Nietzsche's will-to-power ontology : an interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil

Abstract: Nietzsche's Will-to-Power Ontology: An Interpretation of Beyond Good and Evil § 36 By: Mark Minuk Will-to-power is the central component of Nietzsche's philosophy, and passage 36 of Beyond Good and Evil is essential to coming to an understanding of it. 1 argue for and defend the thesis that will-to-power constitutes Nietzsche's ontology, and offer a new understanding of what that means. Nietzsche's ontology can be talked about as though it were a traditional substance ontology (i.e., a world made up of forces; a duality of conflicting forces described as 'towards which' and 'away from which'). However, 1 argue that what defines this ontology is an understanding of valuation as ontologically fundamental—^the basis of interpretation, and from which a substance ontology emerges. In the second chapter, I explain Nietzsche's ontology, as reflected in this passage, through a discussion of Heidegger's two ontological categories in Being and Time (readiness-to-hand, and present-at-hand). In a nutshell, it means that the world of our desires and passions (the most basic of which is for power) is ontologically more fundamental than the material world, or any other interpretation, which is to say, the material world emerges out of a world of our desires and passions. In the first chapter, I address the problematic form of the passage reflected in the first sentence. The passage is in a hypothetical style makes no claim to positive knowledge or truth, and, superficially, looks like Schopenhaurian position for the metaphysics of the will, which Nietzsche rejects. 1 argue that the hypothetical form of the passage is a matter of style, namely, the style of a free-spirit for whom the question of truth is reframed as a question of values. In the third and final chapter, 1 address the charge that Nietzsche's interpretation is a conscious anthropomorphic projection. 1 suggest that the charge rests on a distinction (between nature and man) that Nietzsche rejects. I also address the problem of the causality of the will for Nietzsche, by suggesting that an alternative, perspectival form of causality is possible.

Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

Niagara Falls Park: Notice to Treat to Sutherland Macklem, Esquire, 1885

The Niagara Parks Commission administrative headquarters are located in Oak Hall which is on the cliff above Dufferin Islands. In 1798 this land was granted by the crown to United Empire Loyalist James Skinner until 1898. A century later it was the home of the Clarks, Streets and Macklems. These families controlled the mills of Bridgewater which was a pioneer industrial village located at Dufferin Islands. Then, it was known as Clark Hill. Colonel Thomas Clark, commander of the Second Lincoln Militia in the War of 1812 is the earliest known occupant of the house. When Clark died in 1837, the house went to Thomas Clark Street who was the son of the Colonel’s partner. Mr. Street was a bachelor and his sister, widow of Dr. T.C. Macklem, managed his household. Mrs. Macklem had 2 sons. The eldest son drowned in the Niagara River at the age of 8 and the younger son, Sutherland became heir to the estate. Mr. Macklem opened Cynthia Islands and Cedar Island to the public and had roads built to reach them. Two suspension bridges connected them to the mainland and tolls were charged on the bridges. The improvements to the land cost Macklem $18,962. He called the bridges “Bridge Castor” and “Bridge Pollux”. There was also an office built at the end of Bridge Castor. Macklem also spent $454 fixing up the Burning Spring Building (the burning spring is enclosed in a barrel which collects gas and lets it out through a tube at the top). Macklem received a yearly income of $56,378.79 from tourists and visitors. In 1887 Cynthia Islands and Cedar Island were deeded to the crown and became part of Queen Victoria Park. The name Cynthia was changed to Dufferin in honour of Lord Dufferin. Sources: www.niagarafrontier.com/parks.html www.niagarafrontier.com/burningsprings.html

Report - Loss Due to Ice Rankine Station - 1938 through 1941

A report outlining the expenses of loss due to ice from the year 1938 through 1941 at the Rankine Station. Included in the report is the lost income due to power outages, operating labour, operating material and the sum of these costs per annum.

Power, Contextual Intelligence and Leadership: Research Approaches for Understanding Participatory Community Climate Change Adaptation

Analysis of power in natural resources management is important as multiple stakeholders interact within complex, social-ecological systems. As a sub-set of these interactions, community climate change adaptation is increasingly using participatory processes to address issues of local concern. While some attention has been paid to power relations in this respect, e.g. evaluating international climate regimes or assessing vulnerability as part of integrated impact assessments, little attention has been paid to how a structured assessment of power could facilitate real adaptation and increase the potential for successful participatory processes. This paper surveys how the concept of power is currently being applied in natural resources management and links these ideas to agency and leadership for climate change adaptation. By exploring behavioural research on destructive leadership, a model is developed for informing participatory climate change adaptation. The working paper then concludes with a discussion of developing research questions in two specific areas - examining barriers to adaptation and mapping the evolution of specific participatory processes for climate change adaptation.

