Interactions of diploid embryonal carcinoma cells and normal cell mass cells with 2.5 day mouse embryos following aggregation

Spontaneous teratocarcinomas are ovarian or testicular tumors which have their origins in germ cells. The tumors contain a disorganized array of benign differentiated cells as well as an undifferentiated population of malignant stem cells, the embryonal carcinoma or EC cells. These pluripotent stem cells in tissue culture share many properties with the transient pluripotent cells of the early embryo, and might therefore serve as models for the investigation of developmental events ill vitro. The property of EC cells of prime interest in this study is an in vivo phenomenon. Certain EC cell lines are known to be regulated ill vivo and to differentiate normally in association with normal embryonic cells, resulting in chimeric mice. These mice have two genetically distinct cell populations, one of which is derived from the originally malignant EC cells. This has usually been accomplished by injection of the EC cells into the Day 3 blastocyst. In this study, the interactions between earlier stage embryos and EC cells have been tested by aggregating clumps of EC cells with Day 2 embryos. The few previous aggregation studies produced a high degree of abnormality in chimeric embryos, but the EC cells employed had known chromosomal abnormalities. In this study, two diploid EC cell lines (P19 and Pi0) were aggregated with 2.5 day mouse embryos, and were found to behave quite differently in the embryonic environment. P19 containing aggregates generally resorbed early, and the few embryos recovered at midgestation were normal and non-chimeric. Pi0 containing aggregates survived in high numbers to midgestation, and the Pi0 cells were very successful in colonizing the embryo. All these embryos were chimeric, and the contribution by the EC cells to each chimera was very high. However, these heavily chimeric embryos were all abnormal. Blastocyst injection had previously produced some abnormal embryos with high Pl0 contributions in addition to the live born mice, which had lower EC contributions. This study now adds more support to the hypothesis that high EC contributions may be incompatible with normal development. The possibility that the abnormalities were due to the mixing of temporally asynchronous embryonic cell types in the aggregates was tested by aggregating normal pluripotent cells taken from 3.5 day embryos with 2.5 day embryos. Early embryo loss was very high, and histological studies showed that the majority of these embryos died by 6.5 days development. Some embryos escaped this early death such that some healthy chimeras were recovered, in contrast to recovery of abnormal chimeric embryos following Pl0-morula aggregations, and non-chimeric embryos following P19-morula aggregations. This somewhat surprising adverse effect on development following aggregation of normal cell types suggests that there are developmental difficulties associated with the mixing of asynchronous cell types in aggregates. However, the greater magnitude of the adverse effects when the aggregates contained tumor derived cells suggests that EC cells should not be considered the complete equivalent of the pluripotent cells of the early embryo.

A comparative study of protoheme and heme d catalases : role of the heme and the heme pocket in catalysis and ligand binding

Catalase dismutes H20 2 to O2 and H20. In successive twoelectron reactions H20 2 induces both oxidation and reduction at the heme group. In the first step the protoheme prosthetic group of beef liver catalase forms compound I, in which the heme has been oxidized from Fe3+ to Fe4+=0 and a porphyrin radical has been created. Compound II is formed by the oneelectron reduction of comp I. It retains Fe4+=0 but lacks the porphyrin radical and is catalytically inert. Molecular structures are available for Escherichia coli Hydroperoxidase II, Micrococcus Iysodeiktus, Penicillium vitale and beef liver enzymes, which contain different hemes and heme pockets. In the present work, the pockets and substrate access channels of protoheme (beef liver & Micrococcus) and heme d (HPII of E. coli and Penicillium) catalases have been analysed using Quanta™ and CharmMTM molecular modeling packages on the Silicon Graphics Iris Indigo 2 computer. Experimental studies have been carried out with two catalases, HPII (and its mutants) and beef liver. Fluoride and formate' are inhibitors of both enzymes, and their binding is modulated by the heme and by distal residues N201 & H128. Both HPII and beef liver enzymes form compound I with H202 or peracetate. The reduction of beef liver enzyme compound I to II and the decay of compound II are accelerated by fluoride. The decay of compound II is also accelerated by formate, and this reagent acts as a 2-electron donor towards compound I of both enzymes. It is concluded that heme d enzymes (Penicillium and HPII of E. coli) are formed by autocatalytic transformation of protoheme in a modified pocket which contains a characteristic serine residue as well as a partially occluded heme channel. They are less active than protoheme enzymes but also do not form the inactive compound II species. Binding of peroxide as well as fluoride and formate is prevented by mutation of H128 and modulated by mutation of N201.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Sport Commitment in Wheelchair Basketball: An Interpretive Look into the Lives of Individuals with Physical Disabilities

