Kierkegaard : the temporality of becoming a self

Introduction In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze compares and contrasts Kierkegaard's and Nietzsche's ideas of repetition. He argues that neither of them really give a representation of repetition. Repetition for them is a sort of selective task: the way in which they determine what is ethical and eternal. With Nietzsche, it is a theater of un belie f. ..... Nietzsche's leading idea is to found the repetition in the etemal return at once on the death of God and the dissolution of the self But it is a quite different alliance in the theater of faith: Kierkegaard dreams of alliance between a God and a self rediscovered. I Repetition plays a theatrical role in their thinking. It allows them to dramatically stage the interplay of various personnae. Deleuze does give a positive account ofKierkegaard's "repetition"; however, he does not think that Kierkegaard works out a philosophical model, or a representation of what repetition is. It is true that in the book Repetition, Constantin Constantius does not clearly and fully work out the concept of repetition, but in Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard gives a full explanation of the self and its temporality which can be connected with repetition. When Sickness Unto Death is interpreted according to key passages from Repetition and The Concept of Anxiety, a clear philosophical concept of repetition can be established. In my opinion, Kierkegaard's philosophy is about the task of becoming a self, and I will be attempting to show that he does have a model of the temporality of self-becoming. In Sickness Unto Death, Kierkegaard explains his notions of despair with reference to sin, self, self-becoming, faith, and repetition. Despair is a sickness of the spirit, of the self, and accordingly can take three forms: in despair not to be conscious of having a self (not despair in the strict sense); in despair not to will to be oneself; in despair to will to be oneself2 In relation to this definition, he defines a self as "a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself relates to another.''3 Thus, a person is a threefold relationship, and any break in that relationship is despair. Despair takes three forms corresponding to the three aspects of a self s relation to itself Kierkegaard says that a selfis like a house with a basement, a first floor, and a second floor.4 This model of the house, and the concept of the stages on life's way that it illustrates, is central to Kierkegaard's philosophy. This thesis will show how he unpacks this model in many of his writings with different concepts being developed in different texts. His method is to work with the same model in different ways throughout his authorship. He assigns many of the texts to different pseudonyms, but in this thesis we will treat the model and the related concepts as being Kierkegaard's and not only the pseudonyms. This is justified as our thesis will show this modelremains the same throughout Kierkegaard's work, though it is treated in different ways by different pseudonyms. According to Kierkegaard, many people live in only the basement for their entire lives, that is, as aesthetes ("in despair not to be conscious of having a self'). They live in despair of not being conscious of having a self They live in a merely horizontal relation. They want to get what they desire. When they go to the first floor, so to speak, they reflect on themselves and only then do they begin to get a self In this stage, one acquires an ideology of the required and overcomes the strict commands of the desired. The ethical is primarily an obedience to the required whereas the aesthetic is an obedience to desire. In his work Fear and Trembling (Copenhagen: 1843), Johannes de Silentio makes several observations concerning this point. In this book, the author several times allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics. This is accomplished in such a way that the religious ideality breaks forth in the dialectical leap and in the positive mood - "Behold all things have become new" as well as in the negative mood that is the passion of the absurd to which the concept "repetition" corresponds.s Here one begins to become responsible because one seeks the required ideality; however, the required ideality and the desired ideality become inadequate to the ethical individual. Neither of them satisfy him ("in despair not to will to be oneself'). Then he moves up to the second floor: that is, the mystical region, or the sphere of religiousness (A) ("despair to will to be oneself). Kiericegaard's model of a house, which is connected with the above definition ofdespair, shows us how the self arises through these various stages, and shows the stages of despair as well. On the second floor, we become mystics, or Knights of Infinite Resignation. We are still in despair because we despair ofthe basement and the first floor, however, we can be fiill, free persons only ifwe live on all the floors at the same time. This is a sort of paradoxical fourth stage consisting of all three floors; this is the sphere of true religiousness (religiousness (B)). It is distinguished from religiousness (A) because we can go back and live on all the floors. It is not that there are four floors, but in the fourth stage, we live paradoxically on three at once. Kierkegaard uses this house analogy in order to explain how we become a self through these stages, and to show the various stages of despair. Consequently, I will be explaining self-becoming in relation to despair. It will also be necessary to explain it in relation to faith, for faith is precisely the overcoming of despair. After explaining the becoming of the self in relation to despair and faith, I will then explain its temporality and thereby its repetition. What Kierkegaard calls a formula, Deleuze calls a representation. Unfortunately, Deleuze does not acknowledge Kierkegaard's formula for repetition. As we shall see, Kierkegaard clearly gives a formula for despair, faith, and selfbecoming. When viewed properly, these formulae yield a formula for repetition because when one hasfaith, the basement, firstfloor, and secondfloor become new as one becomes oneself The self is not bound in the eternity ofthe first floor (ethical) or the temporality of the basement (aesthete). I shall now examine the two forms of conscious despair in such a way as to point out also a rise in the consciousness of the nature of despair and in the consciousness that one's state is despair, or, what amounts to the same thing and is the salient point, a rise in the consciousness of the self The opposite to being in despair is to have faith. Therefore, the formula set forth above, which describes a state in which there is not despair at all, is entirely correct, and this formula is also the formula for faMi in ^elating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

