Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

The effects of postural threat on cognitive strategies used to maintain upright stance

It is well established that postural threat modifies postural control, although little is known regarding the underlying mechanism(s) responsible. It is possible that changes in postural control under conditions of elevated postural threat result from alterations in cognitive strategies. The purpose of this study was to determine the influence of elevated postural threat on cognitive strategies and to determine the relationship between postural control, psychological, and cognitive measures. It was hypothesized that elevated postural threat would cause a shift to more conscious control of posture. It was also expected that a relationship between fear of falling and postural control would exist that could be explained by changes in conscious control of posture. Forty-eight healthy young adults stood on a force plate at two different surface heights: ground level (LOW) and 3.2m above ground level (HIGH). Center of pressure (COP) summary measures calculated to quantify postural control were the mean position (AP-COP MP), root mean square (AP-COP RMS) and mean power frequency (AP-COP MPF) in the anteriorposterior direction. Trunk sway measures calculated in the pitch direction were trunk angle and trunk velocity. Psychological measures including perceived balance confidence, perceived fear of falling, perceived anxiety, and perceived stability were self reported. As a physiological indicator of anxiety, electrodermal activity was collected. The cognitive strategies assessed were movement reinvestment and attention focus. A modified state-sp-ecific version of the Movement Specific Reinvestment Scale was used to measure conscious motor processing (CMP) and movement self-consciousness (MSC). An attention focus questionnaire was developed to assess the amount of attention directed to internal and external sources. An effect of postural threat on cognitive strategies was observed as participants reported more conscious control and a greater concern or worry about their posture at the HIGH postural threat condition as well as an increased internal and external focus of attention. In addition changes in postural control, psychological, and physiological measures were found. The participants leaned away from the edge of the platform, the frequency of their postural adjustments increased, and the velocity of their trunk movements increased. Participants felt less confident, more fearful, more anxious, and less stable with an accompanying increase in physiological anxiety. Significant correlations between perceived anxiety, AP-COP MP, and cognitive measures revealed a possible relationship that could be mediated by cognitive measures. It was found that with greater conscious motor processing, more movement self-consciousness, and a greater amount of attention focused externally there was a larger shift of the mean position away from the edge of the platform. This thesis provides evidence that postural threat can influence cognitive strategies causing a shift to more conscious control of movement which is associated with leaning away from the edge of the platform. Shifting the position of the body away from the direction of the postural threat may reflect a cognitive strategy to ensure safety in this situation due to the inability to employ a stepping strategy when standing on an elevated platform.

Using fuction-based CBT with parent involvement to treat OCD in two school-age children with high-functioning autism

Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) involves excessive worry coupled with engaging in rituals that are believed to help alleviate the worry. Pervasive Developmental Disorders (PODs) are characterized by impairments in social interaction, communication, and the presence of repetitive and/or restrictive behaviours (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Research suggests that as many as 81% of children with a POD also meet criteria for a diagnosis ofOCD. Currently, only a handful of studies have investigated the use of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) in treating OCD in children with autism (Reaven & Hepburn, 2003 ; Sze & Wood, 2007; Lehmkuhl, Storch, Bodtish & Geflken, 2008). In these case studies. the use of a multi-modal CBT treatment package was successful in alleviating OCD behaviours. The current study used function-based CBT with parent involvement and behavioural supplements to treat 2 children with POD and OCD. Using a multiple baseline design across behaviours and participants, parents reported that their child 's anxiety was alleviated and these gains were maintained at 6-month follow-up. According to results of the Children 's Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Goodman, Price, Rasmussen, Riddle, & Rapoport, 1986) from preto post-test, OCD behaviours of the children decreased II"om the severe to the mild range. In addition, the parents rated the family's level of interference related to their child 's OCD as substantially lower. Last, the CBT treatment received high ratings of consumer satisfaction.

Utilizing a Phenomenological Approach to Examine the Experience of Sexuality for Women Concerned about Urinary Incontinence following Spinal Cord Injury

Sexuality after spinal cord injury (SCI) is a complex issue that is influenced by a number of social, psychological and physiological factors, one of which is urinary incontinence (UI). Using a phenomenological approach, seven mixed methods interviews combining both the interview guide and standardized open-ended approaches were conducted to examine the experience of sexuality for women who are concerned about UI following SCI. Sexual function was one of the top priorities for the women after SCI, and UI was one of the main concerns the women had regarding sexuality. The findings of this study demonstrate that various dimensions of intimacy and the sexual experience as a whole were affected by UI, and the women discussed both physical and psychological concerns. The main issues regarding sexuality included concerns related to relationships, frustrations with limited sexual activities and the difficulty of being sexually satisfied, the number of unanswered questions and concerns, and a fear of being hurt or injured while participating in sexual activities. The main concerns regarding UI were embarrassment, the work and inconvenience involved with the clean-up of UI, bladder infections, the lack of accessible washrooms, and the negative effects of UI medications. When examining sexuality and UI together, the major issues were the constant comparison to the way things were before SCI, as well as the new concerns that the women did not have to worry about previously, worrying about how their partner would react if UI were to occur during sexual activity, and the impact of their own feelings toward UI on sexuality, a connection between pleasurable sexual sensations and UI as well as difficulty differentiating between the sensation of UI with the sensation of UI, dealing with infected urine during sexual activity, having to discuss UI with a new potential sexual partner, and a fear of rejection. Other identified issues included those related to body image, a lack of resources, Doctors who were inadequately educated regarding SCI, and issues related to both having and raising children. There is a significant shortage of information available for women with SCI to use as a resource regarding sexual function in general, and sexual function as it relates to UI. It is necessary that future work focus on creating resources to assist in this area, and that the dissemination of those resources becomes both appropriate and effective. Addressing sexual function and UI which are among the top concerns for this population has the opportunity to greatly improve quality of life (QOL) for these individuals.

Letter - Mrs. Olive Diefenbaker to Sean O'Sullivan, 6 December 1966

A handwritten letter from Olive Diefenbaker to Sean O'Sullivan, 6 December 1966. Mrs. Diefenbaker remarks about a phone call she received from a Hamiltonian who had met O'Sullivan at "the Convention" and had "'tried to help him over his disillusion"'. Mrs. Diefenbaker took offense to the comments and responded to the individual "I wouldn't worry about Sean. He is mature and wise, and will think his way through like the rest of us".