68 resultados para Yahweh to his anointed
em Brock University, Canada
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Printed by Walter and Steele
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A letter from Cyrus Sumner to his brother Walter Sumner, dated 23 April 1849. The letter describes the experiences of Cyrus Sumner from the road. He discusses the travel "from Erie to Pittsburg". A transcription accompanies the letter
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A letter from Col. Frank C. McCordick to his wife May dated 24 December 1915. He discusses plans for Christmas dinner in the mess room and decorating the hall with holly. He mentions friends who have sent Christmas cards and asks about his daughter Doris.
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Letter to Robert Nelles from his son, Abraham Nelles. He says that he would liked to have visited, but Hannah is quite weak. On Monday he plans to go to Walpole where W. Malcolm will meet him to survey the lot. He writes of his gratefulness to his father and hopes that his father will be rewarded in the afterlife, Dec. 6, 1833
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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to show how Gadamer's hermeneutics synthesizes the insights of both Heidegger and Dilthey in order to introduce a new hermeneutics. Gadamer's hermeneutics is based not only on the priority of ontology, as Heidegger insists, and neither is it only a product of life which can be objectively understood through study and rigorous method, as Dilthey suggests. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is the bringing together of ontology in terms of history. By this synthesis Gadamer not only places himself within the context of a Lebensphilosophie, but also shows that it is within language that Being can be disclosed according to a lived context. Throughout this paper the philosophies ofDilthey and Heidegger are explicated within a historical context as to bring out how, and why, Gadamer sees the need to surpass these philosophies. Through Gadamer's philosophy of play and the game, language, the dialogical model, application, and the fusion of horizons we can see how Gadamer's critique and questioning of these two philosophy leads to his new hermeneutics. Special attention is paid to the role in which these two contrasting philosophies were used to complement each other in the product of Gadamer' s philosophical hermeneutics as it is presented in his major work Truth andMethod. For Gadamer, the task of understanding is never complete. Therefore, his hermeneutics remains a dynamic structure with which we can always question the past and our traditions. This paper seeks to show his philosophical movements within these questions
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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Thesis (M.Ed.)-- Brock University, 1995.
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Transcript (original spelling and grammar retained): We the Commissioned Officers belonging to the Second Regiment of Lincoln Militia - Do sincerely promise and swear that we will be faithful and bear true allegiance to his Majesty King George, and heirs will defend to the utmost of our power against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts whatsoever which shall be made against his Person, Crown or Dignity; and we will do our utmost endeavours to disclose and make them known to his Majesty, His Heirs and successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies and attempts, which we shall know to be against Him or them. So help us God. Thomas Clark - Lt. Col. David Secord - Major John Crysler - Capt James Macklin - Capt John [Ross] - [Captain] [Abraham] Bowman - Lieut Gilbert McMicking - Quartmaster John [Misiner] - Ensign Robert Campbell - Capt John [Couke] - Ensign Nicholas Smith - Lieut I certify that the officers who have here [subscribed] the oath took it before me at Chippawa 4 Sept 1812 Thomas Dickson JP
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A two page letter written by Sir Isaac Brock in York, Upper Canada to James FitzGibbon on July 29, 1812. The name of the recipient is not included but according to Mary Agnes FitzGibbon, one can find a transcript of the letter in her "A Veteran of 1812", page 60.[1812], 29 July: Major-General Isaac Brock, York, to James FitzGibbon. I lament that you should have been so long impressed with the idea that I possessed the means of being serviceable to you. I had scarcely heard of Mr. Johnson having declined a Company in the Glengarry (which would have given me the nomination) but I received account of his being reinstated. I consequently thought no more of the business thinking that officer was enjoying the fruits of his good fortune. I know not positively whether Mr. Johnson is reinstated, but being under obligations to promote his views, I cannot possibly interfere to his prejudice. I rather wonder you did not hear that Lieut Lamont had long ago my promise of nominating him to the Company provided it became vacant, which of course would have precluded my application in your behalf. Altho you must be sensible of the impossibility of my taking any step to forward your views in the present case, yet be assured I shall always feel happy in any opportunity that may offer to do your service. To a person unaccustomed to my writing I scarcely would hazard sending this scrawl. I am, Dear Sir, Yours faithfully, Isaac Brock I should like to be among the 49th at this moment. I am satisfied they will support and even add to their former fame. They have my very best wishes. The 41st are behaving nobly at Amherstburg.