"I might be a duck, but I'm human" : an analysis of clothing in Disney cartoons

Mickey Mouse, one of the world's most recognizable cartoon characters, did not wear a shirt in his earliest incarnation in theatrical shorts and, for many years, Donald Duck did not wear pants and still rarely does so. Especially when one considers the era in which these figures were first created by the Walt Disney Studio, in the 1920s and 1930s, why are they portrayed without full clothing? The obvious answer, of course, is that they are animals, and animals do not wear clothes. But these are no ordinary animals: in most cases, they do wear clothing - some clothing, at least - and they walk on two legs, talk in a more or less intelligible fashion, and display a number of other anthropomorphic traits. If they are essentially animals, why do they wear clothing at all? On the other hand, if these characters are more human than animal, as suggested by other behavioral traits - they walk, talk, work, read, and so on - why are they not more often fully clothed? To answer these questions I undertook three major research strategies used to gather evidence: interpretive textual analysis of 321 cartoons; secondary analysis of interviews conducted with the animators who created the Disney characters; and historical and archival research on the Disney Company and on the times and context in which it functioned. I was able to identify five themes that played a large part in what kind of clothing a character wore; first, the character's gender and/or sexuality; second, what species or "race" the character was; third, the character's socio-economic status; fourth, the degree to which the character was anthropomorphized; and, fifth, the context in which the character and its clothing appeared in a particular scene or narrative. I concluded that all of these factors played a part in determining, to some extent, the clothing worn by particular characters at particular times. However, certain patterns emerged from the analysis that could not be explained by these factors alone or in combination. Therefore, my analysis also investigates the individual and collective attitudes and desires of the men in the Disney studio who were responsible for creating these characters and the cultural conditions under which they were created. Drawing on literature from the psychoanalytic approach to film studies, I argue that the clothing choices spoke to an idealized fantasy world to which the animators (most importantly, Walt Disney himself), and possibly wider society, wanted to return.

Christopher Newton Collection, 1955-1998 (non-inclusive)

Christopher Newton was born in England in June of 1936. He received his education at Sir Roger Manwood’s School in Kent, the University of Leeds, Purdue University in Indiana and the University of Illinois where he received his M.A. He founded Theatre Calgary in 1968 and was the artistic director there until 1971. He was appointed as the artistic director of the Vancouver Playhouse where he established the Playhouse Acting School with Powys Thomas. Mr. Newton has also performed and directed at Stratford Festivals and on Broadway. He became the artistic director at Shaw Festival in Niagara-on-the-Lake in 1979 and remained there for 23 seasons until 2002. Mr. Newton has many television, radio and film credits to his name as well as having written many stage plays. Mr. Newton has received honorary degrees from Brock University (1986), the University of Guelph (1989), Wilfrid Laurier University (1997) and Buffalo State University. He was made an Honorary Fellow at the Royal Conservatory of Music of Toronto (1993) and of Ryerson Polytechnic University (1995). He has won the Governor General’s performing arts award (2000), the Molson Prize and the Thomas DeGaetani Award from the United States Institute for Theatre Technology. In 1996 he was made an Honorary Life Member of the Association for Canadian Theatre Research and in the same year he received the M. Joan Chalmers Award for Artistic Direction. In 1995, he was made a Member of the Order of Canada and he won a Governor General's Performing Arts Award in 2000. Christopher Newton is currently the Artistic Director Emeritus at the Shaw Festival. Sources: http://www.shawfest.com/the-ensemble/christopher-newton/ http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/articles/christopher-newton