in Kingston. She would like him to “come down and teach singing” this winter. She also asks him to give her regards to Mr. P. Beamer and family. She ends this part of the letter with “Nothing further yours affectionately [Eleanor Corman]”. There are 4 red postmarks on the outside of the letter and they are: Picton, July 31, 1849 Cobourg, August 2, 1849 St. Catharines, August 4, 1849 There is one other postmark which is too faded to be legible.

The physiology of inscription : Foucault's genealogy as curative science

In ''Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," Foucault suggests that genealogy is a sort of "curative science." The genealogist must be a physiologist and a pathologist as well as an historian, for his task is to decipher the marks that power relations and historical events leave on the subjugated body; "he must be able to diagnose the illnesses of the body, its conditions of weakness and strength, its breakdowns and resistances, to be in a position to judge philosophical discourse." But this claim seems to be incongruent with another major task of genealogy. After all, genealogy is supposed to show us that the things we take to be absolute are in fact discontinuous and historically situated: "Nothing in man-not even his body-is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men." If this is true, then the subjugated body can never be restored to a healthy state because it has no essential or original nature. There are no universal standards by which we can even distinguish between healthy and unhealthy bodies. So in what sense is genealogy to be a "curative science"? In my thesis, I try to elucidate the complex relationship between genealogy and the body. I argue that genealogy can be a curative science even while it "multiplies our body and sets it against itself." Ifwe place a special emphasis on the role that transgression plays in Foucault's genealogical works, then the healthy body is precisely the body that resists universal standards and classifications. If genealogy is to be a curative science, then it must restore to the subjugated body an "identity" that transgresses its own limits and that constitutes itself, paradoxically, in the very effacement of identity. In the first chapter of my thesis, I examine the body's role as "surface of the inscription of events." Power relations inscribe on and around the body an identity or subjectivity that appears to be unified and universal, but which is in fact disparate and historically situated. The "subjected" body is the sick and pathologically weak body. In Chapters 2 and 3, I describe how it is possible for the unhealthy body to become healthy by resisting the subjectivity that has been inscribed upon it. Chapter 4 explains how Foucault's later works fit into this characterization of genealogy

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

Forsaking all others: towards a new model of nationalism utilizing the case study of former Yugoslavia

Many people would like to believe that nationalism is a thing of the past, a dinosaur belonging to some bygone, uncivilized era. Such a belief is not borne out by recent history, however. Nationalism occupies the political forum with as much force as ever. Yet, in many ways, it remains a mystery to us. The purpose of this study is to explore individual motivations involved in the rise of nationalism, in addition to the role of structural factors. The linkage employed in this exploration is the psychosocial phenomenon of self-identity, including emotions and self-esteem. We demonstrate how individual, socially-constructed self-identity accounts for why some people embrace nationalism while others eschew it. The methodology employed was theoretical and historical analyses of secondary sources and indepth interviews with subjects who had some connection with former Yugoslavia, the country utilized to test the new model. Our analyses yielded the result that current conceptualizations of nationalism from an exclusively macro or micro perspective are unsatisfactory; we require a more comprehensive approach wherein the two perspectives are integrated. Such an integration necessitates a bridge: hence, our new model, which rests on the psychosocial premise, offers a more useful conceptual tool for the understanding of nationalism. We conclude that nationalism is first and foremost a matter relating to individual social self-identity which takes place within a particular context where oppositional forces emerge from structural factors and our membership in a particular group becomes paramount.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Out of the darkness and into the light : a study of inauthentic and authentic speech

