Cheque Presentation

Members of the Niagara Peninsula Joint Committee on Higher Education receiving cheques for their cause. Ivan Buchanan is second from the left and on the far right are Robert Schmon and his father Arthur Schmon (Chairman of the Committee).

Alumni Association Cheque Presentation

Presentation of the Alumni Association cheque at the sod turning ceremonies for the Science Complex in 1982. Pictured here from left to right are: R. Misener, Chancellor; Geoff Borland, president, Alumni Assocation; Ginny Gilbert, Alumni Officer; and Don Bethune, honorary chairman for Alumni Association Fundraising.

1970 Design Presentation

Pictured here from left to right are Chairman of the Board, Whiting Lathrop, President James Gibson, and Architect Raymond Moriyama during the formal presentation of the $7.7 million MacKenzie Chown Complex project, which at the time was known as the Academic Staging Building or simply East Block.

UAW Presentation

Pictured here from left to right are James Hogan, University Librarian, Dr. James Gibson, President, and William Marshal of the UAW.

Commerative Stamp Presentation

Pictured here from left to right are James Hogan, Librarian, and President James Gibson with a set of stamps commerating Sir Isaac Brock that were issued from the Bailiwick of Guernsey in October of 1969.

Foundation

View of the construction of the foundations in November 1971.

Pool Foundation

Exposed escarpment rock during the construction of the pool.

Foundation Work

Work on the foundation for the Aquatic Centre around 1980.

Aquatic Centre Foundation

The steel, rock, and conrete foundation of the Aquatic Centre.

Foundation and Pillar work

Work on the foundation and pillars of the Aquatic Centre.

The role of self-presentation in adolescent health risk behaviours

Self-presentation has been identified as playing a key role in the perfonnance of various potentially hazardous health behaviours such as substance abuse, eating disorders and reckless behaviours (Leary, Tchividjian, & Kraxberger, 1994; Martin & Leary, 2001; Martin, Leary, & O'Brien, 2001). The present study investigated the role of selfpresentation on adolescent health-risk behaviours. Specifically, this study examined the prevalence of adolescent identified health-risk behaviours rooted in self-presentational motives in youths aged 13-18 years. The current study also identified the specific images associated with these behaviours desired by youth, and the targets of these behaviours. Also, the relationship between these behaviours, and several trait measures (social physique anxiety, public-self consciousness, fear of negative evaluations, selfpresentational efficacy) of self-presentation were examined. Finally, the gender differences in health risk behaviours and self-presentational concerns were examined. Participants in the present study were 96 adolescent students, 34 male and 62 female, recruited from various private schools across Southern Ontario. Students ranged in age from 13 to 18 years for both males (M age = 15.81 years, SD = 1.49) and females (M age = 14.89 years, SD = 1.17) and ranged from grades 8 through 13. Results of the current study suggested that Canadian adolescents between the ages of 13 and 18 years participated in health risk behaviours for self-presentational purposes. Drinking alcohol, skipping school, and performing stunts and dares were identified as the most common health risk behaviours performed for self-presentational purposes by both males and females. Appearing fun and cool were the most commonly reported desired images while appearing brave and mature were the least reported. The most desired target group cited was same sex friends, followed by other sex friends. Trait measures of self-presentational concerns identified females as being higher in public self-consciousness, and social physique anxiety than males. Males were found to be higher in self-presentational efficacy than females. The total number of health risk behaviours was predicted by selfpresentational efficacy and social physique anxiety for males, and social physique anxiety for females. Findings of the current study suggest that Canadian adolescents' health risk behaviours are rooted, in part, in self-presentational motives. Thus far, an educational approach to health interventions has been favoured and/or adopted by teachers, health promoters, and educators (Jessor, 1992). Implications of the current study suggest that although educational interventions are beneficial in presenting the associated risks with certain activities and/or behaviours, one reason this type of approach may be ineffective in changing adolescent behaviour over the long run is that it does not address the strong and prominent influences of interpersonal motives on health damaging behaviour. It is evident that social acceptance and public image are of importance to adolescents, and the desire to make the "right" impression and to achieve peer approval and acceptance often override health and safety concerns (Jessor, 1992). Thus, a self-presentational approach focusing on changing the images associated with the behaviours may be more successful at deterring adolescent health risk behaviours.