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Transcript (spelling and grammar retained): “Col Proctor Sir I hope your goodness will excuse the Liberty I have taken of Enclosing a Letter for my nephew Mr. Hailes to your care, and begging the favor of you to forward it to him, - not knowing myself at what Post he is – With Great Respect I am Sir Your Most Obed Serv David Todd”
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The letter written by A.N. Moyer to his brother Samuel Moyer recounts his early years in Pelham.
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A letter from Prime Minister Wilfrid Laurier to A. Munro Grier regarding an invitation to His Royal Highness. This is possibly referencing the Royal visit of the Duke of Cornwall in the year 1901. The Royals were due to tour Canada September and October of that year, with a stop in the Niagara area October 13th.
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Fort George, situated on the west side of the Niagara River in Niagara-on-the-Lake, served as the headquarters for the Centre Division of the British Army during the War of 1812. On May 25, 1813, the Americans launched an artillery attack on the Fort, destroying most of the buildings. Two days later, the Americans invaded the Town of Niagara and occupied Fort George. They remained in the Fort for almost seven months, but suffered defeats at the Battle of Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams. Only a small number of militia remained stationed at the Fort. Fearing an attack by the British, the Americans retreated back across the Niagara River in December, 1813. The Fort remained in British possession for the rest of the War.
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A letter from Andrew Cowan to his son William Cowan 29 Septemer 1841. The letter reads "Dear William, I have taken my pen the third time since I have received any word from you, my first letter was about the beginning of the year, and the second in the month of April with John Armstrong of Northhouse, he sailed from Liverpool the fifteen of that month with his sisters Jane and Jenny and their two children. I received a letter from him dated Cleavland in the State of Ohio the 6 of June. He did not intend stopping in that place. The leaves us all well for any thing that I know, but I have not heard from Andrew since March altho I have writen to him three months since your Mother and I are both sore faild altho we have tolerable good health for which we desire to be thankfull to the giver of all our mercies, which are new every day, that we may be found in Christs and clothed in his imputed righteousness at the last, for in him is only found true happyness. We have had another cold wet Summer and the crops is far back ------ not light, the price of -----is high and trade bad, but sheep and cattle are high. Cattle have not been higher since the French war, but the cattle trade is very bad at present and the opperatives out of imployment and consequently verrry badly of. If none of my former letters have reached you this will inform you that James is at Lanshawburn, and gets imployment all the year, he keeps a cow and five or six sheep, they have three children, Mary, Hannah, and Andrew; I was there after clipping time seeing them, they seem to be verry happy. James Lamb is well he was here the other night, he has got two letters from his son Adam this Summer; they are still in the same place and will finish their job this fall, and seem to be doing well, your Uncle Adam Scott and family are well. John was there lately there is little prospect of his getting to America as the money that was left him is not got yet and will not for some time, If ever this reach you, you must let us know how all the Scotch people that are near you, that went from this place of the Country are doing, as their freinds are anxious to hear from them, perticularly if you know what is becomed of Alexander Hoggs widow and family of ------hill, as I was desired to write to you about them - I got a letter from John Miller dated Gatt but I understand it is a long way from your place he was a gentleman and had the charge of a farm and seems verry ----- Now William if this ever reach you, you must excuse me for not filling this letter up, but if I receive an answer I promise to fill the next better, We all join in our love and respect to you and family. From your loving Father Andrew Cowan