Introduction Man can be described as the being who shows himself in speech, and from birth to death is continually speaking. Communication is so close to us, so woven into our very being, that we have little understanding of the way it is constituted; for it is as hard to obtain distance from communication as it is to obtain distance from ourselves. All communication is not alike. There are two basic modesl of communication, the inauthentic and the authentic, between which there occurs a constant tension. It is in the inauthentic mode, points out Heidegger, that we find ourselves "proximately and for the most part"; 1. Being and Time, pg. 68 Dasein decides as to the way it will comport itself in taking up its task of having being as an issue for it. " •.• it~, in its very being 'choose' itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself or only "seem" to do so. But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be authentic--that is, something of its own--can it have lost itself and not yet won itself." 2. therefore Heidegger also terms it "everydayness".2 Caught up in the world of everydayness, our speaking covers over and conceals3 our rootedness in being, leaving us in the darkness of untruth. The image of darkness may be inferred from Heidegger's use of the image of "clearing,,4 to depict being as 2. ibid. pg. 69 "Dasein's average everydayness, however, is not to be taken as a mere 'aspect'. Here too, and even in the mode of inauthenticity, the structure of existentiality lies ~ priori and here too Dasein's being is an issue for it in a definite way; and Dasein comports itself towards it the mode of average everydayness, even if this is only the mode of fleeing in the face of it and forgetfulness thereof." 3. ibid. pg. 59 "covering over" and "concealing" are 1;yays Dasein tries to flee its task of having being as an issue for itself. " ••• This being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten and no question arises about it or its meaning ••• n How everyday speaking accomplishes this will be taken up in detail in the second chapter which explores Dasein's everyday speech. 4. ibid, pg. 171 lI ••• we have in mind nothing other than the Existential - ontological structure of this entity (Dasein), that it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is -' illuminated' [tlerleuchtet"] means that as Being-in-theworld it is cleared [gelichtetJ in itself7 not through any other entity, but in such a way that it is itself the clearing. Only for an entity which is eXistentially cleared in this way does what is present-at-hand become accessible in the light or hidden in the dark •••• " 3 dis-coveredness and truth. Our first task will be to explore the nature of communication in general and then to explore each of the modes manifested in turn. The structure of the inauthentic mode of communication can be explored by asking the following questions: What is this speaking about? Who is it that is speaking and who is spoken to? Does this speaking show man in his speech? The authentic mode is distinguished by the rarity with which we encounter it; as the inauthentic conceals, so the authentic reveals our rootedness in being. Yet this rarity makes it difficult to delineate its elusive structure clearly. Its constituent elements can be brought into focus by asking the same questions of this mode that we previously asked of the inauthentic mode. Our initial response to the disclosure of the authentic mode is to attempt to abandon the inauthentic mode and leave the darkness behind dwelling only in the "lighted place". All through the ages, some men pushing this to extreme, have, upon uncovering their relatedness to being, experienced a deep longing to dwell in such a "place" of pure truth and oft times denigrated or attempted to exclude the everyday world. Such 4. flight is twice mistaken: first it atbempts to fix truth as unchanging and static and secondly, it opposes this to untruth which it seeks to abolish. This is both the wrong view of truth and the wrong view of untruth as Heidegger points out in The Origin of The-Work of Art: The Way-to-be of truth, i.e., of discoveredness, is under the sway of refusal. But this refusal is no lack or privation, as if truth could be simply discoveredness rid of all covers. If it could be that, it would no longer be itself . ••• Truth in its way-to-be is untruth.5 Pure light is not the nature of Being nor is pure unconcealedness possible for man. Failure to remember this is the failure to realize that communication destroys itself in such flight because it no longer maintains the contingency of its task, i.e., the dis-closedness of being. We are reminded of the strong attraction this flight from darkness held for Plato. Light, truth and Being are all beyond the darkness and have nothing to do with it. In Book VII of the R~public, Socrates' explanation of the Allegory of the Cave to Glaucon points to a decided preference men have for the "lighted place". 5. The Origin Of The Work Of Art, pg. 42 5. Come then, I said, and join me in this further thought, and do not be surprised that those who attained to this height are not willing to occupy themselves with the affairs of men, but their souls ever feel the upward urge and yearning for that sojourn above. For this, I take it, is likely if in this point too the likeliness of our image holds. 6 Despite the attraction to pure truth, human communication is more complex than putting down one mode of communication and picking up another. Due to the fact that we are always on the way, the title of my thesis will have to be amended: OUT OF THE DARKNESS AND INTO THE LIGHT--AGAIN AND AGAIN. It must be this way because this is what it means to be human. This is the point made by Mephisto to Faust in pointing out that man, standing between God and the devil, needs both darkness and light: Er findet sich in einem ewigen Gl~t Uns hat er in die Finsternis gebracht, Und euch taugt einzig Tag und Nacht. 7 6. Republic z (517 c & d) It should be noted however, that while the philosopherking must be compelled to return to the cave for purely political reasons, once he has taken adequate view of the "brightest region of being" he has the full truth and his return to darkness adds nothing to the truth. 7. Faust, pg. 188 6. This thesis proposes to examine the grounds that give rise to communication, uncovering the structure of its inauthentic and authentic modes and paying close attention to tpeir interrelationship and to their relationship to language as "the house of Being": language that both covers and opens up man's rootedness in Being, transforming him as he moves along his way, taking up his "ownmost task" of becoming who he is. roots. He is the being who shows himself inn that reflects his forgetfulness or remembrance of his rootedness in being. Man comes into an already existent world and is addressedl through things in the world which are c

