Subjective Ambivalence and the Expression of Anti-Gay Bias

Univalent attitudes toward gay people have been widely studied, but no research to date has examined ambivalent (i.e., torn, conflicted) attitudes toward gay people. However, the Justification-Suppression Model (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) proposes that ambivalence leads to biased expressions through intrapsychic processes which facilitate biased expression, particularly in contexts presenting strong justifications for expressing prejudice and weak pressures to suppress prejudice. I test these implications in the context of bias toward gay people. In Study 1, the measurement of ambivalence is examined in terms of both subjective ambivalence (i.e., the reported experience of “torn” attitudes) and calculated ambivalence (i.e., mathematical conflict between positive and negative attitude components). I find that higher subjective ambivalence is only associated with more negative attitudes toward gay people (and not positive attitudes toward gay people), and that higher subjective ambivalence predicts less gay rights support even after taking negative and positive attitudes toward gay people into account. Further, higher subjective ambivalence is associated with ideological opposition to gay people and more negative intergroup emotions (e.g., intergroup disgust). These findings suggest it is valuable to examine the unique component of subjective ambivalence separate from univalent negativity. Because calculated ambivalence measures are mathematically dependent upon a univalent negative measure, they cannot be examined separately from negativity. Therefore, subjective ambivalence is the focus of Study 2. The main goals of Study 2 were to determine why and when subjective ambivalence is related to bias. I examined the extent to which the negative relation between subjective ambivalence and opposition to anti-gay bullying can be accounted for by lower intergroup empathy and lower collective guilt, which may facilitate the expression of bias in keeping with the JSM. The relation between subjective ambivalence and anti-gay bullying opposition was examined within four social contexts based on a 2 (high vs. low offensiveness) x 2 (normatively unjustified vs. normatively justified) manipulation. I expected that higher subjective ambivalence would be most strongly related to lower intergroup empathy and collective guilt when there are the strongest justifications for bias expression, and that lower intergroup empathy and collective guilt would lead to less opposition to anti-gay bullying. Higher subjective ambivalence predicted less anti-gay bullying opposition. After accounting for positivity and negativity, the direct effect of subjective ambivalence was no longer significant, yet subjective ambivalence uniquely predicted intergroup empathy, which in turn predicted less anti-gay bullying opposition. These findings provide evidence that subjective ambivalence is largely negative in nature, but also presents evidence for a unique component of subjective ambivalence (separate from univalent attitudes) associated with low intergroup empathy and negativity. In contrast to previous research, I found very little evidence for the context-dependency of subjective ambivalence. Further research on subjective ambivalence, including subjective ambivalence toward other social groups, may expand our understanding of the factors leading to biased expressions.

Individual Differences in Global/Local Processing Bias and the Attentional Blink

When the second of two targets (T2) is presented temporally close to the first target (T1) in rapid serial visual presentation, accuracy to detect/identify T2 is markedly reduced as compared to longer target separations. This is known as the attentional blink (AB), and is thought to reflect a limitation of selective attention. While most individuals show an AB, research has demonstrated that individuals are variously susceptible to this effect. To explain these differences, Dale and Arnell (2010) examined whether dispositional differences in attentional breadth, as measured by the Navon letter task, could predict individual AB magnitude. They found that individuals who showed a natural bias toward the broad, global level of Navon letter stimuli were less susceptible to the AB as compared to individuals who showed a natural bias toward the detailed, local aspects of Navon letter stimuli. This suggests that individuals who naturally broaden their attention can overcome the AB. However, it was unclear how stable these individual differences were over time, and whether a variety of global/local tasks could predict AB performance. As such, the purpose of this dissertation was to investigate, through four empirical studies, the nature of individual differences in both global/local bias and the AB, and how these differences in attentional breadth can modulate AB performance. Study 1 was designed to examine the stability of dispositional global/local biases over time, as well as the relationships among three different global/local processing measures. Study 2 examined the stability of individual differences in the AB, as well as the relationship among two distinct AB tasks. Study 3 examined whether the three distinct global/local tasks used in Study 1 could predict performance on the two AB tasks from Study 2. Finally, Study 4 explored whether individual differences in global/local bias could be manipulated by exposing participants to high/low spatial frequencies and Navon stimuli. In Study 1, I showed that dispositional differences in global/local bias were reliable over a period of at least a week, demonstrating that these individual biases may be trait-like. However, the three tasks that purportedly measure global/local bias were unrelated to each other, suggesting that they measure unique aspects of global/local processing. In Study 2, I found that individual variation in AB performance was also reliable over a period of at least a week, and that the two AB task versions were correlated. Study 3 showed that dispositional global/local biases, as measured by the three tasks from Study 1, predicted AB magnitude, such that individuals who were naturally globally biased had smaller ABs. Finally, in Study 4 I demonstrated that these dispositional global/local biases are resistant to both spatial frequency and Navon letter manipulations, indicating that these differences are robust and intractable. Overall, the results of the four studies in this dissertation help clarify the role of individual differences in attentional breadth in selective attention.