Summons to Samuel Street from Thomas Merritt, July 27, 1819

Samuel Street (1775-1844) was a prominent businessman in Niagara. Thomas Merritt (1759-1842) was an army and militia officer who settled with his family in the Niagara district, eventually becoming sheriff. He is the father of William Hamilton Merritt.

Summons to Samuel Street from Thomas Merritt, 27 July 1819

Samuel Street (1775-1844) was a prominent businessman in Niagara. Thomas Merritt (1759-1842) was an army and militia officer who settled with his family in the Niagara district, eventually becoming sheriff. He is the father of William Hamilton Merritt.

University Faculty Members’ Understanding of Their Role: Identity, Power, and Silence

This qualitative study was conducted to explore tenured faculty members’ understandings of their roles as professors. Tenure is an institutional means to enact academic freedom, which allows tenured faculty members to investigate topics of their choosing free from external influence. Academic freedom also enables faculty members to be public intellectuals who shape and critique social policies and make knowledge assertions. In effect, the faculty members are institutionally protected to speak truth to power. Purposeful sampling of 9 participants from 2 universities yielded 3 major themes: professorial identity (shaped by such factors as career stage, university culture, and faculty affiliation), professorial power (powers that participants experienced as well as the ways in which they exercised power), and professorial silencing (as a response to fiscal realities coupled with numerous governance issues). While participants were cognizant of the powers that affected their freedoms, they were less aware of the ways in which their position afforded them powers. Subtle but more potent forms of power were at play for tenured professors, but the participants saw themselves as having to work within institutional and financial constraints that limited their freedom to speak out on controversial issues. Faculty members were, thus, silenced and at times chose to self-silence. The context of the present-day university, governance models, and the financial issues affecting universities and departments worked in concert to silence this critical voice in society.

Caseflow management and the politics of professionalism : lawyers and independent paralegals

Caseflow Management is a public sector program designed to promote effective management of cases through the resolution process in the public court system. Given its public nature caseflow management policy is ultimately an exercise in political will. To date that political will has been dominated by the legal profession which has influenced the Ministry of the Attorney General to limit the term~ of reference for caseflow management and its application to a narrow range of alternatives which are primarily in the interest of the legal profession. This thesis will explain the nature and extent of the politics within the legal profession that impact on caseflow management and demonstrate the potential for better serving the public interest by eXl~anding its terms of reference to incorporate independent paralegals and public / private sector partnerships in the Ontario Provincial Court System for highway traffic offences and other matters of a summary conviction nature.

The effects of simple procedural, cognitive procedural and declarative learning on sleep /

Sleep spindles have been found to increase following an intense period of learning on a combination of motor tasks. It is not clear whether these changes are task specific, or a result of learning in general. The current study investigated changes in sleep spindles and spectral power following learning on cognitive procedural (C-PM), simple procedural (S-PM) or declarative (DM) learning tasks. It was hypothesized that S-PM learning would result in increases in Sigma power during Non-REM sleep, whereas C-PM and DM learning would not affect Sigma power. It was also hypothesized that DM learning would increase Theta power during REM sleep, whereas S-PM and C-PM learning would not affect Theta power. Thirty-six participants spent three consecutive nights in the sleep laboratory. Baseline polysomnographic recordings were collected on night 2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: C-PM, S-PM, DM or control (C). Memory task training occurred on night 3 followed by polysomnographic recording. Re-testing on respective memory tasks occurred one-week following training. EEG was sampled at 256Hz from 16 sites during sleep. Artifact-free EEG from each sleep stage was submitted to power spectral analysis. The C-PM group made significantly fewer errors, the DM group recalled more, and the S-PM improved on performance from test to re-test. There was a significant night by group interaction for the duration of Stage 2 sleep. Independent t-tests revealed that the S-PM group had significantly more Stage 2 sleep on the test night than the C group. The C-PM and the DM group did not differ from controls in the duration of Stage 2 sleep on test night. There was no significant change in the duration of slow wave sleep (SWS) or REM sleep. Sleep spindle density (spindles/minute) increased significantly from baseline to test night following S-PM learning, but not for C-PM, DM or C groups. This is the first study to have shown that the same pattern of results was found for spindles in SWS. Low Sigma power (12-14Hz) increased significantly during SWS following S-PM learning but not for C-PM, DM or C groups. This effect was maximal at Cz, and the largest increase in Sigma power was at Oz. It was also found that Theta power increased significantly during REM sleep following DM learning, but not for S-PM, C-PM or C groups. This effect was maximal at Cz and the largest change in Theta power was observed at Cz. These findings are consistent with the previous research that simple procedural learning is consolidated during Stage 2 sleep, and provide additional data to suggest that sleep spindles across all non-REM stages and not just Stage 2 sleep may be a mechanism for brain plasticity. This study also provides the first evidence to suggest that Theta activity during REM sleep is involved in memory consolidation.