Buddhism and the earth : environmental thought in early Buddhist philosophy

Introduction Fundamental to the philosophy of Buddhism, is the insight that there is "unsatisfactohness" (dukkha) in the world and that it can be eliminated through the practice of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Buddhism also maintains that the world as we experience and entities that exist are bereft of any substantiality. Instead existence is manifest through dependent origination. All things are conditional; nothing is permanent. However, inherent in this dependent existence is the interconnectedness of all beings and their subjection to the cosmic law of karma. Part of cultivating the Eight Fold path includes a deep compassion for all other living things, 'trapped' within this cycle of dependent origination. This compassion or empathy (karuna) is crucial to the Buddhist path to enlightenment. It is this emphasis on karuna that shows itself in Mahayana Buddhism with respect to the theory of the boddhisatva (or Buddha-to-be) since the boddhisatva willingly postpones his/her own enlightenment to help others on the same path. One of the ramifications of the theory of dependent origination is that there is no anthropocentric bias placed on humans over the natural world. Paradoxically the doctrine of non-self becomes an ontology within Buddhism, culminating in the Mayahana realization that a common boundary exists between samsara and nirvana. Essential to this ontology is the life of dharma or a moral life. Ethics is not separated from ontology. As my thesis will show, this basic outlook of Buddhism has implications toward our understanding of the Buddhist world-view with respect to the current human predicament concerning the environment. While humans are the only ones who can 4 attain "Buddhahood", it is because of our ability to understand what it means to follow the Eight fold path and act accordingly. Because of the interconnectedness of all entities {dharmas), there is an ontological necessity to eliminate suffering and 'save the earth' because if we allow the earth to suffer, we ALL suffer. This can be understood as an ethical outlook which can be applied to our interaction with and treatment of the natural environment or environment in the broadest sense, not just trees plants rocks etc. It is an approach to samsara and all within it. It has been argued that there is no ontology in Buddhism due to its doctrine of "non-self". However, it is a goal of this thesis to argue that there does exist an original ontology in Buddhism; that according to it, the nature of Being is essentially neither "Being nor non-being nor not non-being" as illustrated by Nagarjuna. Within this ontology is engrained an ethic or 'right path' (samma marga) that is fundamental to our being and this includes a compassionate relationship to our environment. In this dissertation I endeavour to trace the implications that the Buddhist worldview has for the environmental issues that assail us in our age of technology. I will explore questions such as: can the Buddhist way of thinking help us comprehend and possibly resolve the environmental problems of our day and age? Are there any current environmental theories which are comparable to or share common ground with the classical Buddhist doctrines? I will elucidate some fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism from an environmental perspective as well as identify some comparable modern environmental theories such as deep ecology and general systems theory, that seem to share in the wisdom of classical Buddhism and have much to gain from a deeper appreciation of Buddhism.

