104 resultados para Whistler, James McNeill, 1834-1903.
em Brock University, Canada
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Receipt from James N. Andrews for hand sawfile, whiskey and postage, June 18, 1834.
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The first president of Brock University. Dr. Gibson was President from 1964 - 1973. He played a pivotal role in the formation and launch of Brock University and is often considered the father of Brock University. After his retirement in 1973 Dr. Gibson continued to be involved with Brock and was appointed President Emeritus. He passed away in 2003.
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James Allan speaks at the Tower groundbreaking ceremony.
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Provincial Treasurer, James Allan, speaking at the Tower groundbreaking ceremony.
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Why are there so many disabled characters in James Joyce's Ulysses? "Disabled Legislators" seeks to answer this question by exploring the variety and depth of disability's presence in Joyce's novel. This consideration also recognizes the unique place disability finds within what Lennard Davis calls "the roster of the disenfranchised" in order to define Joyce as possessing a "disability consciousness;" that is, an empathetic understanding (given his own eye troubles) of the damaged lives of the disabled, the stigmatization of the disabled condition, and the appropriation of disabled representations by literary works reinforcing normalcy. The analysis of four characters (Gerty MacDowell, the blind stripling, the onelegged sailor, and Stephen Dedalus) treats disability as a singular self-concept, while still making necessary associations to comparably created marginal identities-predominantly the colonial Other. This effort reevaluates how Ulysses operates in opposition to liberal Victorian paradigms, highlighting disability's connections to issues of gender, intolerance, self-identification and definition.
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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A history of Niagara Falls, including the Programme for the Conference.
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Report year irregular.
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Printed by Order of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario.
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Notes by F. L. Olmsted.
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Originally published in the Federal Republican of Baltimore.
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Cover title.
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The Women's Literary Club of St. Catharines was founded in 1892 by a local author, Emma Harvey (Mrs. J.G.) Currie (1829-1913) and held its last official meeting on February 19, 1994. The Club developed, flourished and eventually waned. After more than one hundred successful years, the last members deposited the Club's archives at Brock University for the benefit of researchers, scholars and the larger community. The ‘object of the Club’ was established as “the promotion of literary pursuits.” The Club was a non-profit social organization composed of predominantly white, upper middle class women from the St. Catharines and surrounding areas. Club meetings were traditionally held fortnightly from March to December each year. The last meeting of the year was a celebration of their Club anniversary. The early meetings of the Club include papers presented and music performed by Club members. The literary pursuits that would dominate the agendas for the entire life of the Club reflected an interest in selected authors, national and local history, classical history, musical performances and current cultural and newsworthy events. For example in 1893 a typical meeting agendas would contain papers on Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Hawaii, Brook Farm, Miss Louisa May Alcott and “Education of Women 100 years Ago.” Within the first year of the Club’s existence, detailed minute books became the norm and an annual agenda or program developed. The WLC collection contains a near complete set of meeting minutes from 1892 until 1995 and a comprehensive collection of yearly programs from 1983-1967 which members took great care to publish each year. Mrs. Currie brought together a group of women with a shared interest in literature and history, who wanted to pursue that interest in a formal and structured manner. She was well educated and influenced at an early age by her tutor and mentor William Kirby, local historian, writer and newspaper editor from Niagara-on-the-Lake. While Currie’s private education influenced her love of literature and history, the Club movement of the 1890’s offered a more public forum for her to share knowledge and learning with other women. Mrs. Currie was the wife of St. Catharines lawyer, James G. Currie, who also served as a Member of Parliament for the county of Lincoln. Mrs. W.H. McClive, who was also married to a St. Catharines lawyer, worked closely with Currie and they began research into the possibility of a literary Club in St. Catharines. Currie corresponded with a variety of literary Clubs across North America before she and Mrs.McClive tagged onto the momentum of the Club movement and published “A Clarion call for Women of St. Catharines To Form a Literary Club” in the local paper The St. Catharines Evening Journal. in 1892 and asked like Clubs to publish the news of their new Club. The early years of the WLC set the foundation of how the Club meetings and events would unfold for the next 80 plus years. Photos and minutes from the first ten years reveal an excitement and interest in organized Club outings. One particular event, an annual pilgrimage to the homestead of Laura Secord, became a yearly celebration for the Club. Club President, Mrs. Currie’s own personal work on Laura Secord amplified the Club’s interest in the ‘heroine of 1812’ and she allocated the profits from her publication on Secord in order to create a commemorative plaque/monument in the name of Laura Secord. The Club celebrated this event with a regular pilgrimage to this site. The connection felt by Club members and this memorial would continue until the Club’s last meetings. The majority of members in the early years were of the upper middle classes in the growing city of St. Catharines. Many of the charter members were the wives of merchants, business men, lawyers, doctors, even a hatter. Furthermore, the position of president was most often held by a woman with a comprehensive list of interests. This is particularly the case in Isabel Brighty McComb (1876-1941). Brighty who became a member in 1903, became Club president in 1932 and stayed in her post until her death in 1941. Similar to Mrs. Currie, Brighty was a local historian and published 2 booklets on local history. Her obituary indicates her position in the community as an author and involved community member committed to lifetime memberships in the Imperial Order of Daughters of Empire, I.O.D.E., the National Organization of Women, N.O.W. and the United Empire Loyalist Society, as well as the WLC. She was a locally known ‘teacher of elocution’ and a devoted researcher of Upper Canadian history. In a Club scrapbook dedicated to her, the biographical sketch illustrates the professionalism surrounding Brighty. There is very little personal history mentioned and the focus is on her literary works, her published essay, booklets and poetry. This professional focus, evident in both her obituary and the scrapbook, illustrate the diversity of these women, especially in their roles outside of the home. The WLC collection contains a vast array of essay, lectures clippings and scrapbooks from past meetings. Organized predominantly by topic or author, the folders and scrapbooks offer a substantial amount of research opportunity in the literary history of Canada. The dates, scope of topics and authors covered offer historians an exciting opportunity to examine the consumption of particular literary trends, artists and topics within the context of a midsized industrial city in English Canada. This is especially important because the agenda adhered to by the Club was bent on promoting, discussing and reviewing predominantly Canadian material. By connecting when and what these women were studying, scholars many gain a better understanding of the broader consumption and appreciation of literary and social trends of Canadian women outside of publishing and institutional records. Furthermore, because the agendas were set by and for these women, outside of the constructs of an institutionalized canon or agenda, they offer a fresh and on the ground examination of literary consumption over an extensive length of time.
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The collection consists of 37 plans, surveys or maps of the City of Niagara Falls beginning in 1846 until 1928. Some of the plans were created for the Falls Company, a group of land speculators that included Buchanan, Murray, Street, Allen, Robinson and others. Other plans relate to the building of the suspension bridge and the railway. Some plans and drawing may refer to estate documents in RG 167 Niagara South estate and legal documents collection. Item 22 has been scanned for preservation purposes.