It is estimated that over 4.4 million people are living in Canada with a reported disability. Due to a number of risk factors associated with potential health concerns and sedentary lifestyles, it is important for people with physical disabilities to lead an active lifestyle. Recreation and leisure pursuits are a great outlet for this to take place. However, in order to gain the long terms benefits of these pursuits one must be committed to an activity. With the use of a collaborative interview method, with the Sport Commitment Model serving as the guiding framework, this study sought to find the underlying factors for continued participation for people with physical disabilities in wheelchair basketball. Through utilizing an interpretive approach it was found that enjoyment, social support, perceived ability and to some extent involvement opportunities, were the main contributors to overall commitment. Criticisms and suggestions for future research are also provided.

Battlefield House flyer, n.d.

Battlefield House was originally the home of Mary Gage, a widow who arrived in Canada with 2 children after her husband was killed in action in the American Revolution in 1777. The original house was a log cabin which was replaced by a storey and a half frame house. Col. Nelson was the next owner of the house, and in the middle of the 19th century he raised the roof to make it a 2 storey house and added a large west wing. Successive owners: the Glover, Williams and Fisher families made a few changes to the house. The last owner was D.A. Fletcher who tore down the newer, western half of the building in 1895. In 1899, Mrs. John Calder, a granddaughter of James Gage formed the Women’s Wentworth Historical Society and raised enough money to buy the Gage Farmhouse and the land around it on which the Battle of Stoney Creek was fought. In 1910 this group purchased another 13 acres of the original Crown Grant and made 17 ½ acres of parkland open to the public. The women of the Society renovated and furnished the house. They maintained the building for 63 years. It was due to them that a monument was erected above the house by the Dominion Government. The monument was unveiled on the 100th anniversary of the Battle, June 6, 1913. The house was turned over by the Historical Society to The Niagara Parks Commission on January 19th, 1962. Source: Battlefield House Flyer, information provided by Mrs. E.B. Thompson, past president of the Women’s Wentworth Historical Society.

How health organizations can apply scenario based planning and analytic technologies to make strategic consequential decisions in a time of uncertainty

The magnitude of the cervical cancer problem, coupled with the potential for prevention with recent technological advances, made it imperative to step back and reassess strategic options for dealing with cervical cancer screening in Kenya. The purpose of this qualitative study was: 1) to explore the extent to which the Participatory Action Research (PAR) methodology and the Scenario Based Planning (SBP) method, with the application of analytics, could enable strategic, consequential, informed decision making, and 2) to determine how influential Kenyan decision makers could apply SBP with analytic tools and techniques to make strategic, consequential decisions regarding the implementation of a Cervical Self Sampling Program (CSSP) in both urban and rural settings. The theoretical paradigm for this study was action research; it was experiential, practical, and action oriented, and resulted in co-created knowledge that influenced study participants’ decision making. Action Africa Help International (AAHI) and Brock University collaborated with Local Decision Influencing Participants (LDIP’s) to develop innovative strategies on how to implement the CSSP. SBP tools, along with traditional approaches to data collection and analysis, were applied to collect, visualize and analyze predominately qualitative data. Outputs from the study included: a) a generic implementation scenario for a CSSP (along with scenarios unique to urban and rural settings), and b) 10 strategic directions and 22 supporting implementation strategies that address the variables of: 1) technical viability, 2) political support, 3) affordability, 4) logistical feasibility, 5) social acceptability, and 6) transformation/sustainability. In addition, study participants’ capacity to effectively engage in predictive/prescriptive strategic decision making was strengthened.