Heidegger's tragic Greeks : the relation between presence and deinon

Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the ancients was born out of something like a crisis in the interpretation of the Greeks, which can be characterized as nothing other than the realization of the idea that the Greek philosophers put a serious question mark over existence. This idea, which had its germination in Prussia with Jakob Burckhart and his teacher, but first came to be seriously cultivated in the Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche, was the first in depth investigation into whether the Greeks, on the one hand, questioned existence or, on the other hand, put a question mark over existence. To question existence is rather innocuous, since it amounts to little more, in the end, than a child looking up at the stars and asking what it all means. To put a question mark over existence, however, is another business entirely. For the Greeks, as the life work of Martin Heidegger amply demonstrates, the nature of Greek thinking and the objects towards which it is directed follows so absolutely from the tragic view of the human person that, in a certain sense, philosophy is Greek and could only have developed in Greece. Perhaps stating it a little less categorically, philosophy could have developed elsewhere at least to the extent that something like they way the Greeks understood life was at the forefront: presence, in other words. This thesis deals with the problem ofHeidegger's relation to the Greeks, specifically in terms of his understanding of the Greeks and presence. It is the position of this dissertation that the Greek notion of presence is, as Heidegger understands it, the homeliness of the hearth that radiates through all the things that humans concern themselves with. This is thought by Heidegger, as the Greeks did, specifically in contrast with the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the hqrnan apart from his or her concern with things. Therefore, the thesis is an attempt at exposing the relation between presence and the unhomely by situating it withing Greek existence and the meaning of the Greek Philosopher. In order to support this position, the thesis has been divided into five parts. The first two chapters deal with Heidegger's explanation of the relation between Greek notion of physics (Phusis), metaphysics (specifically in relation to an analysis of time and motion in Greek thought), and what Heidegger calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein (boredom). More exactly, it deals with these issues only so far as they allow us to bring out something like the notion of 'presence' in relation to things and homelessness or restlessness in relation to the human being. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central problem of the paper is that in Heidegger's elucidation of physics and metaphysics, he conducts his analysis in such a way that he explicitly uncovers that dimension of human existence that he calls the fundamental attunement of Dasein. This fundamental attunement is, in tum, similar to what the Greeks understood as the deinon, the uncanninesslunhomeliness of the human. The third and fourth chapters take as their explicit themes the problem of the Greek understanding of the assertion and the ways in which the person can comport himlherself toward things, two issues which are not separable. The rationale for these two chapters in relation to the central theme of the paper is that Heidegger's analysis of these two areas in Greek thought brings out precisely why the philosopher and the philosophical way of life is the highest mode of existence for the Greeks and how this is thought specifically in tenns of the uncanniness of humans. The final cijapter gives a complete elucidation of presence as the homeliness of the hearth and shows specifically how this is thought of in contradistinction to the uncanny/unhomely for the Greeks. 1I1 This last chapter also explains Martin Heidegger's reaction to the Greek's interpretation of the highest mode of existence, and what he posited as a counter-thought. The essay as a whole is an attempt to fully concertize an important dimension of Heidegger' s understanding of the Greeks, that is, the relation between presence and the deinon or Greek notion ofunhomely, which, to my la)owledge, has not been offered anywhere in commentaries on Heidegger.