Charting developmental EEG gamma changes in the auditory modality /

The oscillation of neuronal circuits reflected in the EEG gamma frequency may be fundamental to the perceptual process referred to as binding (the integration of various thoughts and perceptions into a coherent picture). The aim of our study was to expand our knowledge of the developmental course ofEEG gamma in the auditory modality. 2 We investigated EEG 40 Hz gamma band responses (35.2 to 43.0 Hz) using an auditory novelty oddball paradigm alone and with a visual-number-series distracter task in 208 participants as a function of age (7 years to adult) at 9 sites across the sagital and lateral axes (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4). Gamma responses were operationally defined as change in power or a change in phase synchrony level from baseline within two time windows. The evoked gamma response was defined as a significant change from baseline occurring between 0 to 150 ms after stimulus onset; the induced gamma response was measured from 250 to 750 ms after stimulus onset. A significant evoked gamma band response was found when measuring changes in both power and phase synchrony. The increase in both measures was maximal at frontal regions. Decreases in both measures were found when participants were distracted by a secondary task. For neither measure were developmental effects noted. However, evoked gamma power was significantly enhanced with the presentation of a novel stimulus, especially at the right frontal site (F4); frontal evoked gamma phase synchrony also showed enhancement for novel stimuli but only for our two oldest age groups (16-18 year olds and adults). Induced gamma band responses also varied with task-dependent cognitive stimulus properties. In the induced gamma power response in all age groups, target stimuli generated the highest power values at the parietal region, while the novel stimuli were always below baseline. Target stimuli increased induced synchrony in all regions for all participants, but the novel stimulus selectively affected participants dependent on their age and gender. Adult participants, for example, exhibited a reduction in gamma power, but an increase in synchrony to the novel stimulus within the same region. Induced gamma synchrony was more sensitive to the gender of the participant than was induced gamma power. While induced gamma power produced little effects of age, gamma synchrony did have age effects. These results confirm that the perceptual process which regulates gamma power is distinct from that which governs the synchronization for neuronal firing, and both gamma power and synchrony are important factors to be considered for the "binding" hypothesis. However, there is surprisingly little effect of age on the absolute levels of or distribution of EEG gamma in the age range investigated.

Psychopathy and self-monitoring : additive and interactive effects on self-presentation tactics /

The purpose of this study was to determine the relative contributions of psychopathy and self-monitoring to the prediction of self-presentation tactics (behaviours that individuals use to manipulate their self-image). Psychopathy is composed of two main factors: Factor 1, which includes manipulativeness and shallow affect, and Factor 2, which includes irresponsibility and anti-social behaviours. Self-monitoring is a personality trait that distinguishes between those who adapt their behaviour to fit different social situations (high self-monitors) and those who behave as they feel regardless of social expectations (low selfmonitors). It was hypothesized that self-monitoring would moderate the relationship between psychopathy and self-presentation tactics. One hundred and forty-nine university students completed the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974), the Self-Report Psychopathy Scale - Version III (Paulhus et aI., in press), the Self-Presentation Tactics scale (Lee, S., et aI., 1999), the HEXACO-PI (a measure ofthe six major factors of personality; Lee, K., & Ashton, 2004), and six scenarios that were created as a supplementary measure of the selfpresentation tactics. Results of the hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that self-monitoring did moderate the relationship between psychopathy and three of the selfpresentation tactics: apologies, disclaimers, and exemplification. Further, significant interactions were observed between Factor 1 and self-monitoring on apologies and the defensive tactics subscale, between Factor 2 and self-monitoring on self-handicapping, and between Factor 1 and Factor 2 on exemplification. Contrary to expectations, the main effect of self-monitoring was significant for the prediction of nine tactics, while psychopathy was significant for the prediction of seven tactics. This indicates that the role of these two personality traits in the explanation of self-presentation tactics tends to be additive in nature rather than interactive. In addition. Factor 2 alone did not account for a significant amount of variance in any of the tactics, while Factor 1 significantly predicted nine tactics. Results are discussed with regard to implications and possible directions for future research.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.