Social comparison and body image in non or infrequent exercisers and exercisers

Body image refers to an individual's internal representation ofhis/her outer self (Cash, 1994; Thompson, Heinberg, Altabe, & Tantleff-Dunn, 1999). It is a multidimensional construct which includes an individual's attitudes towards hislher own physical characteristics (Bane & McAuley, 1998; Cash, 1994; Cash, 2004; Davison & McCabe, 2005; Muth & Cash, 1997; Sabiston, Crocker, & Munroe-Chandler, 2005). Social comparison is the process of thinking about the self in relation to others in order to determine if one's opinions and abilities are adequate and to assess one's social status (Festinger, 1954; Wood, 1996). Research investigating the role of social comparisons on body image has provided some information on the types and nature of the comparisons that are made. The act of making social comparisons may have a negative impact on body image (van den Berg et ai., 2007). Although exercise may improve body image, the impact of social comparisons in exercise settings may be less positive, and there may be differences in the social comparison tendencies between non or infrequent exercisers and exercisers. The present study examined the nature of social comparisons that female collegeaged non or infrequent exercisers and exercisers made with respect to their bodies, and the relationship of these social comparisons to body image attitudes. Specifically, the frequency and direction of comparisons on specific tal-gets and body dimensions were examined in both non or infrequent exercisers and exercisers. Finally, the relationship between body-image attitudes and the frequency and direction with which body-related social comparisons were made for non or infrequent exercisers and exercisers were examined. One hundred and fifty-two participants completed the study (n = 70 non or ill infrequent exercisers; n = 82 exercisers). Participants completed measures of social physique anxiety (SPA), body dissatisfaction, body esteem, body image cognitions, leisure time physical activity, and social comparisons. Results suggested that both groups (non or infrequent exercisers and exercisers) generally made social comparisons and most frequently made comparisons with same-sex friends, and least frequently with same-sex parents. Also, both groups made more appearance-related comparisons than non-appearance-related comparisons. Further, both groups made more negative comparisons with almost all targets. However, non or infrequent exercisers generally made more negative comparisons on all body dimensions, while exercisers made negative comparisons only on weight and body shape dimensions. MANOV As were conducted to examine if any differences on social comparisons between the two groups existed. Results of the MANOVAs indicated that frequency of comparisons with targets, the frequency of comparisons on body dimensions, and direction of comparisons with targets did not differ based on exercise status. However, the direction of comparison of specific body dimensions revealed a significant (F (7, 144) = 3.26,p < .05; 1]2 = .132) difference based on exercise status. Follow-up ANOVAs showed significant differences on five variables: physical attractiveness (F (1, 150) = 6.33,p < .05; 1]2 = .041); fitness (F(l, 150) = 11.89,p < .05; 1]2 = .073); co-ordination (F(I, 150) = 5.61,p < .05; 1]2 = .036); strength (F(I, dO) = 12.83,p < .05; 1]2 = .079); muscle mass or tone (F(l, 150) = 17.34,p < .05; 1]2 = 1.04), with exercisers making more positive comparisons than non or infrequent exercisers. The results from the regression analyses for non or infrequent exercisers showed appearance orientation was a significant predictor of the frequency of social comparisons N (B = .429, SEB = .154, /3 = .312,p < .01). Also, trait body image measures accounted for significant variance in the direction of social comparisons (F(9, 57) = 13.43,p < .001, R2adj = .68). Specifically, SPA (B = -.583, SEB = .186, /3 = -.446,p < .01) and body esteem-weight concerns (B = .522, SEB = .207, /3 = .432,p < .01) were significant predictors of the direction of comparisons. For exercisers, regressions revealed that specific trait measures of body image significantly predicted the frequency of comparisons (F(9, 71) = 8.67,p < .001, R2adj = .463). Specifically, SPA (B = .508, SEB = .147, /3 = .497,p < .01) and appearance orientation (B = .457, SEB = .134, /3 = .335,p < .01) were significant predictors of the frequency of social comparisons. Lastly, for exercisers, the results for the regression of body image measures on the direction of social comparisons were also significant (F(9, 70) = 14.65,p < .001, R2adj = .609) with body dissatisfaction (B = .368, SEB = .143, /3 = .362,p < .05), appearan.ce orientation (B = .256, SEB = .123, /3 = .175,p < .05), and fitness orientation (B = .423, SEB = .194, /3 = .266,p < .05) significant predictors of the direction of social comparison. The results indicated that young women made frequent social comparisons regardless of exercise status. However, exercisers m,a de more positive comparisons on all the body dimensions than non or infrequent exercisers. Also, certain trait body image measures may be good predictors of one's body comp~son tendencies. However, the measures which predict comparison tendencies may be different for non or infrequent exercisers and exercisers. Future research should examine the effects of social comparisons in different populations (i.e., males, the obese, older adults, etc.). Implications for practice and research were discussed.

John Adams Smith letter, Jan. 14, 1813

Transcript: New York Jan. 14. 1813. My dear uncle, I had nearly concluded to have made my [jaunt?] earlier than I had mentioned in my last letter to you, for Swartout had intended to have written by me to Father & yourself; having [Louisa?] concluded not so soon to depart he sends me his letters which I forward in mail, I shall hope to have letters from home soon, it is a great pleasure to hear from any of you. I said last week in Hollands letter mentioning [bladeworth?] account, I have explained to him. It is a mistake about me agreeing to pay Mr. [Dening?] [their?] account. Caroline mentions to me your jaunt to [Sophia?], but I regret our friend there should be unpleasantly situated. I have not yet seen Col. Willett but will see him as mentioned. I have neglected to go there for some time which has been remiss in me. We have nothing new I believe unless it be that Armstrong & Jones of Philadelphia have been nominated as Secretarys of War & the Navy & [cer?] this in all probability may be appointed. There may be room for speculation, but perhaps it is not probable that Canada will be ceded to American Valor in the year 1813. There is a Bill before congress by which it may be made penal to enter on board American vessels, either British subjects or naturalized Americans, which it is presoomed by many will [spon?] the accommodation of Peace – may be yes may be no – the proof of the pudding is in the eating of it. I imagine pacification is not so near at hand although it is much to be desired. Whatever might be for the honor & prosperity of the Country I would strenuously advocate, aloof from partial & party considerations. We have not a word as yet what the Council at Albany may be thinking of as yet. I suppose these things will come in time, perhaps untimely to many. I desire for the present not to be found among the untimely. I am your sincerely, with love to all. John Adams Smith

Crowland Municipality : an act for regulating and governing auctioneers, and other persons putting up for sale, goods, wares, and merchandise to the highest or best bidder., 1854

On February 1st, 1854 an act was passed in order to regulate the sale of goods, wares and merchandise. Section I pertained to the fact that any merchant would first obtain a license. Section II deemed that no merchant should sell any wine or spirituous liquors, beer or ale within the municipality of Crowland in any less quantity than 5 gallons or less than 12 bottles in any place other than a House of Public Entertainment without having obtained a license. Section III was in regard to licensing any person who would use a billiard table which was set up for hire or gain. Section IV stated that all sums of money paid by the keepers of Houses of Public Entertainment plus the imperial duty of 2 pound would be payable to the Treasurer of the Municipality of Crowland. Section V was written regarding the continuance of the act to regulate inns, taverns, temperance houses and other Houses of Public Entertainment. Section VI specified that all recesses (not authorized to sell liquor) would pay the sum of 2 pounds. Section VII declared that Peter Benedict was appointed Revenue Inspector of the township and section VIII stated that recess-keepers who took out liquor licenses would be required to pay 6 pounds 5 shillings and for violating this they would pay a penalty. This document was written by Leonard M. Matthews, Township reeve and Alex Reid, clerk.

James Corbin letter, October 2, 1813

James Corbin (1791-1860) lived in Williamstown, Berkshire County, Massachusetts. He is buried there is Southlawn cemetery. Pliny Moore (1759-1822) was the founder of the town of Champlain, New York. He served in the revolutionary war and after received the Smith and Graves patent, a parcel of land more than 11,000 acres in size. He served in several town offices in Champlain, including postmaster and judge, as well as operating sawmills and textile mills. Letter transcription: Dear Sir, The reason I did not come to tend your mill last spring was because the letter you wrote me dated 1 of March I didn’t receive it until the 12 of April and inform me that if I could be there in 2 or 3 weeks you would employ me as we agreed and therefore I concluded it would not do any good for me to come. It was a great disappointment to me because I was all ready to come whenever I got word. It is impossible for me to come now for I am in partnership with my brother in the farm and Mills and must take care our crops and settle our [bushels] this winter. I know nothing to the contrary but what I can come next spring I will let you know by uncle Corbin this winter. James Corbin

James Corbin Letter - October 2, 1813

Letter transcription: Dear Sir, The reason I did not come to tend your mill last spring was because the letter you wrote me dated 1 of March I didn’t receive it until the 12 of April and inform me that if I could be there in 2 or 3 weeks you would employ me as we agreed and therefore I concluded it would not do any good for me to come. It was a great disappointment to me because I was all ready to come whenever I got word. It is impossible for me to come now for I am in partnership with my brother in the farm and Mills and must take care our crops and settle our [bushels] this winter. I know nothing to the contrary but what I can come next spring I will let you know by uncle Corbin this winter. James Corbin